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Abstract  
 
 
With the rise of the new social movements and increasing number of protests over service 
delivery in South Africa’s poorest townships, many activists have started to question 
whether unions are able to relate to the demands of the unorganised and poor. It is argued 
that under the new democracy COSATU has become bureaucratic and is too closely 
aligned to the ANC to challenge government policies and play a transformative role in 
society. Such concerns are not entirely new. Labour historians and industrial sociologists 
have long debated the political potential and democratic character of trade unions and 
there is a vast literature documenting the organisational styles of unions in South Africa 
today and in the past. Based on examination of union archival records and interviews 
with key informants, this study traces the emergence of the ‘workers control’ tradition in 
South African trade unions. ‘Workers control’ is a unique approach based on non-racial, 
industrial trade unions, which are democratically organised on the factory floor. Such 
unions, which are ideally controlled by elected worker representatives at all levels and 
united nationally on the basis of sharing common policies and resources, create the basis 
for an autonomous movement that promotes the interest of workers.    
 
Although most closely associated with FOSATU (1979-1985), this study found that 
workers control had deeper historical roots. Workers control was a product of the 
ideological and organisational renewal that characterised the 1970s and was initially 
created by the Trade Union Advisory Coordinating Committee (TUACC) in Natal and, 
later, the Witwatersrand. TUACC, which included significant numbers of women 
employed as semi-skilled production workers and unskilled migrant men, reflected 
complex shifts in the labour market and the economy. It was in this context that ordinary 
union members together with a diverse layer of activists developed TUACC’s unique 
approach to organisation. The power of white university trained activists in determining 
union policies has been overestimated and worker leaders, particularly more educated 
women workers, played an important role in building TUACC unions. Based on a 
Gramscian analysis, TUACC maintained that democratic unions based on strong shop 
floor organisation could exploit loop holes in the law and participate in industrial 
structures without undermining union autonomy and democracy. TUACC, however, was 
less clear of how to relate to political movements and parties. TUACC distanced itself 
officially from the banned ANC to avoid repression, but some workers and unionists 
looked to homeland and traditional leaders for alliances. This tension between the 
creation of a democratic trade union culture and the workers’ support of more autocratic 
political and traditional leaders and populist movements was never resolved.      
 
All of TUACC’s affiliates were founder members of COSATU and this study gives us 
some insight into the traditions that inform COSATU’s responses to social movements, 
political parties and the state today. Drawing on the insights of the Anracho-syndicalism, 
this study also highlights some of the dangers of separating the economic and political 
activities of workers into unions and political parties respectively.   
 1 
Introduction 
 
The Origins of ‘Workers’ Control’    
Since its formation in 1979, the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) 
has attracted much controversy. Shaped by what has become known as the ‘workerist-
populist’ debate, this controversy is mostly driven by various interpretations of the 
federation’s political agenda or lack thereof. This study originally aimed to contribute to 
this debate by investigating the political tenets of FOSATU and analysing the 
federation’s policies and activities.  
 
FOSATU’s political position, however, cannot be understood in isolation and forms part 
of the federation’s unique approach to trade union organisation. This approach, referred 
to as ‘workers control’, promoted non-racialism, industrial unionism, and a distinct form 
of direct democracy. For FOSATU, workers could only gain meaningful control over 
society if they created their own democratic organisations that were independent of non-
working class political alliances and were placed under their own command. Democratic 
trade union organisation was based on building solid structures at the workplace- the 
point of production where workers have the most power and authority. It was also at the 
workplace that rank and file members, from different factory departments, elected 
representatives, who were given clear mandates and held accountable through regular 
report back meetings.1 The control of workers was further entrenched by developing 
worker representatives into a layer of confident and capable worker leaders and creating 
structures that allowed these worker leaders to participate from a position of strength and 
dominate decision-making at all levels. 2 FOSATU also sought to unite organised workers 
into a ‘tight’ national structure. This meant that union affiliates, which organised on a 
national basis in strategic industries, agreed to share resources and develop policies 
jointly.  
  
These organisational principles were designed to steer day-to-day struggles at the 
workplace as well as provide the federation with a broader political direction. FOSATU’s 
understanding of the state centred on the notion that class determined the way in which 
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power operated in society and that political issues essentially revolved around the class 
struggle and the fight against capitalism. Drawing on the ideas of Antonio Gramsci, the 
federation saw the apartheid state as a repressive instrument of domination and control 
that was located within a contradictory nexus of social relations and shaped by the 
balance of class forces.3 Consequently, the federation maintained that workers could 
exploit the contradictions inherent in government reforms and use legal openings to their 
advantage if their organisations were strong, democratic and resisted measures that 
undermined their goals. FOSATU, therefore, challenged the argument made by the exiled 
South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) that it was impossible to build an 
effective non-racial trade union movement under apartheid.       
     
This emphasis on the development of strong and democratic working class organisation 
that championed the interests of workers by focusing on the class struggle underpinned 
the federation’s understanding of political action. The political position of the federation 
was articulated in the lecture delivered by the historian and labour activist Philip Bonner 
at the founding congress in which he raised concerns about previous trade union 
movements.4 He criticised the Industrial Commercial Union (ICU) for failing to develop 
strong factory floor organisation and including all sorts of other classes (professionals, 
chiefs and businessmen). Consequently, Bonner argue d, the union became dominated by 
professionals and their interests (such as fighting for the abolition of passes for suitably 
qualified Africans) and ‘far from being a workers organisation the ICU turned itself into a 
populist movement, without the capacity for improving workers conditions…’.5 Bonner 
made similar criticisms of SACTU. Barring the older established registered unions, he 
argued that most SACTU affiliates aimed to recruit as many workers as possible and not 
only neglected strategic industries, but also resorted to general unionism and failed to 
develop sound organisational structures. In addition, the particular way in which SACTU 
unions became involved in political issues led to the subordination of unions to ‘their 
ANC masters’ and diverted their energies away from factory organisation into political 
campaigns.       
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Bonner, however, noted that SACTU organised during a period of heightened political 
militancy and did not condemn the federation from taking up political issues. Rather, he 
maintained that:6  
 
Workers obviously have political interests, but these are best catered for by 
workers organisations. What they should not allow is to let themselves be 
controlled by non-worker political parties…or they will find their interests 
disregarded and their organisation and power gradually cut away.  
 
FOSATU’s position on the national liberation struggle and the workers movement was 
further elaborated in Joe Fosters’ speech ‘The Workers’ Struggle - where does FOSATU 
stand?’ delivered at the 1982 congress. While acknowledging the importance of popular 
struggles against national oppression, Foster drew on the experiences of other post-
colonial African countries, pointing out that popular movements that were based on 
cross-class alliances focused on fighting illegitimate regimes. These movements did not 
necessarily confront capitalism and, once they came to power, often implemented 
measures that were not in the interests of workers.  
 
Joe Foster explained:7 
All the great and successful popular movements have had as their aim the 
overthrow of oppressive- most often colonial- regimes. But these movements 
cannot and have not in themselves been able to deal with the particular and 
fundamental problems of workers….it is, therefore essential that workers must 
strive to build their own powerful and effective organisation even whilst they are 
part of the wider popular struggle. This organisation is necessary to protect and 
further worker interests and to ensure that the popular movement is not hijacked 
by elements who will in the end have no option but to turn against their worker 
supporters.      
 
Referring to SACTU in the 1950s and early 1960s, Foster argued that in the past 
progressive trade unions were too small and weak to pose a sustained challenge to 
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capitalism and concentrated on the wider national liberation struggle, giving popular 
movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) and the Congress alliance a 
workers’ voice. By the early 1980s, however, factors such as the growth and 
concentration of a more educated and skilled working class in the factories and urban 
centres created favourable conditions for workers to build their own organisations in 
order to counter the growing power of capital and to protect and promote the interests of 
workers in society.  FOSATU did not constitute the workers movement, but aimed to 
give ‘leadership and direction’ and provide an organisational base for workers by creating 
a strong working class identity and developing the necessary confidence and political 
presence for worker organisations. Once again, the federation broke with SACTU, which 
was strongly influenced by the South African Communist Party (SACP) that accepted the 
Soviet model of socialism, and Foster’s speech confirmed a commitment to more 
democratic forms of socialism and the federation aimed to ‘build a just and fair society 
controlled by workers.’8 The actual composition of the workers’ movement – whether or 
not it would include a worker party - and its exact relationship to the national liberation 
movement was not clarified and remained contentious.  
 
Workers’ control represented the emergence of a unique organisational tradition within 
South Africa that not only differed from the ‘political unionism’ of SACTU, but also 
contrasted with populist unions, which had weak structures and were dominated by a few 
charismatic leaders, as well as bureaucratic African unions, which focused on work place 
issues and were controlled by officials. Preliminary investigations revealed, however, that 
much of the workers’ control tradition was already in place by the time FOSATU was 
formed. This raised an important question – how did this novel style of trade union 
organisatio n come into being? The attention of this study shifted to the 1970s, which 
denotes a period of organisational and ideological rejuvenation and the re-birth of trade 
unionism amongst African workers. A variety of different tendencies can be found in the 
‘emerging’ trade union movement and this study argues that the workers’ control 
tradition originated with the organisations and unions associated with the Trade Union 
Advisory Coordinating Council (TUACC) in Natal and the old Transvaal. Consequently, 
TUACC, as opposed to FOSATU, became the central focus of this study.  
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Most of the key studies on the history of emerging unions fall within the old school of 
labour history and mainly investigate organisational structures, strikes, and leadership. It 
is within this context that debates around the new generation of white unionists, who 
were instrumental in the establishment of the new non-racial trade unions, have come to 
dominate the literature. 9 There are, however, studies that break this mould and examine 
the culture and consciousness of organised workers. These include David Hemson’s 
study of the 1969 Durban dockworkers’ strike and Aristides Sitas’ study of metal workers 
on the East Rand in the early 1980s.10 Sakhela Buhlungu’s work straddles these concerns 
and while he remains concerned with white unionists and contributes a great deal to 
recent discussions on their role, his study of leadership and democracy in post-1973 trade 
unions highlights the role that the ‘lived experiences’ of workers played in shaping trade 
union traditions.11  
  
This study does not provide a detailed social history of TUACC, but draws on the 
insights of these authors by arguing that while the major role of trade union leaders 
should not be minimised, it is important to consider the ways in which the working class 
members of TUACC contributed to the creation of the workers’ control tradition. The 
membership composition of TUACC affiliates proves particularly salient in this regard. 
One of the key contributions made by Hemson and Sitas is that they highlight the 
prominent role that migrants played in revival of trade unions during the 1970s. A similar 
membership trend can be seen in TUACC more generally where male migrants 
constituted a significant proportion of union membership. Sitas also draws our attention 
to women workers by noting that the first urban-based workers to join the Metal Allied 
Workers Union (MAWU) on the East Rand were African women. The large numbers of 
African women (both migrant and urban-based) in TUACC- who had only recently been 
employed in the manufacturing industry (particularly in textiles) in unprecedented 
numbers as semi-skilled production workers- should also be taken into account. By 
examining the membership of TUACC it becomes evident that the merging unions were 
not simply a reflection of the growing presence and bargaining power of African semi-
skilled production workers in industry, but represented the organisational and ideological 
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responses of the African working class to complex shifts taking place in the economy and 
labour market. 
      
The character of TUACC’s members- their level of skill and education, access to urban 
rights, and connections to the countryside- established organisational parameters that not 
only impacted on trade union structures and leadership, but also influenced the political 
positions adopted by the organisation.  Although the transformative role of trade unions 
remains a key concern in South African labour studies, the political culture of organised 
workers has been conceptualised in narrow terms. This is largely due to the influence of 
Marxism and the difficulty scholars have with understanding migrants, who have not 
been fully proletarianised, as progressive agents of change.12 In addition, many scholars 
accept that trade unions can only be truly political if they are aligned to social movements 
or political parties and tend to characterise the emerging unions as economistic. This 
study, however, draws on an Anarcho-Syndicalist paradigm, which offers a broader 
definition of the working class that does not necessarily have an urban bias and maintains 
that trade unions can and do collapse the political and economic struggles of workers. It 
should be stressed that this study does not argue that TUACC or FOSATU were 
Syndicalist, but rather draws on the additional tools provided by Syndicalism to analyse 
the political dynamics within TUACC.  
 
The organisational strategies and policies adopted by TUACC unions shifted over time 
and the formation of the workers’ control tradition was determined by the day-to-day 
realities of workers as well as a range of objective and subjective conditions. It is within 
this context that two key arguments are examined. Firstly, this study questions the notion 
that connections with past traditions of resistance were totally severed during the nadir of 
African unionism in the second half of the 1960s. Even though the TUACC included 
large numbers of workers that were not previously schooled in trade unionism, workers 
relied a great deal on their past political and industrial experiences. Buhlungu argues that 
migrants drew on their experiences of participating in traditional political structures 
(imbizo and lekgotla), while Hemson highlights the profoundly democratic traditions of 
resistance that were developed by migrants at their workplaces. The interplay between 
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traditional or populist political cultures on the one hand and the entrenchment of a 
democratic workplace culture under TUACC, on the other, is of particular interest and it 
is within this context that TUACC’s alliance with KwaZulu homeland officials needs to 
be examined. Secondly, this study seeks to add to the debates on trade union leadership 
and maintains that not enough attention has been accorded to the union leaders who 
emerged from ranks of the working class. 
     
Chapter Outline  
Chapter 1 reviews the literature on the emerging unions and explores the debates and 
theories that have informed the literature. Many of the scholars of the emerging unions 
were connected to the union movement in some way and their approaches shed light on 
the ideologies that shaped union organisation. Nevertheless, this chapter argues that we 
need to move beyond these debates and investigate the culture and consciousness of the 
rank and file to gain a more nuanced understanding of the factors that gave rise to the 
workers’ control tradition under TUACC. Chapter 2 discusses the methodologies that 
were utilised by this study and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of oral testimony as 
well as the archival documents that were consulted.     
 
In Chapter 3 it is argued that the union movement in Natal did not emerge in a vacuum 
and the factors that gave rise to and shaped the development of the new unions in Natal 
are considered. Emphasis is placed on the complex ways in which the  boom and bust in 
the urban economy, the steady decline of the rural subsistence economy, and the 
regulations designed to control and regulate African workers created conditions that 
encouraged particularly migrant and female workers to mobilise and organise in the early 
1970s. Attention is also given to the way in which the legacy of past union movements 
and the re-emergence of political and industrial resistance in the province during the late 
1960s shaped the new movement. Chapter 4 traces the early emergence of the workers 
movement with the formation of the General Factory Workers Benefit Fund (GFWBF) 
and the 1973 strike wave that gave rise to the first new unions (the National Union of 
Textile Workers (NUTW) and MAWU). This chapter suggests that the workers’ control 
tradition took root at this time and the early organisational forms, policies and strategies 
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that were adopted by the new unions are considered. Special attention is given to the role 
of migrants and female textile workers, the nature of work ing class resistance and 
organisation, and the rise and of worker leaders.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the consolidation and advancement of the workers’ control tradition 
under TUACC and the various obstacles hampered the creation and growth of non-racial, 
democratic, industrial unions. These consist of the economic downturn; hostility from 
employers and the widespread victimisation of unionists; state repression and harassment; 
the negative perceptions of unions amongst workers; divisions among workers on the 
shop floor and the failure of strategic alliances. Internal organisational weaknesses- 
particularly the difficulties associated with the development of a solid layer of worker 
leaders- are also perused. This chapter maintains that the TUACC and the open unions 
responded to these challenges by refining their organisational practices and strategies. 
TUACC’s expansion in the Transvaal and the development of national unions are two of 
the themes investigated in Chapter 6. Responses to the 1976 student uprising are 
discussed and this chapter contends that as the open unions started to recover from 1977 
onwards, unionists paid increasing attention to the development of tactics that would 
enhance in-depth workplace organisation and rank and file participation. Chapter 7 looks 
at the political and trade union alliances that TUACC developed in the late 1970s. 
TUACC’s responses to Inkatha’s overtures and the move towards a policy of political 
independence as well as the unity talks that led to the formation of FOSATU are 
examined. Chapter 7 maintains that the close links between TUACC and the 
NUMARWOSA/ UAW and their joint submission the Wiehahn Commission laid the 
basis for the new federation’s position on registration.  
 
A Note on Terminology  
Many scholars refer to the unions that emerged to the 1970s as the ‘independent’ trade 
unions. As Johann Maree has already pointed out, the meaning of the term has altered 
over time.13 Coined in 1977 by the South African Labour Bulletin, ‘independent’ trade 
unions were contrasted to African parallels affiliated to the Trade Union Council of South 
Africa (TUCSA) and referred to unions that organised African workers and govern their 
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own affairs. According to Maree, the term soon shifted to include all unions that were 
perceived to be autonomous from employers and the state. By the early 1980s, the term 
had changed its meaning again and was used to refer to those unions that rejected 
alliances with political parties.  
 
It is due to the loaded meaning of this term that scholars have adopted other terms such as 
the ‘emerging trade unions’,  ‘democratic trade unions’, or even the ‘post 1973 unions’.14 
These terms are not without difficulties. Firstly the term ‘democratic trade unions’ creates 
the impression that all the unions that organised African workers in the 1970s were 
democratic and it obscures the various forms of democracy that were adopted by unions 
at this time. On the other hand, the term ‘post 1973’ trade unions ignores those unions 
that organised African workers, but that were formed before the 1973 strikes and 
excludes unions aligned to the Urban Training Project (UTP). 
  
This leaves the term ‘emerging trade unions’. Although not perfect in that it negates the 
role of some of the older registered trade unions that assisted with the re-organisation of 
African workers in the 1970s, it is sufficiently neutral in other respects. The term does 
not imply any particular structure or policy (such as non-racism, political independence, 
or democracy) and is vague enough, at least in terms of timing, to capture most of the 
relevant unions. More importantly, it denotes the birth of a vibrant new workers 
movement that was marked by the establishment of new unions with a predominantly 
African membership. 
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unpublished paper presented at XVI World Congress of Sociology, Durban, South Africa, 
2006.    
13 J. Maree, ‘Introduction’, in J. Maree, The Independent Trade Unions 1974-1984: ten 
years of the South African Labour Bulletin, Johannesburg, Raven Press, 1987, p. i.   
14 J. Maree, ‘Introduction’ p. ix; S. Buhlungu, ‘Democracy and Modernisation,’ coins the 
term ‘post-1973 unions’.   
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Chapter 1: 
Nationalism, Socialism and the Emerging Union Movement. 
 
1.1. Introduction     
This study owes much to the insights of other scholars who have previously investigated 
the emerging trade union movement. In this chapter the contributions of these authors 
will be reviewed. Special attention will be paid to what they have written about past 
movements (especially SACTU); democracy; leadership and the way in which the 
emerging unions approached political issues. The membership composition of the 
emerging unions, as well as what has been written about their organisational culture and 
consciousness, will also be considered. In so doing, this chapter will also review the 
theoretical frameworks through which the emerging unions have analysed and the key 
debates that feature in the literature. 
 
1.2. Renewed Interest in Labour   
The late 1960s and 1970s represented a period of ideological and organisational renewal 
both locally and abroad. While Europe and North America witnessed the emergence of 
the ‘New Left’, South African scholarship was radicalised and transformed. Starting with 
the emergence of the revisionist school, radical academics within South Africa 
increasingly replaced classical liberal ideas with more radical interpretations of South 
African society that recognised the centrality of class in determining social relations 
within society. 1  
 
According to Jon Lewis, who writes one of the only historiographies of South African 
labour history, this major ideological shift inspired a number of students and lecturers, 
especially from English medium universities, to focus their energies on organising black 
workers. 2 The worlds of white middle class intellectuals and black workers converged; 
while intellectuals made their skills available to new unions (particularly in the field of 
worker education), the emergence of a new workers movement stimulated a keen 
academic interest in labour and shaped the research agenda of labour studies.3 
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The 1970s witnessed a plethora of contemporary studies that examined a variety of 
themes – strikes; labour law and industrial relations; influx controls and migrant labour; 
economics; union tactics and strategies. Many of these were published in academic 
journals such as Transformation as well as more popular publications including Work in 
Progress and the South African Labour Bulletin. Eddie Webster explains that the 
founding editors of the South African Labour Bulletin deliberately set out to link the 
journal to the trade union movement.4 Contributions were drawn from people who were 
active in or sympathetic to the unions and dealt with current developments and debates. 
Consequently, the journal provides an invaluable historical record of the emerging trade 
unions and the commentaries published in the 1970s will be treated as primary sources in 
this study.   
 
Lewis notes that labour history was also revived and mirrored the concerns and 
maturation of the workers movement. In the 1970s, for instance, Lewis argues that his 
own work on industrial unions in the 1920s and Philip Bonner’s work on the ICU, were 
mainly concerned with organisational issues and union structures.5 By the 1980s the 
resurgence of widespread resistance in South African townships brought issues such as 
race and nationalism to the fore. This, he argues, is reflected in Helen Bradford’s A Taste 
of Freedom: the ICU in Rural South Africa, 1924- 1930 that discusses the ambiguity of 
cultural symbols and highlights the dynamic way in which the organisation combined the 
nationalist and class interests of its members.6  
 
In addition, both Lewis and Luli Callinicos claim that labour history had a strong popular 
dimension. 7 According Callinicos, ‘history is a political weapon activists use to advance 
current organisational strategies’ and unionists incorporated the histories of trade unions 
into the curricula of worker education and union newspapers. The South African Labour 
Bulletin published numerous historical overviews, including a special issue dedicated to 
the ICU, and in the early 1980s FOSATU Worker News carried a series of articles entitled 
‘The Making of South African Working Class’ (written by Philip Bonner). 8 Such interest 
was not confined to the union movement and Callinicos notes that various groupings, 
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such as the History Workshop, the Labour History Group, and  the Labour and 
Community Project, also produced popular labour histories.9  
 
The link between the labour movement and labour studies was further entrenched by the 
relationship that scholars of the emerging unions had with unions. Most were connected 
to the union movement in some way. To illustrate- Philip Bonner, Ari Sitas, Eddie 
Webster, Johan Maree, Steven Friedman, Rob Lambert, David Lewis, and Sakhela 
Buhlungu have all written about the emerging unions and have either played an active 
role in organisations closely associated with the union movement or have held a position 
in a union at some point. These connections allow authors to draw on knowledge and 
material that is not in the official record, affording intimate insight into the emerging 
unions. At the same time, it must be kept in mind that the accounts of the emerging 
unions are influenced by the experiences and views of the authors, who were often key 
participants in the heated debates that took place in union movement during the 1970s 
and the literature on the emerging unions is often polemical in tone and forms part of the 
ideological record of the trade union movement.    
 
1.3. SACTU and the Emerging Unions    
SACTU’s relationship with the emerging unions is complex. On the one hand, many 
locally based SACTU unionists and members of the Congress Movement threw their 
weight behind the new workers’ movement and played an instrumental role in building 
the new unions. SACTU unionists, for instance, were involved in the Western Province 
Workers’ Advice Bureau (WPWAB) in the Western Cape, the General Factory Workers 
Benefit (GFWBF) in Durban and the Industrial Aid Society (IAS) in Johannesburg. There 
are even indications that SACTU members provided the new non-racial unions with 
limited financial support.10 However, the official SACTU, which was reconstituted in 
exile, was much more circumspect. The exiled SACTU’s view of the emerging unions 
was outlined by Ken Luckhardt and Brenda Wall in Working for Freedom: black trade 
union development in South Africa  throughout the 1970s, one of the first overview of the 
emerging unions that was written to drum up support for the international anti-apartheid 
movement and to warn against the reforms proposed by P.W. Botha’s regime.11   
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Luckhardt and Wall divide the emerging unions into six categories consisting of: the 
SACTU underground network; the ‘mobilising’ tendency of the TUACC; the ‘legalistic’ 
tendency of the UTP; the ‘subordinate’ tendency of African parallel unions; the 
‘nationalist’ Black Consciousness aligned unions such as BAWU; and unaffiliated unions 
and organisations such as the WPWAB and the African Food and Canning Workers 
Union (AFCWU). Luckhardt and Wall are dismissive of the parallel unions, BAWU, and 
the UTP and their sympathies clearly lie with the  new non-racial unions. They even try to 
establish connections between these unions and occasionally refer to the participation of 
underground SACTU members in these unions.12 They write that while the repression of 
SACTU led to a nadir in African working class resistance, the new leaders of the 1970s 
were distinguished ‘by their determination to carry on the traditions of the Congress 
Movement’.13   
 
They go on to argue that trade unions can only enact progressive change if they are non-
racial and aim to liberate workers from both their class and national oppression by taking 
up political issues. Although they argue that TUACC failed to take an open political 
stand, they maintain that TUACC unions implicitly challenged aspects of apartheid. They 
write: 14 
 
It was these unions which had considerably more experience of strike action than 
any other grouping and responded most often to spontaneous strikes by African 
workers. While the strikes which were supported by them and led by them were 
not expressly political, in all cases they either challenged the existing wage 
control system, the ‘Bantu labour relations’ institutions or involved a demand for 
recognition of the independent trade unions of African workers… 
 
These challenges, they suggest, did not go unnoticed and the TUACC unions were 
‘exposed to the most severe state repression’ as a result.15    
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Luckhardt and Wall argue that the reforms proposed by the Wiehahn Commission forced 
the emerging unions to make a choice – they could either take up political issues, which 
would lead to more repression, or keep politics out of the unions and collaborate with the 
apartheid government. According to Denis MacShane, Martin Plaut and David Ward, 
who provide an overview of trade unions in the early 1980s in their book Power: black 
workers, their unions and the struggle for freedom in South Africa, this understanding 
emanated from SACTU’s characterisation of the apartheid state as fascist. 16  
 
As John Gaetsewe, General Secretary of SACTU, had observed: 17 
 
In the day-to-day battles for higher wages, better working conditions and trade 
union rights, the organisation and consciousness of the workers has advanced…at 
the same time SACTU recognises that there are ultimately only two options open 
to legal African trade unions: either to advance, taking up political as well as 
economic questions, and eventually being crushed or driven underground; or for 
the leadership to become co-opted and the unions emasculated…  
 
SACTU considered any worthwhile trade union activity within South Africa impossible 
and claimed that SACTU (in exile) and other Congress structures were the only 
legitimate representatives of South African workers. SACTU and, indeed the SACP, went 
on to claim that the new unions were undemocratic ‘yellow unions’ and all the trade 
unions in South Africa were branded agents of colonialism and the apartheid state.18 
Since the new unions did not align to the ANC or SACP, as SACTU had done, they were 
also accused of ignoring the political struggle of workers and national liberation and were 
labelled ‘economistic’ (an argument that would resurface during the workerist-populist 
debate in the 1980s).19 SACTU and the SACP promoted these views in the internationally 
based anti-apartheid movement and the new unions found it difficult to gain international 
support. In 1974 and 1975, for instance, the Student Association at Ruskin College called 
on the College to uphold the Geneva Resolution and break ties with the IIE, described as 
‘a solely defensive economic unit’, on the grounds that SACTU and the ANC were the 
only ‘authentic’ bodies that represented the oppressed people of South Africa.20  
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On the other hand, emerging unions embodied a critique of SACTU and much of the 
literature on the progressive trade union movement from the 1950s onwards is couched in 
an ongoing debate on the way in which trade unions relate to the apartheid state and 
political struggles, including nationalist parties and community groups.  The emerging 
unions were not monolithic in their critique of SACTU. The more moderate UTP- 
Consultative Committee of Black Trade Unions (CCOBTU) linked unions were anti-
communist; rejected SACTU’s focus on political rights; and called for the 
institutionalisation of industrial conflict that would allow for the development of 
‘responsible’ unions for black workers. On the other hand, BAWU, which did not have 
much of a presence throughout the 1970s, agreed that the unions should participate in the 
political struggles of black workers, but rejected the non-racialism of the Congress 
Movement.  
 
The debate, however, centres on the disagreements between the SACTU and the new 
non-racial Marxist unions (associated with the WPWAB, TUACC and the IAS) and later 
FOSATU. A number of activists, including SACTU unionists who participated in the 
new union movement did not want the new trade unions to be used as a front to recruit to 
for Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK).21 Believing that the organisation of workers was not only 
possible under apartheid 22, but a necessary component of a strong opposition within the 
country, they did not want to expose the unions to repression before they were given a 
chance to consolidate.23 There was also a distinct tendency within TUACC that rejected 
the authoritarian model of Soviet socialism (supported by the SACP) and which sought to 
build a democratic and independent workers’ movement that was not subordinated to a 
nationalist movement during the national liberation struggle and that could fight for the 
rights of workers and socialism even after independence was achieved.24  
 
The arguments made by this tendency became more pronounced towards the end of the 
1970s and were articulated in Bonner’s address at FOSATU’s inauguration and Fosters’ 
speech at FOSATU’s 1982 Congress. As already noted, Bonner criticised SACTU for 
subordinating the interest of workers to the ANC; diverting the energies of unionists into 
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political campaigns and failing to set up sound industrially based union structures.25 
Similarly, Foster argued that the progressive unions under SACTU became part of the 
popular struggle against oppression, but did not provide a base for working class 
organisation and left capitalist relations within South Africa unchallenged. 26       
 
Similar concerns were reflected in the literature on the emerging unions. For instance, 
Steven Friedman’s Building Tomorrow Today, which was published for a local audience 
in 1987, maintains that trade unions were subordinated to the Congress Movement under 
SACTU.27 Friedman writes that: 28 
 
[b]ecause the Congresses needed a mass worker movement, SACTU tried to 
become one before it was ready: it threw its meagre resources into a campaign to 
build numbers, not strength. Workers were signed on but not organised and 
unions were formed hastily without proper staff or a firm factory base…The new 
unions [that is in the 1950s and 1960s] were weak and inefficient.  
 
Friedman concludes that, ‘[b]y weakening that organisation in the factories, the alliance 
with the Congresses also weakened worker’s ability to become a political force outside of 
them.’29 The main lesson to be learned from past movements such as SACTU was that 
unions should build a strong organisational base in the factories before taking up broader 
political battles. They needed to rely on their own strength and remain independent from 
controlling registered unions and unequal political alliances that prevented workers from 
setting their own priorities.30  
 
Rob Lambert, however, promotes a more nuanced critique of the SACTU tradition by 
arguing that while SACTU may have been subordinated to nationalist interests, there 
were instances where affiliates used their alliance with the Congress Movement to bolster 
trade union organisation. 31 After the passage of the 1950 Suppression of Communism 
Act, communists continued their activities and worked through other organisations, 
allowing communists to gain an ideological foothold in the Congress Movement.32 It was 
in this context, Lambert argues, that Michael Harmel’s notion of ‘internal colonialism’ 
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(an elaboration of the ‘Black Republic Thesis’) became influential.33 According to 
Harmel, the relationship between white rulers and the black masses was primarily one of 
imperialism and it was necessary to prioritise the political struggle to ensure that the 
racial restrictions that prevented the free development of capitalism and the emergence of 
an African bourgeoisie were lifted. Capitalism unfettered by the vestiges of imperialism 
would allow for the development of an organised and conscious working class that could 
proceed to the second stage and take up the fight for socialism. There is some ambiguity 
surrounding the question over which class should lead the national liberation, but Harmel 
maintained that the national liberation should be based on a class alliance and the African 
petty bourgeoisie should not be offended or alienated. 34  
 
A large number of SACTU unionists agreed with Harmel’s assessment, but Lambert 
argues that their interpretation and application of his theory varied a great deal. As a 
result, SACTU was uneven when it came to defining the relationship between the 
political and economic struggles of workers, giving rise to various regionally based 
approaches to trade union organisation. 35 According to Lambert, the strongest of these 
was ‘political unionism’, which took root in Natal, and was based on the development of 
democratic factory committees that utilised political campaigns not only to raise the 
political consciousness of workers, but also to mobilise and organise workers at their 
work places. In this region the alliance with Congress strengthened workplace 
organisation and gave the unions an opportunity shape the politics of the Congress 
Movement by calling for a worker- led national liberation struggle.  
 
In the Transvaal, however, SACTU unions such as NULCDW and ALCDW failed to 
integrate the econo mic struggles of workers and the political campaigns of the Congress 
movement. Unions in this province, which were bureaucratic and focused on ‘bread and 
butter’ issues, were relatively weak and unionists feared that other Congress structures 
and political leaders would dominate the unions. 36 In the Western Cape the FCWU was 
the strongest SACTU affiliate. While local union branches championed the civic 
concerns of workers (housing, transport, health etc), the union left broader political 
struggles to the ANC. 37  The ‘political unionism’ in Natal failed to become hegemonic 
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within the broader Congress Movement and, due to the federation’s close linkages with 
the ANC’s newly formed armed-wing, SACTU was smashed by state repression in the 
1960s. 
 
A number of authors have attempted to defend SACTU. For instance, in her study of 
trade union organisation in Port Elizabeth, Janet Cherry refutes the arguments that 
SACTU did not represent a true trade union movement and that SACTU was dominated 
by ‘populist’ or petty bourgeoisie concerns. 38 She argues that due to the weakness of the 
trade union movement in PE during the post-war period, general working class politics 
centred on issues of reproduction, giving rise to a militant tradition of community 
politics.39 Organisations such as the CPSA, and later the ANC, played an important part 
in directing these struggles. Leaders of there organisations were not petty-bourgeoisie, 
but were drawn from the working class and the Congress movement took on a working 
class character. Unlike SACTU in Natal, industrial organisation failed to take root in PE, 
but the general union established by SACTU served to mobilise workers into a broader 
working class movement by taking up concrete demands and participating in political 
campaigns.40 
 
More recently, Jabulani Sithole and Sifiso Ndlovu argue that ‘white supported initiatives’ 
(the non-racial Marxist unions, including the WPWAB, IAS, TUACC) have received a 
disproportionate amount of attention in the historical accounts of the revival of the labour 
movement.41 Sithole and Ndlovu attempt to rectify this bias by, firstly, highlighting the 
important role that SACTU (in exile) played in building the trade union movement in 
South Africa. They maintain that, in addition to persuading the internationa l labour 
movement to support an anti-apartheid programme, SACTU leaders attempted to regroup 
and revive contacts within the country in an effort to resuscitate political unionism. When 
such efforts were hampered by a security clampdown in the mid 1970s, the ‘SACTU 
underground shifted away from recruiting members and sending them to operate abroad’ 
and operatives were encouraged to remain inside the country where they ‘performed their 
duties as coordinators and organisers’. 42 Sithole and Ndlovu claim that by the second half 
of the 1970s, political unionism (along the lines of the SACTU tradition) resurfaced and 
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challenged the ‘workerism’ of the other emerging unions. By the end of the decade ‘a 
sound foundation’ for trade union unity and ‘struggles to create a democratic trade union 
movement, rooted in political unionism and guided by the tenets of the Freedom Charter’ 
had been laid. 43  
 
In the second instance, Sithole and Ndlovu question the role of the emerging unions. 
Echoing the older SACTU argument that the unions inside South Africa were ‘yellow 
unions’, they characterise the emerging unions- including the non-racial Marxist unions 
that would later form the core of FOSATU and COSATU- as reformist organisations that 
‘bordered on the reactionary’.44  
 
There are many problems with Sithole and Ndlovu’s arguments. Legassick argues that 
they have misrepresented evidence to discredit TUACC/FOSATU and exaggerate the 
importance of SACTU and he draws attention to a number of inaccuracies in their 
work.45 For instance, Legassick notes that the political unions (community unions) to 
which Sithole and Ndlovu refer only emerge in 1980, and not the mid-1970s as they 
suggest, and the unity talks that led to the formation of FOSATU were initiated by 
NUMARWOSA, not TUCSA, and SACTU did not participate in these talks. Legassick 
also questions the role of underground operatives and argues that ‘while some SACTU 
activists may have been involved in building democratic unions inside the country, the 
whole pressure exerted by SACTU officials in exile was not towards building trade 
unions, but to act as a signpost to MK’.46 Even though Sithole and Ndlovu claim 
operatives were encouraged to remain inside the country towards the end of the decade, 
Legassick shows that SACTU still called on workers to leave the unions and join MK in 
the 1980s.  
 
Finally, Sithole and Ndlovu tend to dismiss any views that deviate from their narrow 
understanding of the SACP’s analysis of South Africa as incorrect and automatically 
reformist or economist. Consequently, the complex conversation that took place between 
the union movement and the Congress Movement in the 1970s and 1980s is simplified. 
Their approach prevents any systematic engagement with the alternative interpretations 
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of Marxism and national liberation that emerged with the new unions and the Black 
Consciousness Movement in the 1970s and the fierce debates that took place in the union 
movement are not entertained.  In so doing, Sithole and Ndlovu also fail to give any 
serious attention to the key discussions in the literature and do not engage with the 
theoretical issues raised in those accounts written by scholars who are sympathetic to the 
non-racial Marxist emerging unions.       
 
1.4. Trade Unions and Socialism  
Even before the 1973 strike and the revival of the union, Friedman notes that young 
activists debated the political and social significance of unions.47 It was in this context 
that Richard Hyman’s Marxism and the Sociology of Trade Unionism provided a 
theoretical framework for scholars, specifically in the field of Industrial Sociology. 48 For 
more than a century socialists have been discussing the revolutionary character of trade 
unions and Hyman summarises the Marxist contributions to this debate. Many Marxists 
may reject Hyman’s characterisation of these various schools of thought. Nevertheless, 
his work – which gauges the revolutionary potential of the British shop stewards’ 
movement in the 1960s- proved influential and requires discussion.    
 
Hyman divides Marxist understandings of trade unions into two main schools. These 
include the ‘optimistic’ view (represented in the early writings of Marx and Engels), 
which proposes that trade unions can pose a threat to the stability of capitalism, and the 
‘pessimists’ (consisting of Lenin, Michels, and Trotsky) who insist that trade unions 
inhibit any overt challenge to capitalism and the development of a revolutionary 
consciousness.  
 
Drawing on the example of the shop stewards’ movement in Britain, Hyman is clearly 
more optimistic in his prognosis. He argues that trade unions must be evaluated within 
their historical contexts and challenges Lenin’s argument that the capitalist system can 
absorb the economic assaults of trade unions and argues that it is necessary to take the 
margin available for employers to make concessions within a specific economic context 
and the level of aspiration and degree of organisation among workers into account.49 A 
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situation of radical instability is created when economic malaise is coupled with the 
heightened organisation and expectations of workers and increasing pressure from trade 
unions.  
 
Michels ‘iron law of oligarchy’, Hyman claims, is also not the inevitable outcome of 
trade union organisation. 50 No matter how bureaucratic or service orientated a trade union 
may become, leaders are judged on their ability to deliver. To be able to lead effectively, 
officials are constrained by the demands and expectations of the rank and file. Related to 
this, the rank and file may well be of the view that their unions ought to run 
democratically and foster a real commitment to democratic practice and worker 
participation. Finally, while Michels tends to focus on formal and national channels of 
decision-making, Hyman notes that there may be significant membership participation 
and control at other levels of the union such as the shop floor or workplace. Formal or 
national levels of organisation may be infected by these localised structures, giving 
members on the shop floor a tremendous sway over the policies and actions of the 
national union and leadership.                            
 
The incorporation of unions and their transformation into mechanisms of control and 
discipline, as theorised by Trotsky, is also not automatic.51 Capitalists may well attempt 
to incorporate unions to neutralise the threat posed in times of economic crisis, but union 
officials may not be in a position to succumb. Once again, Hyman cites the British shop 
stewards’ movement as a case in point, noting that union leaders were compelled to 
support the self-activity of the rank and file in the areas of collective bargaining and 
internal union government. 52 Union officials were faced with the choice of either 
supporting union militants or running the risk of loosing control over their membership 
entirely. This, Hyman maintains, had important outcomes- a veneer of legitimacy was 
added to the vigorous resistance of shop floor militants and the traditional restraining 
influence of union officialdom was undermined.       
 
For Hyman the British experience revealed a number of countervailing tendencies to 
those outlined by Lenin, Michels and Trotsky. The essential insight of Marx and Engels 
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was that they argued that unions represent a reaction against exploitation and their 
economic demands cannot always be accommodated within the system. Moreover, 
unions raise issues of power and control at the workplace, which may form the basis of 
political demands. This is especially true of the employment relationship and managerial 
control, which serves as a ‘persistent source of political conflict.’53 Consequently Hyman 
concludes that ‘[p]ure-and-simple trade union activity does pose a substantial threat to the 
stability of the capitalist economy in some circumstances’.  
 
Hyman, however, argues that this position should not be accepted without qualification 
and it is necessary to interrogate the relationship between the day-to day activity of trade 
unions and the consciousness of workers. In so doing, he poses the question- can workers 
move beyond a limited form of consciousness without the revolutionary party?       
 
Hyman is critical of Lenin’s rigid distinction between trade union and revolutionary (or 
Social Democratic) consciousness and Lenin’s rejection of a ‘middle ideology’. Quoting 
Hobsbawm, he maintains that trade union consciousness may give rise to a general 
discontent and vague aspirations for a socialist society and argues that Lenin’s approach 
masks a continuum along which escalation is possible.  Hyman, nonetheless, notes that in 
some of Lenin’s writings there is an acknowledgement that the trade union struggles can 
heighten the consciousness of workers. For instance, Lenin argues:54   
 
Strikes, therefore, teach the workers to unite; they show them that they can 
struggle against the capitalist only when they are united; strik es teach the workers 
to think of the struggle of the whole working class against the whole class of 
factory owners and against the arbitrary, police government. This is the reason 
that socialists call strikes “a school of war”.  
 
Lenin’s debates with Rosa Luxemburg, Hyman suggests, were not about the generation 
of a revolutionary consciousness through economic struggles without the party, but 
revolved around the degree to which trade union struggles rendered workers susceptible 
to a revolutionary consciousness and the type of relationship that should be established 
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between the party and spontaneous trade union activity. These questions were central to 
Gramsci’s work, which Hyman argues ‘…possessed certain close affinities with the 
theories developed contemporaneously by the ideologists of the British shop stewards’ 
movement.’55   
 
On the one hand, Gramsci holds a negative view of unions. He claims that trade unions 
are dominated by capital, which can be used to discipline workers, and are an integral 
part of capitalist society. In addition, trade unions are prone to bureaucratisation, which 
flows out of collective bargaining and the need to secure concrete gains through 
collective agreements. At the same time, Gramsci argues that trade unions were of great 
value in building working class unity and self-confidence and that industrial legality was 
a victory for the working class, which improved the material conditions of workers. This 
victory, however, was not an end in itself, but represented a compromise that had to be 
supported until the balance of forces were turned in favour of the working class.       
 
For Gramsci the Italian Factory Councils and ‘internal commissions’ (which have been 
compared to the British shop stewards’ committees) represented a new and revolutionary 
form of organisation.  These representative and democratic structures were based in the 
factory or workplace and united workers as producers (as opposed to wage earners) 
posing a direct challenge to the power and control exercised by the capit alist.  Gramsci 
writes that,’[t]he Factory Council is the negation of industrial legality. It tends at every 
moment to destroy it, for it necessarily leads the working class towards the conquest of 
industrial power, and indeed makes the working class the source of that power...’.56 These 
councils were not merely instruments of class struggle, but would form part of a new 
society and take the place of the capitalists by assuming all the functions of management 
and administration. 57 Gramsci argues that it was necessary for trade unions and these 
factory-based organisations to relate to each other and while revolutionary Councils 
dissolved the bureaucratisation of the trade union, the capricious impulses of the Councils 
needed to be constrained by the discipline of the union.   
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According to British theorists of workers’ control, democratic factory-based organisation 
would continually encroach on managerial power and control, making inroads within 
capitalism that would strengthen the position of the working class and reduce that of the 
capitalist class, leading to a situation of dual power.58 This relates to Gramsci’s theories 
of hegemony and the role of the revolutionary party. Gramsci argued that the modern 
state was complex and relied on violence, economic coercion and ideology (the common 
sense values within society) to maintain control. For Gramsci the success of a socialist 
revolution depended on the working class creating a culture of its own that contradicted 
the norms and values promoted by the bourgeoisie. The only way in which 
revolutionaries could undermine bourgeoisie hegemony was through adopting a ‘war of 
position’ or ‘war of movement’ when dealing with the state. In essence this meant that 
the power of the state could be contested and, depending on the balance of class forces, 
workers’ organisations should either seek to make compromises and alliances to maintain 
the status quo and defend their rights or fight for advances.  
 
Referring to the Italian Factory Councils, Gramsci argued that the revolutionary party 
should take on a leading ideological (as opposed to an organisational) role. The party 
should not dominate the spontaneous struggles of workers, but should become immersed 
within these struggles and relate to them in a dialectical manner. It is important to note, 
however, that after the decline of the Italian Councils, Gramsci placed more emphasis on 
the revolutionary party and went on to adopt more conventional Marxist-Leninist 
understanding of the party. 59 Drawing on Machiavelli’s ‘The Modern Prince’, he argued 
that it was the party’s role to develop organic intellectuals and create an alternative 
hegemony within capitalist society.        
   
Hyman argues that the experience of Italian Factory Councils demonstrated that 
consciousness is volatile and takes on different forms in different historical settings. 
Revolutionaries, therefore, need to be sensitive to the context in which economic 
achievements either facilitate the formulation of more ambitious material demands, 
making inroads into capitalism and culminating in class confrontation, or allow for the 
cooptation and incorporation of working class organisations. He claims that an important 
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determinant is the manner in which reforms are achieved. Drawing on the theorists of the 
British shop stewards’ movement, he argues that reforms should be based on the 
mobilisation of an independent power base. Even though Hyman recognises that the 
workers’ perceptions of reforms is also a significant factor, he is reluctant to accept 
Gramsci’s model of the party (as defined during the period of the Factory Councils) 
which he maintains is over-optimistic.  
 
Hyman concludes that:60  
 
…the limits of trade union consciousness can vary markedly between different 
historical contexts and can shift radically with only a brief passage of time. Under 
specific objective conditions the educative potential of collective industrial action 
may be immense; in others, perhaps more typical circumstances the spontaneous 
development of workers consciousness may fail absolutely to transcend the 
confines of bourgeois ideology.    
 
Since there is no general theory that relates the struggle for material reforms to the 
development of consciousness, the revolutionary potential of the British shop stewards’ 
movement could not be predicted. Returning to Gramsci in a sense, Hyman maintains 
that the question would only be resolved through practical activity and experience and the 
‘praxis of struggle itself.’61            
 
One of the key weaknesses of Hyman’s essay is his treatment of the Anarcho-syndicalist 
tradition. Anarcho-syndicalism was one of the dominant organised traditions in Italy 
during the late 1910s and an understanding of this school of thought gives us some 
insight in the consciousness and combinations of the Italian working class at the time.62 
There have even been suggestions that Gramsci may have been influenced by the 
anarchists in the Turin movement in what has been referred to as his ‘spontaneist’ 
period.63 This is true in as far as Gramsci maintains that the democratic combinatio ns of 
workers based at the point of production are potentially revolutionary and that he 
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recognises the importance that the contestation of bourgeois ideas and every-day 
struggles have in shaping the consciousness of the working class.  
 
Like many Marxists, Hyman maligns and caricatures Anarcho-syndicalists by 
maintaining that proponents of this form of socialism believe that the economic struggles 
of trade unions ‘directly and exclusively’ generate revolution and ‘naturally and 
spontaneously lead to the overthrow of capitalism’ and that Syndicalists ignore the role of 
the state in society. 64 Most Anarcho-syndicalists would reject these claims.  65 Although 
Anarcho-syndicalists argue that trade unions are strategically located at the point of 
production, the heart of capitalist society, they do not assume that all trade unions are 
automatically revolutionary. For a union to be revolutionary it must be based on direct 
democracy and decentralised structures, adhere to the anarchist idea and rely on direct 
action and the self-activity of the working class.  
 
Anarcho-syndicalists go on to argue that revolutionary unions cannot ignore political 
structures, but differ significantly in their methods of political struggle by maintaining 
workers should rely on their own revolutionary combinations (which could take the form 
of councils or unions) to take up political demands. This relates to the way in which 
Anarcho-syndicalists view the modern state. According to Bakunin, the state is 
necessarily a coercive institution, but is also reliant on a ‘State morality’ to legitimise 
state rule. The state, therefore, will introduce censorship and expropriate control over 
education and popular instruction to ensure that all citizens are inspired in both deed and 
thought by the values and norms of the ruling class. 66 
 
For a socialist revolution to be successful it would be necessary to challenge this ‘State 
morality’ and Emma Goldman argues that even before a revolution can take place a 
fundamental ‘transvaluation of values’ is necessary to ensure that the underlying values 
and ideas of the old society are removed.67 For Anarcho-syndicalists, however, this 
‘transvaluation of values’ cannot take place as long as socialists participate in state 
structures. The state is an agency whereby a ruling minority (which may include but is 
not confined to capitalists) oppresses a majority and is fundamentally hierarchical in 
 29 
nature. Using the Russian revolution as a model, Anarcho-syndicalists argue that if 
workers’ do not contest the state in its current form, a new ruling minority with a new 
‘State morality’ would emerge and the sense of justice, equality, love of liberty and 
human brotherhood created by a revolutionary working class would be sacrificed to the 
self-preserving interests of the state.  The ‘transvaluation of values’, therefore, not only 
includes a rejection of the ‘State morality’, but also of the physical structures produced 
by capitalist society and the hierarchical and authoritarian institutions of the ruling class. 
The means of socialists must match their ends and the revolution must be massed based, 
acquire democratic morals and ideals, break with hierarchical and authoritarian methods 
of organisation and reject the ‘authoritarian principle’ of the state.68  
 
Anarcho-syndicalists agree that unions must relate to the state, but argue that the use of 
political parties are the ‘very weakest and the most hopeless form of the political 
struggle’ and oppose participation within parliamentary structures.69 They also stress that 
it is through direct action – mass protest, strikes, pickets, sabotage, etc.- that the working 
class makes the most enduring advances. One of the key difficulties is that Anarcho-
syndicalists are deeply divided when it comes to the industrial relations arena (the signing 
of agreement and participating in collective bargaining) and reform. While some argue 
that industrial structures dominated by capital and industrial agreements should be 
boycotted and unions should rely on the direct action of members to win demands and  
rights, others adopt a position similar to that of the theorists of the British shop stewards’ 
movement and Gramsci. They maintain that political and industrial reforms represent a 
victory for the working class and unions could enter into agreements, as long the direct 
action of members and the autonomy of working class organisations are not 
compromised. Anarcho-syndicalists maintain that the working class with their democratic 
organisations must lead the struggle for socialism and revolutionary intellectuals have to 
utilise their skills and knowledge to facilitate this. Rudolph Rocker, a leading Anarcho -
syndicalist in the first half of the twentieth century, sums up these views: 70  
 
The focal point of the political struggle lies, then, not in the political parties, but 
in the economic fighting organisations of the workers. It as the recognition of this 
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which impelled the Anarcho- Syndicalists to centre all their activity on the 
Socialist education of the masses and on the utilisation of their economic and 
social power. Their method is that of direct action in both the economic and the 
political struggles of the time. That is the only method which has been able to 
achieve anything at all in every decisive moment in history. 
 
Few trade union intellectuals in the South African are familiar with the original writings 
of Anarcho-syndicalists and rely on Marxist characterisations as a guide. As a result 
Anarcho-syndicalism has become equated with a crude economism and is mostly used as 
a term of slander in the South African context. Even though there have been instances 
when the emerging unions such as FOSATU have been accused of promoting 
syndicalism, it is important to note that trade union intellectuals did not draw on 
Anarcho-syndicalist ideas. Any similarities that the emerging trade unions shared with 
Anarcho-syndicalism should rather be attributed to the influence of Gramsci’s ideas. 
Intellectuals in TUACC were inspired by the British shop stewards’ movement and drew 
on Gramscian understandings of the revolutionary potential of the democratic worker 
organisations based at the point of production; the immersion of revolutionary 
intellectuals in the organisations and struggles of the working class; the importance of 
working class struggles in shaping consciousness; and the tactic of gaining industrial 
legality and engaging critically with state reforms. These ideas were not only reflected in 
the registration debate that unfolded in the late 1970s, but also has resonance with the 
more recent strategies adopted by COSATU around radical reform and engaging in 
negotiations with government and business.       
 
1.5. Democracy, Bureaucratisation and Leadership  
The British shop stewards’ movement inspired many unionists in South Africa during the 
1970s and it is not surprising to find that these scholars adopt a more positive, or 
optimistic, evaluation of unions and are interested in the same issues that are discussed by 
Hyman. For instance, Johann Maree, who provides one of the most comprehensive 
examinations of the emerging unions to date, focuses on the organisational aspects of 
these unions and investigates democracy and the role of intellectuals.  71  
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Maree rejects the cynicism of the ‘iron law of oligarchy’ and challenges Michels’ 
predetermined trajectory of union deve lopment, arguing that the emerging unions started 
out as oligarchic organisations that became more democratic over time. Maree concedes 
that African workers of the 1970s were not ‘intellectually and politically inept’ and drew 
on past political and union experience, but argues that due to the relatively low levels of 
education amongst African workers, TUACC, WPWAB and CCOBTU were initially 
dominated by their founders. 72 Union leaders, however, all ‘…shared a common intention 
of building democratic trade unio ns ultimately situated in the hands of workers’ and 
played a central role in building democratic unions. 73   
 
For instance, Maree writes that: 74 
 
…in Britain the driving force behind the democratisation of the unions after the 
1960s was the upsurge in worker action on the shop floor, workers in the 
independent unions did not play a comparable role in South Africa during the 
1970s. The force behind the democratisation of the unions was the commitment of 
intellectuals and other leaders to democratic practices into the unions.  
 
It was largely as a result of this commitment that the TUACC, WPWAB and the 
CCOBTU progressed through three main stages of democratisation, which overlapped in 
some cases.75 These stages included: the creation of democratic structures in which the 
majorities of worker representatives were established at all levels of the unions and 
coordinating structures; the development of workers’ capacities to take effective control 
of these structures; and the creation of a representative and an accountable leadership in 
the unions.  
 
According to Maree, democratisation was uneven process and important differences 
emerged in the leadership styles adopted by the various union groupings. Fearful of white 
domination, the CCOBTU unions focused on the development of African leadership. 
These unions did not really address the domination of African officials over ordinary 
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members and failed to prioritise the development of worker representatives on the shop 
floor.76 On the other hand, white intellectuals in TUACC and the WPWAB, who proved 
tremendously influential, nurtured working class leaders and intellectuals and encouraged 
them to take up positions of leadership.77 Although white intellectuals remained 
influential, by the end of the decade black working class leaders were becoming a 
prominent and powerful force.  
  
Friedman makes common arguments to Maree, but does not give much credit to the past 
organisational experience, skills, or know-how of workers. He writes that: 78   
 
[b]ecause African workers had been powerless for so long, most have no 
experience of running their own organisations. Because they have been denied 
formal education, most have also lacked the skills to run these organisations or the 
knowledge of history, economics and politics which enabled leaders to make 
informed tactical discussions.  
 
This understanding of African workers may explain Friedman’s bias in documenting the 
experiences of trade union leaders, particularly when dealing with the formative period of 
the emerging unions. In common with Maree, he suggests that it was the student activists 
who originally defined the approaches of emerging unions. It was only once African 
workers gained the necessary skills and confidence that they became more influential.79  
Nevertheless, Friedman argues that on the whole the emerging unions were committed to 
‘democratic grassroots unionism’ and differed from their predecessors because they 
deliberately sought to build structures that would ensure that workers took part in 
decisions. It was largely due to this commitment to building strong democratic trade 
unions that the emerging unions finally achieved permanence. 
 
In his study, ‘Democracy and Modernisation in the Making of the South African Trade 
Union Movement: the dilemma of leadership, 1973- 2000’, Sakhela Buhlungu also 
investigates bureaucratisation, democracy and the role of intellectuals. Like Maree, he 
challenges Michels’ ‘iron law of oligarchy’ and argues that while unions can become 
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more oligarchic over time, there are also instances where the old leadership is replaced 
and unions democratised. He opposes the ‘sterile polarity of democracy versus oligarchy’ 
and confirms that while democracy may have been pronounced in the emerging unions, 
and even romanticised, democracy coexisted with anti-democratic and oligarchic 
tendencies and practices. 80   
 
Buhlungu goes on to conceptualise ‘the dilemma of leadership’, which he defines as the 
tension between the need to have an elected and accountable leadership and the desire for 
a more skilled and efficient full-time leadership. 81 He concludes that trade unions should 
learn to manage this dilemma and balance the need for democracy and efficiency. This, 
he argues, can be achieved by encouraging membership participation in democratic 
processes, which will allow them to hold un-elected specialists accountable, and 
providing education that empowers elected leaders and preserves the collective memory 
of union traditions and struggle. 
 
Buhlungu, however, criticises Friedman and Maree for ignoring the ways in which 
workers shaped the traditions of their unions and rejects the notion that trade union 
democracy was the creation of a select group of activists. Drawing on the work of Eric 
Hobsbawn and E.P Thompson, he maintains that trade union democracy owes its origins 
to a number of cultural, traditional, political, and intellectual sources and influences.82 
Buhlungu is sensitive to the ways in which African workers shaped their unions and 
contributed to the creation of new trade union traditions. He argues that the ‘lived 
experiences’ of black workers facilitated the development of a common sense approach 
to democracy. 83 These lived experiences consist of previous organisational experience, 
the traditional customs of African workers, and negative experiences of repression. 
Previous organisation experience includes participation in political movements and trade 
unions and Buhlungu maintains that many of the older workers who joined the new 
unions, especially in the Natal region, drew on the knowledge they gained from 
SACTU.84 According to Buhlungu, workers’ common sense approach to democracy was 
refined and articulated by a variety of intellectuals and both workers and their leaders 
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were responsible for the creation of a democratic culture that became part of trade union 
organisation.85  
 
Buhlungu’s study contributes to the growing recognition by labour scholars that it is 
important to consider the role that black workers and leaders played in shaping trade  
union structures and policies in the 1970s and 1980s. Deborah Bonnin and Mathew 
Ginsburg, for example, note that black working class intellectuals- many of whom were 
older and who drew on their previous union and political experience- played an important 
role in educating younger workers in the unions  (usually through cultural forms such as 
poetry and theatre) and contested the ideas of more educated and middle-class 
unionists.86 Buhlungu, however, does not always explore the complexities of workers’ 
life experience and the contradictory impact that specific life experiences may have on 
trade union formation in much depth. For instance, he asserts that African union members 
drew on their experiences of traditional gatherings (imbizo or lekgotla ), but does not 
explore how workers reconciled these patriarchal structures based on consensus decision 
making with more radical notions of direct democracy and accountability in the union. 87  
 
Buhlungu has subsequently turned his attention to interrogating the link between white 
unionists and the making of trade union democracy. While this focus fits into his broader 
argument that a range of different intellectuals contributed to the creation of democratic 
trade union practices, Buhlungu is mainly interested in unpacking non-racism in the 
broader national liberation struggle and assessing the ‘contradictory location’ of white 
unionists in trade unions that mainly organised black workers.88  
 
Buhlungu contests Maree’s understanding of the part played by white intellectuals and 
the positions of both authors have recently been outlined in a debate published in Current 
Sociology.89 Both authors agree that white unionists, who were mostly middle class and 
university trained, played a positive role by brining much needed skills and resources into 
a fledging union movement and contributed to the creation of a democratic trade union 
tradition. It was also largely due to their privileged access to skills and resources that 
white unionists were able to occupy and even dominate strategic positions in the unions 
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for a time. This started to change in the early to mid 1980s when an assertive layer of 
black leaders emerged and replaced white unionists, who retreated into research and 
policy work outside of the union movement.  
 
Buhlungu, however, argues that white unionists neither transcended their history and 
heritage, nor bridged the social, cultural, linguistic and spatial distance between 
themselves and black workers and unionists. 90 Even though white unionists were 
dependent on black unionists to access the world of black workers, white unionists 
misused their special status to undermine democratic practice and operated in a manner 
that entrenched unequal power relations. On the other hand, black unionists, who found 
themselves reliant on white unionists, became resentful of being confined to more menia l 
tasks and they were also unable to overcome their mistrust of white officials. With 
heightened political resistance against apartheid in the 1980s a critical mass of assertive 
black leaders emerged and turned towards the union movement. These new leaders were 
independent with their own political ideas and challenged the power of white unionists.         
 
Maree, on the other hand, maintains that in spite of racial and class difference, white 
unionists played a central role in developing the capacity of black unionists and workers- 
so much so that unions with white officials tended to be more democratic and effective 
than those without.91 White unionists did not necessarily impose their leadership and 
gained much trust from black workers. There was a real sense of solidarity. Maree also 
takes issue with Buhlungu’s notion that white officials were ‘rebels without a cause of 
their own’ and argues that white unionists aimed to build a democratic and powerful 
workers movement, fight for economic and social justice and secure their own long term 
future in a democratic non-racial society. Finally, he maintains that the withdrawal of 
white officials from black unions in the 1980s should be viewed as a consequence of a 
broader strategy of training and developing black workers to take over the running of the 
unions.   
             
Both authors have made valuable contributions to the literature, but are unable to meet 
Buhlungu’s initial objective of moving beyond the ‘…usual South African obsession with 
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apportioning blame and claiming credit when different racial groups are involved’ and 
they open the door to arguments that attribute important ideological and organisational 
trends in the trade union movement to the racial characteristics of unionists.92 In addition, 
their persistent focus on white unionists leave us with an incomplete picture, obscuring 
significant features of the emerging unions, and a number of myths remain intact. For 
instance, in the case of the 1970s Buhlungu focuses on black leaders in the UTP- 
CCOBTU unions and both authors tell us very little of the black workers and leaders in 
non-racial Marxist unions (those unions with white officials). Even Buhlungu suggest 
that ‘[i]n the early years of the movement before the emergence of a critical mass of 
young and organic intellectuals and assertive political leaders among the workers, the 
leadership of white officials seems to be unproblematic’ and we are left with an 
impression that the black workers who spearheaded the revival of open industrial 
resistance in the country were at the mercy of powerful white officials and had no real 
bearing on the character of their own unions.93 
 
1.6. Trade Unions, National Politics and Community Struggles  
Even though Maree and Buhlungu, and to some extent Friedman, note that oligarchic 
tendencies existed alongside democratic practice, especially during the formative period 
of the 1970s, they agree that the emerging unions were at the forefront of creating a 
democratic trade union culture. By challenging the notion that trade unions are not 
automatically bureaucratic they suggest that trade unions are also not necessarily 
conservative in nature. Together with other labour scholars, they question pessimistic 
understandings of trade unions (as outlined by Hyman) as well as SACTU’s claim that 
the emerging trade unions were economistic and reformist and comment on the broader 
social and political role played by the emerging unions.  
 
Maree is one of the few authors to explore the TUACC’s dealings with the KwaZulu 
government in detail. He maintains that due to the close proximity of the KwaZulu 
homeland to industrial centres such as Durban and Pietermaritzburg, the TUACC had to 
take a stance on the KwaZulu government and Inkatha. 94 At first the unions in Natal 
believed that an alliance with KwaZulu officials would provide the workers movement 
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with some protection from employer and state hostility. Later pressure from Inkatha 
compelled the TUACC to formulate a policy on alliances with non-working class 
nationalist movements and the TUACC called for the unions to remain independent of 
party influences. Maree, however, does not believe that the political significance of the 
emerging unions lay in the way in which they related to national liberation, socialism, or 
‘community’ issues. Adopting a classical Marxist approach (as defined by Hyman) Maree 
argues that since the power of trade unions lie at the point of production, ‘…the most 
important political role that the independent unions thus played in the 1970s was to lay 
the foundations which could assist the eventual transformation of the social relations of 
production in the work place.’95  
 
Friedman, on the other hand, maintains that it was the commitment to democratic 
organisation that rendered the unions political: 96        
 
…everything the unions have done over the past few years has been 
‘political’…The union movement may well have done more to bring political 
change nearer than any other black organisation in the country’s history, but it has 
done this mainly in its ‘humdrum’ factory battles rather than its political 
campaigns. The factory fight has done something which few black battles for 
rights have done before- it has given powerless people a chance to wield power 
for the first time in their lives.  
 
For Friedman, democratic unions not only demonstrated that change was possible, but 
also gave black workers the opportunity to make decisions and the confidence to change 
their world.  In so doing, the unions created a model for political action that was later 
replicated in communities. 
 
Building on arguments made by Friedman and Maree, scholars have extended the 
discussion by systematically analysing and theorising the ways in which unions relate to 
the state and un-organised sections of the working class and poor. South African labour 
activists have looked to other African trade union movements, especially under 
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independent regimes, for guidance. In 1966 Elliot Berg and Jeffery Butler argued that 
African labour movements that were in alliance with nationalist parties were unable to 
pose a significant challenge to the state because they would either become totally 
subordinate to nationalist parties or responsive and pliable to party pressures.97 In 1973 
Giovanni Arrighi and John Saul, who focused on the material position and consciousness 
of unionised workers in Africa, contributed to the discussion. They argued that unionised 
workers were a ‘labour aristocracy’ who were solely concerned with protecting their 
economic privilege at the expense of the urban and rural poor. 98  
 
Scholars such as Richard Jeffries, Adrian Peace and Richard Sandbrook, have challenged 
these ‘pessimistic’ interpretations.99 According to these authors, the economic prosperity 
of unionised workers is not as marked as Arrighi and Saul suggest. In addition, unionised 
workers are connected to the urban and rural poor through social and familial relations 
and organised workers often support their poorer family members financially. In addition, 
Sandbrook and Jeffries note that African trade unions have taken up the wider social and 
political grievances of the working class, posing a significant challenge to the state in 
some cases. They point to the 1961 strike by unionised rail and harbour workers in 
Sekondi- Takoradi (Ghana) when workers raised broad grievances and gained the support 
of the unemployed and market women. Sandbrook and Jeffries argue that such strikes 
illustrate that workers are subject to a wide range of ideas and consciousnesses. While not 
explicitly socialist, this ‘populism’ transcends economism as trade unions represent the 
underprivileged and no longer accept the distribution of wealth and power in their 
societies. These ‘populist’ attitudes drew unionised workers and the broader urban and 
rural poor together and encouraged the development of new tactics such as the general 
strike.  
 
Similar debates have recently surfaced in South Africa about the role of trade unions 
under the new democracy. Buhlungu, for instance, is optimistic about the role that 
COSATU can play and argues that unions can make strategic use of tripartite structures 
to strengthen their position and influence broader economic and social policy to the 
benefit of workers and the poor without becoming dominated by experts and eroding the 
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militant tradition of workers’ control. 100 In the literature on the new community based 
‘social movements’ in South Africa, however, scholars and activists have criticised 
COSATU for failing to provide un-organised sections of the working class and poor with 
institutional support.101 They see COSATU’s alliance with the ANC government and 
‘legalistic’ approach to organisation as a sign of incorporation and growing 
bureaucratisation and it would appear that the more optimistic readings of the role of 
trade unions in society, which dominate labour studies in the 1980s and  early 1990s, is 
gradually being challenged.     
 
It was not only in places such as Ghana and Nigeria that trade unions reached beyond the 
economic realm and championed the cause of un-organised workers and the poor and 
Eddie Webster and Rob Lambert have drawn on the experience of militant labour 
movements that emerged in newly industrialised countries during the 1970s and 1980s to 
gain a better understanding of the historical role of South African trade unions.  In an 
attempt to come to grips with these labour movements Peter Waterman and Ronaldo 
Munck pioneered new international labour studies and developed concepts such as 
‘political unionism’ and ‘social movement unionism’. 102 These concepts are quite loosely 
defined and in 1988 Munck observed that, ‘…trade unions in the Third World are 
increasingly reaching out to those sectors outside of the formal proletariat and developing 
a form of ‘social movement unionism”.103 He went on to argue that these unions were 
either approached by or turned towards new social movements, such as religions, 
neighbourhood, and women’s organisations, and there were even unions that took up 
political demands. Social movement unions represented, ‘…a growing confluence of 
interests and a gradual overcoming of previous social and political barriers.’104        
 
Others have refined this definition. Gay Seidman, who compares trade unions in South 
Africa and Brazil in the 1980s, distinguishes between political unionism, which refers to 
trade unions that operate within the existing political and economic framework and 
support political parties, and social movement unions, that have a constituency beyond 
the factory and take up broad issues around social and economic change.105 Social 
movement unions link trade union and community struggles and challenge the state as 
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well as individual employers.  
 
These concepts of political and social movement unionism have attracted some criticism. 
There are numerous historical examples – including in industrialised Western countries 
and ‘socialists’ countries – where unions have taken on social roles and aligned with 
political parties and movements. Thus, social movement unions should not be conceived 
as a new, or even unusual, phenomenon confined to the ‘Third World’. Notions of 
political and social movement unionism only indicate that unions relate to other 
movements and sections of society, but do not shed light on the nature of these 
relationships (Are alliances formal or informal? Do organisations make joint decisions 
around campaigns? Which organisations lead the alliance?). Related to this, there is an 
assumption that political and social movement unions are necessarily progressive in 
character. This is problematic in South African where unions have mobilised beyond the 
factory for conservative aims, such as the protection of racial privilege.  
 
Lambert and Webster’s use of the concept, however, is quite well armed against these 
critiques. Firstly, they assert that political and social movement unionism is a distinct 
union tradition that emerges with SACTU in the 1950s. Secondly, they argue that 
political unionism is based on a structured alliance with political parties and social 
movements. In his doctoral thesis, Lambert insists that these social movements should be 
urban based and that alliances should be formed with the aim of challenging the existing 
structures of capitalist dominance through collective action.  106  
 
Furthermore, they distinguish political/ social movement from other types of unions. 
Firstly, they maintain that political/ social movement unionism differs from ‘orthodox’ 
unions, which are integrated into industrial relations system and view collective 
bargaining as a key priority. Orthodox unions concentrate on wages and the workplace 
and ignore issues related to reproduction, communities, and state power. In the second 
instance, political/ social movement unions should also be differentiated from ‘populist 
unionism’, which take up broader political and community concerns but neglect shop 
floor and industrial organisation.   
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For Lambert the political/ social movement unionism proved a powerful analytical tool as 
no other tradition is able to accommodate a configuration whereby African unions take a 
lead in the national liberation struggle.107 This he asserts is true of Leninism, which 
subordinates the union to the party; Social Democracy, which subordinates the union to 
the bourgeois state; and syndicalism, which constrains the role of trade unions by failing 
to confront issues of state power. Political unionism, however, provides for the 
combination of the economic and national struggles of workers through trade union 
alliances with nationalist parties and urban-based social movements. Such alliances do 
not necessarily lead to the subordination of African unions, but give workers the 
opportunity to influence national liberation movements by placing the workers’ struggle 
for socialism on the political agenda. Due to Lambert’s understanding of syndicalism, 
however, he obscures a possible option whereby unions take up the political interests of 
their members and fight for national liberation without aligning to a political party.     
 
Lambert and Webster also make allowances for a more loosely defined form of social 
movement unionism. They argue that the emerging unions were social movement unions 
in that they resembled the working class movement in nineteenth century England, which 
was first and foremost a ‘human rights movement’. This movement had not yet been 
absorbed into an industrial relations system and the separation between economic and 
political struggles had not been institutionalised.108 If applied consistently to the South 
African case, all unions that organised African workers before 1979, when the Wiehahn 
Commission recommended the registration of African unions, challenged racial 
capitalism and would have to be characterised as social movement unions. The general 
criticisms of the political and social movement union model apply in this instance. While 
there is a broad acknowledgement that unions take up political and social issues in certain 
historical contexts, the nature of these more loosely defined social movement unions 
(structure and ideology) remain vague. 
 
David Lewis, who introduces a number of primary sources reprinted in G. Karis and M. 
Gerhart’s From Protest to Challenge (Volume 5) has started to interrogate the  nature of 
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the relationships established between the emerging unions and communities in more 
depth and adopts a refreshing approach to union and community relations.109 He points 
out that there were a number of highly successful examples of union and community 
cooperation in the late 1970s and draws attention to the pasta boycott led by the FCWU 
and the red meat boycott led by the Western Province General Workers Union 
(WPGWU- previously the WPWAB). Focusing on the 1976 uprising, which involved 
clashes between migrant workers and township youth in Soweto, he argues that such 
relations were not always smooth and were limited by divisions within the African 
working class. He writes: 110    
 
…continuing tensions highlighted a problem that has dogged community 
organisations to the present, namely the tendency of these organisations to focus 
on permanent township residents often to the exclusion of the migrants living in 
the hostel complexes and those in the squatter camps. One effect of this was to 
exclude a large proportion of the working class from township political 
organisation and to increase some of the difficulties in forging links between the 
unions and community organisations.  
  
Lewis highlights the complexities of union–community relations and points out that even 
though the African working class shared the experience of national oppression, workers 
were not automatically united nor did they share the same immediate concerns. In so 
doing, Lewis provides us with a framework in which to explore the various ways in 
which notions of ‘community’ may have been conceptualised by different layers of the 
working class and encourages a more nuanced analysis of the issues that the emerging 
unions, especially with a large migrant base, prioritised.         
 
1.7. The Marxist Unions and the Urban Training Project  
Another key concern in the literature is the argument that undue attention has been given 
to the non-racial Marxist emerging unions. In his book 20 Years in the Labour 
Movement: the Urban Training Project and change in South Africa, Donovan Lowry 
claims that the UTP had been marginalized from history and its leading role had not 
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received the acknowledgement it deserves. 111 Preoccupied with the need to demonstrate 
the ways in which the UTP established precedents for the other emerging unions, Lowry 
argues that it was the UTP that first rejected the political unionism of SACTU and 
encouraged a focus on ‘bread and butter’ issues in order to build strong and democratic 
union structures and avoid state repression. 112 This ‘economism’ was part of the UTP’s 
overall strategy of institutionalising industrial conflict, which Lowry claims has since 
become hegemonic.  
 
Buhlungu has criticised Lowry for being too conspiratorial and for failing to examine the 
factors, apart from competition from the non-racial Marxist unions, which facilitated the 
UTP’s marginalisation. 113 Much like the other scholars of the emerging unions, Lowry 
also does not pay much attention to the rank and file of the UTP unions. This is 
unfortunate as there are indications that the UTP unions mainly organised semi-skilled 
urban-based workers and formed part of a more ‘respectable’ trade union culture on the 
Witwatersrand (see Chapter 6 for more details). Even though he mentions the important 
role of the churches in supporting the UTP unions and the influence of Black 
Consciousness ideas on union leaders, there is little discussion on what impact this may 
have had on the consciousness of ordinary members. Lowry also does not address 
Maree’s claims that there were important regional differences in the UTP unions and fails 
to recognise the role that the more militant (and presumably more migrant) East Rand 
sections had in calling for the democratisation of the unions and drawing sections of the 
UTP unions into FOSATU. Finally, Lowry’s discussion on the various approaches 
adopted by the emerging unions is superficial and he does not examine the way in which 
the Marxist unions viewed the state, which informed their engagement with the industrial 
relations system and reform, and how these views may have differed from the UTP’s 
economism.     
 
As noted above, Sithole and Ndlovu make similar claims and argue that ‘student 
supported initiatives’ (WPWAB, IAS and TUACC) have received more attentio n ‘despite 
the fact that their performance in unionisation was far outshone by that of the UTP’. 114 
These authors, however, do not consider how the UTP, an indeed the other emerging 
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unions, may have changed over time, nor do they define what they mean by the 
‘performance in unionisation’. For instance, while the UTP may have had more members 
in the mid 1970s, TUACC unions were based on in-depth factory organised and were 
stronger and more democratic. In addition, by the end of the decade the Marxist unions 
were overtaking the UTP- CCOBTU unions in terms of numbers – at its formation in 
April 1979 FOSATU (which did not include the WPWAB) claimed 45,000 members, 
while CUSA, formed in September 1980, only claimed between 20,000 to 30,000 
members.115   
 
Lowry, Sithole and Ndlovu, nevertheless, point to an important gap and more research on 
the UTP-CCOBTU unions will enhance our knowledge of workers’ organisation in the 
1970s. Scholars, however, should move beyond the polemics that dominate accounts of 
the emerging unions and consider the part played by the rank and file and the way in 
which different working class cultures may have influenced organisation and fed into the 
conflicts between the emerging unions.      
 
1.8. Class, Culture, and Consciousness  
Understanding the political role of trade unions and their contribution to socialism and 
national liberation remains important, but scholars also need to pay attention to the 
members of unions and analyse working class organisations on their own terms to gain a 
more in-depth understanding of labour in the 1970s and the factors that shaped the 
various approaches adopted by the emerging unions. Social historians, particularly E.P. 
Thompson, who recognises that even the most sophisticated sociological models are 
unable to capture the fluency and intricacies of historical processes, provide a framework 
for doing this. 116 
 
Although Thompson accepts the centrality of class and class struggle, he defies the 
essentialism and teleology associated with a crude Marxism based on historical 
materialism. He explores the subjective aspects of the working class experience and, 
rather than placing faith in historical laws, emphasises the agency of ordinary people in 
history. This is illustrated by his conception of class, which is not seen as a thing with a 
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predetermined and ideal consciousness, but a historical relationship that must be viewed 
‘…as a social and cultural formation arising from processes which can only be studied as 
they work themselves out over a considerable historical period.’117 Thompson argues 
that, ‘…[t]he class experience is largely determined by the productive relations into 
which men are born- or enter into involuntarily ...’  and many social historians recognise 
the importance of examining the social, economic and political context in which the 
working class finds itself and creates.   
 
According to van der Linden, E.P. Thompson’s The Making of the English Working 
Class, first published in 1963, was a landmark publication for social history and 
transformed labour history into working class history. 118 ‘Old labour history’- with its 
institutional focus on the description of organisational developments, political debates, 
leaders and strikes- was replaced by a new approach to history that focused on the 
working class and sought to contextualise workers’ struggles. Lewis argues that social 
history started to blossom within the South African academy in the early 1980s, 
stimulating an interest in new themes such as gender, working-class culture, community 
and consciousness, and class formation in the countryside.119 Social historians not only 
asked new questions, but also deployed new methodologies and strongly encouraged the 
use of oral testimonies (this methodology will be discussed in Chapter 2). Social history 
gave rise to a number of innovative studies such as Elsabe Brink’s ‘Maar a’ Klomp 
Factory Meide: Afrikaner Family and Community on the Witwatersrand in the 1920s’; 
Dunbar Moodie’s ‘Mine Culture and Miners Identity on the South African Gold Mines’; 
and William Beinart, ‘Worker Consciousness, Ethnic Particularism, and Nationalism: the 
experiences of a South African migrant, 1930- 1960’.120  
 
Social history allows us to imagine unions in a new ways. When working from the 
perspective of the working class union members, for instance, entirely different meanings 
become attached to the social and political aspects of unions. By breaking from historical 
laws and ideal consciousnesses, we are able to consider the real life experiences of 
workers and how they shaped the subjective and structural aspects of their organisations. 
Lewis argues, however, that on the whole social history did not radically transform 
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labour history, which remained narrowly focused on institutions, leaders and strikes. In 
terms of the literature on trade unions in the 1970s and 1980s, however, there are a 
number of notable exceptions where authors have investigated the culture and 
consciousness of organised workers.121 Of these, David Hemson’s ‘Class Consciousness 
and migrant Workers: Dockworkers in Durban’ and Aristides Sitas’ ‘African Worker 
Responses on the East Rand to Changes in the Metal Industry, 1960 – 1980’ are 
particularly useful in shedding light on the members of the TUACC unions and require 
discussion.  
 
Hemson, who briefly touches on the 1970s, examines the dynamic consciousness and the 
traditions of workplace resistance that were adopted by African migrant dockworkers in 
Durban.122 Scholars have considered the impact that migrants’ urban experiences have 
had on social and political relations in the countryside. For instance, Peter Delius 
documents how Pedi migrants on the Witwatersrand used their burial societies to resist 
the introduction of Bantu Authorities in Sekhukhuneland. 123 One of the most significant 
outcomes of this struggle, which bridged the urban-rural divide, was that migrants 
challenged many of the undemocratic aspects of their traditional political systems and the 
chieftaincy. Hemson argues, however, that the working class actions of migrant workers 
at the workplace have largely been neglected and, as a result, little attention has been paid 
to development of a working class identity amongst migrants and their struggles in the 
cities.124 The record shows, however, that migrants joined trade unions, took part in 
strikes, and became members of political parties and Hemson notes that dockworkers in 
Durban have a long history of workplace resistance.125 With the rural subsistence 
economy in perpetual decline, migrants became increasingly dependent on wages. They 
focused their attention on workplace issues and fought for wage improvements (as 
opposed to more resources and schemes to improve rural production), which Hemson 
argues, was part of their general struggle to have their rights as proletarians 
acknowledged.126  
 
Dockworkers established links with SACTU unionists in the 1950s and supported the 
three day stay-away in demand of a minimum wage of one Pound a day, but from the late 
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1940s migrant dockworkers had already started to develop clandestine networks to 
coordinate collective resistance in response to growing state repression and control and 
the mass dismissal of strikers and victimisation of ‘undesirables’ by employers. 
According to Hemson, this underground organisation reflected the advanced nature of 
dockworkers’ resistance and was able to survive longer than more formal methods of 
trade union organisation that took root amongst other workers. It is interesting to note 
that migrant mineworkers adopted similar modes of organisation on the Witwatersrand in 
the 1940s and (as Dunbar Moodie demonstrates) migrant forms of self-organisation 
existed alongside, and sometimes fed into, trade union struggles. 127  
 
Both Hemson and Moodie draw attention to the egalitarian character of migrant 
organisation on the docks and in the mines and worker leaders, who were often elected, 
went to grate lengths to ensure that consensus was achieved amongst workers before any 
action was taken. Democracy was not absolute, however, and the most profound 
expressions of democracy and working class autonomy existed alongside an acceptance 
of more autocratic forms of leadership, particularly in the political sphere. Mindful of the 
influences of populist ideas, Hemson examines the ambivalent relationship that migrants 
had with traditional authorities and homeland leaders and highlights the contradictory 
role that indunas played in workplace organisation and resistance. He, for instance, 
documents instances in the 1960s and early 1970s where dockworkers drew on traditional 
political structures and leaders to rally workers and discipline supervisors that were 
considered to be too harsh or unsympathetic.128  
 
In his doctoral thesis ‘African Worker Responses on the East Rand to Changes in the 
Metal Industry, 1960 – 1980’ Aristides Sitas considers the consciousness and changing 
organisational cultures of metal migrant workers.129 Sitas notes that SACTU had made 
few inroads into the metal industry on the East Rand during the 1950s and 1960s and 
argues that African metal unions, most notably the Engineering Allied Workers Union 
(EAWU), were shaped by their dealings with registered unions in TUCSA.130 Although 
the EAWU would reject the paternalistic attitudes of this federation and associate with 
the Johannesburg based UTP, the union’s structures and practices mimicked those of the 
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registered metal unions- officials were divorced from the shop floor, while shop stewards 
functioned as ‘contacts’ and ‘recruiters’ for individual members of the union.’131 Sitas 
argues that this type of trade unionism was challenged by MAWU in the 1970s.  
 
Sitas refutes the ‘…common orthodoxy that a township based stable black labour force 
was at the heart of the upsurge of worker militancy in the 1970s’. 132 He notes that 
migrant workers were at the forefront of union organisation in South Africa and, like 
Hemson, is one of the few to analyse the relationship between the declining subsistence 
economy in the homelands and the rise of the new unions. Sitas attributes the growing 
militancy of migrants to increasing economic and social pressures, which plunged the 
established ‘cultural formations’ of migrants into a crisis. He maintains that MAWU 
provided workers with a much-needed sense of cohesion and the union’s style of grass 
roots democracy gave migrants a greater sense of control over their own lives. Migrants 
replaced their long-established leadership, which consisted of a conservative layer of 
older migrants who were quickly loosing legitimacy, with leaders who were elected and 
accountable. Before long, migrant’s social networks were reshaped to facilitate union 
organisation. The consciousness of union members is also examined and Sitas claims that 
a new discourse of struggle- described as a ‘militant, populist workersim’- emerged. This 
discourse included national and racial metaphors together with romantic notions of the 
countryside intermeshed with Christianity. At the same time, the primacy of the working 
class struggle and the union was stressed. 133  
 
This study will draw on many of Sitas’ insights. There are, however, aspects of his study 
that require reflection. Firstly, Sitas does not shed much light on the informal and hidden 
forms of workplace resistance that were adopted by migrant metal workers before they 
joined MAWU. Consequently, it is difficult to get a fix on the way in which the ‘cultural 
formations’ of migrant metal workers were transformed. Did MAWU represent and an 
entirely new method of organisation and the beginnings of working class resistance 
amongst migrant metal workers or did the union draw on and formalise existing modes of 
protest and mobilisation? Secondly, Sitas draws attention to the populist elements within 
migrant metal workers’ culture and consciousness, but does not consider how the more 
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autocratic elements within migrant culture and homeland politics may have shaped the 
union.   
 
Finally, Sitas points out that the fist urban workers to join new unions such as MAWU 
were African women. He, however, does not explore gender in any depth, which is 
unfortunate since women seemed to occupy many key positions in the emerging unions, 
including MAWU. The prominence of women seems out of the ordinary and the way in 
which migrants, who Delius claims were not used to dealing with women in their own 
organisations, related to female worker leaders needs further attention.134 In her study, 
Threads of Solidarity: women in South African industry, 1900 – 1980, Iris Berger argues 
that South African labour history has been too narrowly conceived to deal with gender. 
She attempts to rectify this by examining the particular contributions made by women 
workers and trade unionists. 135 As in the case of Sitas, however, Berger does not throw 
that much light on gender relations within the emerging unions and she does not consider 
the impact that gendered identities may have had on trade union organisation.  
 
1.9. Conclusions  
Accounts of the emerging unions are mostly written by activists who participated in the 
workers’ movement and the literature is framed by a number of key debates, which 
emanate from contemporary discussions that took place within the unions. These debates 
have  mostly focused on the way in which the unions were organised; how they perceived 
and related to the state, and their approach to national politics and community-based 
struggles.  
 
The relationship between SACTU in exile and the emerging unions features prominently 
and still shapes the way in which scholars have characterised the emerging unions. Even 
though SACTU veterans participated in non-racial Marxist unions, activists in these 
unions maintain that SACTU failed to build effective industrial structures, subordinated 
the interests of the unions to nationalist parties, and did not give rise to an effective and 
well organised working class movement that was able to challenge capital. On the other 
hand official SACTU unionists and leaders of the SACP maintained that the emerging 
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unions, including TUACC, were undemocratic, economistic and reformist organisations 
that failed to challenge the apartheid state. In spite of evidence to the contrary, Sithole 
and Ndlovu have resuscitated some of these old SACTU arguments and contribute to an 
official narrative that places the ANC exile movement and the armed struggle at the 
centre of the struggle against apartheid. 136  
 
Sithole and Ndlovu recount the positions of SACTU and the SACP, but do not appear to 
understand the ideas that influenced unionists in the 1970s and which inform many of the 
scholarly accounts of the emerging unions, especially on the on-racial Marxist orientated 
WPWAB, IAS and TUACC. These authors are particularly concerned with Marxist 
debates on the revolutionary potential of trade unions and, like Hyman, argue that trade 
unions are not necessarily bureaucratic or conservative in nature. Scholars such as Maree, 
Friedman and Buhlungu have concentrated on the organisational aspects of unions and 
examine democracy and leadership, particularly the role of white unionists, in the 
emerging unions. Even though these scholars note that there were oligarchic tendencies 
in the emerging unions, they reject the notion that trade unions will automatically become 
more bureaucratic over time and maintain that the emerging unions played an important 
role in challenging capital and apartheid. Webster and Lambert have extended this 
discussion by looking at the way in which unions relate to political organisations and 
other social and community based movements. They argue that the emerging unions were 
never economistic and not only championed worker and trade union rights, but were also 
involved in wider issues relating to reproduction (such as housing and pensions).  
 
The literature has been dominated by theoretical debates and little attention has been 
given to the working class members of trade unions. This is also true of Lowry’s account 
of the UTP. There are, however, notable exceptions. Lewis, for instance, has questio ned 
the urban bias in the literature and points to the complexities that inform the relations 
between urban communities and unions with migrant members. He demonstrates that by 
taking divisions within the African working class into consideration account, a whole 
range of events – such as relations with the KwaZulu government, the 1976 uprising, 
struggles and strikes over union rights for migrants, and registration- take on an entirely 
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different meaning. In addition, scholars such as Hemson and Sitas have broken away 
from ‘old labour history’ and investigate the culture and consciousness of dockworkers 
and metal workers respectively. They elucidate the prominence of unskilled migrant 
workers in the workers’ movement during the 1970s and highlight the ways in which 
workers were able to shape their own organisations and forms of resistance. By taking the 
agency of union members into account, our understanding of the impact of past 
organisations, trade union democracy, political policy, and union relations with 
communities starts to shift.   
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Chapter 2: 
Telling the Story: theory and methodology.  
 
2.1. Introduction  
Scholars of the emerging unions have deployed a wide range of methodologies, but the 
most common evidentiary sources used include documentary material, particularly the 
archives of the emerging unions, and oral testimony. This study also rests on an 
examination of these historical sources, which raise interesting challenges for researchers.   
 
2.2. Oral Testimony      
According to Paul la Hausse, the revival of African unions in the 1970s encouraged 
historians to move beyond political economy and explore issues related to class formation 
and the culture, consciousness and forms of self-organisation in the black working class.1 
This led to the emergence of a new ‘history from below’ that drew on social historians 
such as E.P Thompson, Eric Hobsbawn, Eugene Genovese and Herbert Gutman. 
Historians in this school recognised the enormous potential that oral sources offered in 
terms of uncovering the experiences of the working class first hand, which had either 
been excluded from the record or mediated through the writings of others. Oral history, 
which had previously been used to recover the histories of African communities and 
polities within Southern Africa during the pre-colonial and colo nial period, was extended 
to investigate new themes relating to popular experiences of change in the twentieth 
century.  
 
For much of the 1970s and 1980s social historians used oral history to construct 
important biographical works; elucidate the nature of social relations and processes of 
impoverishment and dispossession in urban centres and the countryside; investigate the 
construction of identities and cultures (with migrants often as a key focus); explore 
resistance and informal and formal modes of organisation and networking; and uncover 
the experience of working life, including the role of women, generation and changing 
forms of family life, and the various life and survival strategies adopted by workers.2 
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Urban social history also stimulated an interest in local histories, the movement of people 
(urbanisation and immigration) and urban settlement.3  
 
More recently the use of oral sources has extended into new areas that do not necessarily 
fall into the category of social history or ‘history from below’, but are nonetheless 
significant as they reflect more contemporary concerns of scholars in a post-apartheid 
context. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC) public hearings, for instance, 
gave the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations under apartheid a voice and 
has brought the need to understand violence and trauma in South African society into 
sharp focus. There has also been a renewed interest in the hidden aspects of the national 
liberation struggle- such as stories of political imprisonment and underground political 
structures and networks. It should be noted that the TRC and many of the histories of 
political resistance, such as the volumes produced by the South African Democracy 
Education Trust (SADET) that has a strong oral history component, have been associated 
with the construction of an official national narrative and nation building. With the new 
democracy there has also been a marked interest in public history and the development of 
heritage sites and museums. Constitution Hill and Robben Island Museum have collected 
numerous testimonies on prison life and oral history has even been introduced into the 
school curriculum. 4 Finally, with the growing HIV-Aids epidemic, a literature that uses 
oral testimony to explore sexual socialisation, gender identities, popular understandings 
of disease and stigma is also in the making.  
 
La Hausse notes that in the South African context oral history is seldom used in isolation 
and social historians combine oral sources with a range of archival material.5 Social 
historians mainly access experiences of social change embedded within living memory 
and tend to focus on oral testimony, as opposed to oral tradition, and the collection of life 
histories interviews has become the preferred method.6 Such interviews respect that a 
wide range of experiences shape individuals (as opposed to a specific event) and attempt 
to place the individual and dramatic events within a larger historical context.7 Interviews 
are open-ended, allowing interviewees to digress and elaborate on issues that they believe 
are important. This, Delius argues, not only opens up new avenues of enquiry (which the 
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historian is often not aware of, but the explanations and interpretations given by 
informants also shape the historian’s understanding and analysis of historical processes.8        
 
La Hausse speculates that it is perhaps due to the reliance on a variety of sources that 
historians in South African have not engaged with the methodological implications of 
oral sources to the same extent as oral historians in the USA and Europe. 9 He maintains, 
nonetheless, that oral material is generally used carefully and critically and historians 
have paid close attention to the variability and fallibility of memory (including the 
tendency to be nostalgic and romanticise the past; the ways in which interviews are 
moulded by power relations and the social characteristics of the interviewee and 
researcher; and the ways in which language and translation influence the interview 
process). In those instances where archival material is scarce, great pains are taken to 
collect numerous testimonies, which are tested against each other with the aim of 
identifying clear patterns. Historians are also sensitive to being drawn into and relying on 
the evidence provided by one social network, which can be a danger of using the ‘snow-
balling’ method, and aim to collect the testimonies from various sections of the 
community being studied.  
 
Social historians have been criticised by scholars influenced by the Frenc h structuralism 
of Louis Althusser and Nicos Poulantzas who rely on broad schematic explanations of 
society. 10 Mike Morris, for instance, argues that social history is anti-theoretical and anti-
conceptual and fails to recognise the role played by ‘primary’ social forces and 
contradictions in structuring society. 11 There is an over-reliance on popular consciousness 
as a source of knowledge, which is problematic in that individuals are not able to 
understand the social forces shaping their lives, behaviours and  consciousness in a clear 
manner.12 He argues that social histories are fragmentary and are unable to comprehend 
society in totality or grapple with theoretical issues that explain larger social questions 
and transitions. This, Morris maintains, has important political implications in that social 
historians are prevented from contributing to a broader emancipatory political project.13  
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Keegan, however, maintains that structuralists have caricatured the theoretical framework 
and methodologies utilised by social historians.14 Many social historians engage with 
macro- level conceptualisations, which they complement with more localised research. 
Keegan maintains that Morris has also confused the argument that oral history can yield 
useful historical data with the notion that subjective human experience is the only 
legitimate level of historical knowledge. In addition, Keegan points out that structuralists 
have not addressed questions around methodology sufficiently and do not question the 
documentary sources upon which they base their theoretical analysis.15 As a result, 
scholars such as Morris ignore the complex processes of change and promote a model of 
functional and predictable outcomes that sideline human agency in favour of a ‘view 
from above’. Oral history, however, enables historians to uncover the experiences of the 
voiceless – allowing historians to challenge hegemonic perception of the past and 
construct more nuanced understandings of change. 16 Finally, oral testimony can play a 
role in political mobilisation by restoring a sense of self-realisation and a common 
historical experience.17    
 
On the other hand, Gary Minkley and Ciraj Rassool criticise South African social 
historians for using the oral testimonies of individuals to construct a historical meta-
narrative, giving rise to a ‘domination and resistance model’ of history. 18 This, they 
argue, is based on two compatible approaches- including the academic promotion of 
culturalist notions of class and consciousness as well as popular histories located within 
the cultural politics of nationalism- which access the past through classes, communities 
and organisations engaged in resistance that played out in a linear fashion with a clear 
origin, course and destination. 19 In summary, they argue that ‘social history in South 
Africa brought together modernist appropriations of oral discourses with nationalist and 
culturalist teleologies of resistance to generate a grand narrative of experience, read as 
history from below.’20 By failing to engage with the power relations embedded within 
conversational narratives, social historians undermine their radical and transformative 
intentions and ‘impose themselves and their ‘radical’ methods on ‘ordinary people’ and 
‘inscribed them into an authenticated historical narrative’.21  
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Minkley and Rassool propose a framework that does not simply equate apartheid and 
resistance and recognises more subtle forms of economic, cultural and intellectual 
exchange integrally tied to the ways in which past and present are negotiated through 
memory, tradition and history (both written and oral) and that counter the existing 
periodisation of resistance and fragment accepted national narratives.22 Oral testimonies 
should not be collapsed into a ‘totalising history’ with the aim of creating a historica l 
realist narrative, nor treated as a monologue that affirms collective memory. 23 Rather it 
should be recognised that oral sources are complex conversational narratives that do not 
have a fixed form.  
 
There are, however, a number of difficulties with Minkley and Rassool’s arguments and 
many of their criticisms of South African social historians, especially in the History 
Workshop, are unfounded. As noted earlier, social historians have long been sensitive to 
the power relations that mould the interview process. They are also keenly aware of 
competing ‘voices’ in marginalised communities and recognise the limitations of 
individual reminiscences when it comes to accentuating differences within a particular 
group.  Even though ‘…human memory is given to error, misconception, elision, 
distortion, elaboration and downright fabrication’, social historians assume that there are 
‘truths’ embedded within oral testimonies that reflect a shared experience, but do not 
necessarily adopt essentialist or teleological approaches to history.  24  Social historians 
often highlight the contradictory nature of consciousness and, while resistance in all its 
forms is a key focus, they rarely assume a particular outcome and highlight the extent to 
which the participants in popular movements diverge from the prescriptions of their 
leaders.  
 
Social historians do not approach their sources uncritically. They do not claim that oral 
testimonies are direct and unmediated links to the past, nor do social historians consider 
oral testimonies to be conversational narratives that are uncontaminated by the 
researcher’s assumptions or interpretations. 25 Rather, they recognise the role played by 
the historian in interpreting sources (written or oral) and argue that it is only through 
external validation that the bias of the historian can be checked. The strength of the life 
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history method, however, is that the power of the researcher in determining the issues that 
will be discussed is constrained- often allowing interviewees to contest the suppositio ns 
and knowledge of the historian. Interviews are also one of the few methods that allow the 
researcher to access the analysis of individuals, which, as Delius argues, can play an 
important part in the construction of history.  
 
One aspect of Minkley and Rassool’s critique that should be taken into account, however, 
is their observation that the social historians have failed to theorise memory. 26 This is not 
to say that memory has been ignored. For instance, Isabel Hofmeyr- who draws attention 
to the gendered nature of storing- telling in traditional African societies; highlights the 
need to identify the keepers of historical knowledge in specific communities and 
recognises the different abilities of storytellers- has made great strides in grappling with 
the complexities of memory. 27 Hofmeyr considers the influences that myth and official 
written accounts have on the recollection and recounting of the past and notes that oral 
testimonies include ‘truths’ that do not necessarily take the form of historical fact. 
Nevertheless, a much more systematic engagement with the structure of oral narratives, 
the influence of the present on historical memory, the interplay between fantasy and fact, 
and links between personal and collective memory is required.     
 
2.3. Oral History and the Emerging Unions   
Most of the scholars of the emerging union movement make use of oral sources, but their 
approaches to these sources vary considerably.28 For instance, Sitas uses oral testimony to 
investigate the consciousness and cultural formations of metal workers on the East Rand. 
Buhlungu, who make extensive use of interviews, is ma inly interested in tracing the 
organisational culture of unions and asks questions dealing with issues such as 
leadership, democracy, changes in union operation, and so on.  29 Maree and Friedman, 
however, mostly use union records, published articles and newspaper reports and draw on 
oral sources to ‘fill in the gaps’.30  
 
There a number of commonalities and scholars of the emerging unions tend to focus on 
union leaders rather than the testimonies of ordinary union members. Buhlungu and Sitas, 
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however, interview shop stewards. There are a number of benefits to this approach as 
shop stewards are elected worker leaders that are in direct contact with members and 
sensitive to their concerns. In addition, shop stewards also tend to be more articulate 
(making them better story tellers) and easier to access. 
  
Scholars have also not reflected a great deal on the methodological challenges posed by 
oral sources. Nevertheless, Maree stresses the importance of respecting the confidentially 
of his informants. He notes that there were deep rifts in the movement and he was careful 
to use the information gained through oral testimony in a sensitive manner. Buhlungu 
also notes that since the first democratic election in 1994 activists have become more 
willing to divulge their political secrets. The collection of oral testimony in the post-
democratic period, however, presents its own difficulties. For instance, there is a real 
danger that researchers target the more influential layer of political activists who have not 
only become well rehearsed in telling their stories, but have also intertwined their 
personal histories with the construction of a broader nationalist narrative.31 
 
This study has shifted over time – not only in terms of content, but also 
methodologically- and has provided valuable lessons in the practice of history. What 
started as an examination of the political policies of FOSATU has become an analysis of 
TUACC. Even though this study falls short of providing a social history of the TUACC 
and is largely organisational in focus, attempts have been made to incorporate social 
history themes and methods. Special attention is paid to issues such as the membership 
composition of the trade unions, generation, gender and ideology.     
 
Attempts were made to contact and interview shop stewards who had participated in the 
TUACC unions during the 1970s. Union affiliates were contacted and it was hoped that 
the snowballing method could be used to get in touch with shop stewards who had retired 
and were no longer part of the union movement. Only a few male shop stewards that 
were active during the 1970 could be traced. All of the shop stewards interviewed, 
however, had urban backgrounds and originally joined the UTP unions. They only 
became part of unions such as MAWU in the 1980s.  There are a number of factors that 
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explain this difficulty in locating shop stewards that were active in the 1970s. Unlike the 
UTP unions, it appears that a huge proportion of the TUACC shop stewards were 
migrant. Shifts in members and leadership composition, massive retrenchments, and the 
transient nature of migrant labour have all unwound the bonds that once tied these worker 
leaders to their unions.  They are now scattered throughout the rural areas and a great 
deal of time and resources are required to find and interview them. Such resources are, 
unfortunately, beyond the scope of this study.    
 
This failure to interview migrant shop stewards did not result in the abandonment of oral 
testimony. In line with Sitas’ observation that African women were the first urban-based 
workers to join the TUACC unions, a couple of women worker leaders were located and 
interviewed. In addition, in-depth interviews with trade union officials and some of the 
early trade union organisers have been conducted.   
 
As in the case of the documentary evidence, the data gained from oral history has as far 
as possible been tested against other sources of evidence and testimonies. In so doing the 
particular strengths of oral history have come to light. These testimonies fill the political 
silences found in the documentary evidence and often explain what is going on in the 
minutes and union reports. The testimonies collected allow us to go beyond trade union 
rhetoric and uncover what was really happening.      
 
2.4. Documents and Archives   
A wide range of documentary material has also been perused. The official archive of the 
TUACC, housed at Historical Papers (University of the Witwatersrand), is a rich source 
of material. This has been supplemented with papers from specific affiliates, which are 
also part of the COSATU collection, as well as the separate collections that contain 
related material, such as the minutes and reports of the Industrial Aid Society (IAS). 
Articles from Abasebensi, which have been published on the Internet by the DISA 
project, and numerous articles from the South African Labour Bulletin and Work in 
Progress have also been utilised. In addition to the union archives, government records, 
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mostly published including the Department of Labour’s annual reports and reports of the 
Wiehahn and Riekert Commissions, have been examined.  
 
As Peter Tosh points out, documentary evidence is by no means infallible and ‘[n]o 
document, however authoritative, is beyond question…’.32 The content of archival 
documents needs to be interpreted and tested for reliability and, as with oral sources, 
historians need to be aware of distortions and inaccuracies. Scholars of the emerging 
union movement have already highlighted a number of problem areas when dealing with 
union records and draw our attention to political silences; the authorship of union 
documents; and inaccuracies in the documents.    
 
Luckhardt and Wall as well as Friedman mostly concentrate on articles from the South 
African Labour Bulletin and newspaper reports. Their reliance on information that had 
already been made public partly reflects serious concerns about security. These authors 
were researching their books during a very repressive period in South Africa history and 
clearly did not want to compromise anyone. Maree goes on to observe that this self-
imposed political censure is reflected in union documents. Unionists were clearly aware 
that they were being watched by the Security Police and he sates that minutes were 
occasionally written to conceal information.   
 
The silences within the documentation are striking at times. For instance there is little 
mention of the 1976 urban uprising in the minutes of the period. It is important to note, 
however, that political debate was not entirely wiped from the record. Often political 
discussions were diverted into fierce debates about seemingly mundane organisational 
issues. It is precisely because of their underlying political implications that these 
conversations were usually documented.  
 
Buhlungu cautions that documentary sources tend to mirror power relations and are 
written from the vantage point of those who are in charge. In the case of the emerging 
trade unions, Buhlungu argues that documents tend to reflect the perspectives of a minute 
layer of full time officials with a strong command of English. Maree confirms this. He 
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claims that union organisers and shop stewards were barely literate and white 
intellectuals were expected to draft minutes and reports, which on occasion reflected their 
views on important issues. One should be careful to interpret this to mean that those in 
control of the minutes necessarily shared the same views. In addition, many of the 
minutes and documents were translated into vernacular and it would be of interest to 
compare and contrast these translations with the English record.  
 
Finally, Maree questions the accuracy of union sources. Although this obviously needs to 
be taken into account when dealing with all records, he suggests that in the case of union 
documents the authorship is not always clear and the records are not always complete. 
Added to this, he argues that, ‘…in their early days, when the unions were struggling for 
survival, there was a tendency for them to exaggerate their achievements, presumably as 
a way of boosting workers confidence and morale.’33 This means that information 
relating membership numbers and general support may be skewed.     
 
2.5. Conclusions  
This study is based on a combination of oral and archival sources. The collection of oral 
testimony has provided valuable lessons in using social and oral history. Interviews have 
been conducted with trade union leaders and perhaps the most notable weakness of this 
study is the absence of shop steward voices. Until attention is given to the voices of 
worker leaders and union members much of the emerging unions’ history will remain 
eclipsed.    
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Chapter 3:  
Political and Economic Transformations and Trade Union Legacies.  
 
3.1. Introduction  
The Sharpeville and Langa massacres in March 1960 signalled the beginning of a new era 
in South Africa. Open political resistance was brutally crushed, forcing both the ANC 
and Pan-African Congress (PAC) into exile, and the African trade union movement 
declined. In addition to increased repression, the government embarked on a massive 
exercise in social engineering that was rooted in the ideology of ‘separate development’, 
resulting in significant societal transformations. The aim of this chapter is to trace the 
conditions out of which the new trade union movement emerged.  
 
Often seen as a ‘decade of darkness’ for African working class resistance, scholars have  
focused on the role that the economic boom of the 1960s played in facilitating the rise of 
the emerging unions in the following decade.1 It is often argued that with the expansion 
and capitalisation of industry, African workers were concentrated in larger numbers and 
their bargaining power intensified as they were increasingly employed as semi-skilled 
production workers.2 Although there is some debate over the existence of an adequate 
industrial base to sustain the organisation of African workers in the 1950s, there is 
general agreement that by the end of the 1960s suitable conditions had developed for the 
emergence of large industrial trade unions.3  
 
Economic conditions play an important role in shaping the organisational possibilities 
within a given context, but the relationship between the economy and industrial 
organisation proved much more complex than the argument above suggests. Most 
notably, this argument does not explain why a large proportion of TUACC’s members 
were drawn from the ranks of unskilled industrial workers who were in the process of 
becoming more vulnerable. To understand the TUACC unions, which were at the 
forefront of creating a militant socialist current in the workers movement, we need to 
look at the economic boom from a different angle and consider the connections between 
the urban modern economy and the rural subsistence economy of the homelands. 
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Economic developments, however, are not a sufficient explanation of the organisational 
forms that emerged and the state as well as ideo logical and organisational factors must 
also be taken into account. As Lambert writes:  
 
‘…working class resistance does not flow automatically from changes in 
production. It has rather to be related to the lived experience of the proletariat, the 
leadership, strategy and changes in consciousness.’4  
 
African workers were caught in a web of extra-economic laws and institutions (such as 
the pass laws and labour bureaux), which were designed to regulate and control every 
aspect of their lives, and in 1953 a joint United Nations and International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) committee concluded that forced labour existed in South Africa.5 
These measures shaped the African labour market and will be examined in conjunction 
with developments in the economy. To unders tand the framework in which TUACC 
emerged it is also necessary to consider the legacy of previous trade union movements as 
well as the emergence of new forms of political and industrial resistance in the late 
1960s, which influenced the organisational choices of the TUACC unions in important 
ways.  
 
3.2. Boom and Bust: the marginalisation of unskilled African workers  
TUACC’ membership reflected both the increase in the number of semi-skilled 
production workers, particularly the growing numbers of African women employed in 
industry, as well as the marginalisation of unskilled workers, many of whom were 
migrant. To understand the composition of the TUACC unions it is necessary to consider 
the impact that tightening influx control measures and the collapse of the homeland 
economy had on workers. Social historians have long recognised that the modern urban 
economy and the rural-subsistence economy of the homelands were linked in important 
ways and this section will examine the implications that these connections had for the 
organisation of African workers in the 1970s.6   
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According to Deborah Posel the urban African labour market could be divided into three 
categories by the 1950s.7 These included: urban workers, who had residential rights 
(under Section 10 of the Native (Urban Areas) Act); oscillating migrants, who maintained 
a permanent household in the rural areas; and men and women who had migrated to an 
urban centre with the intention of settling permanently but were still legally classified as 
migrant.8 She argues that within a context of intensifying influx control, urban-based 
workers had more power to negotiate and tended to occupy the most popular jobs, which 
were better paid, offered better working conditions, and did not involve much manual 
labour.9 New arrivals, especially those who were not linked into any social and economic 
networks, were initially forced into more unskilled or ‘obnoxious’ categories of work, 
although they quickly moved out of these positions once they became more established.10  
 
Posel maintains that oscillating migrants occupied an ambiguous position in the labour 
market. Drawing on the work of William Beinart and Peter Delius, she notes that the 
urban experience for migrants was often mediated through migrant associations.11 It was 
through these associations that young men (and rising numbers of women) were able to 
access the experience and social networks of older workers and tap into the informal 
economy and established employment arrangements.12 Many companies preferred to 
employ migrants. Even though migrants were more transient and less educated than 
urban-based workers, they were more disciplined and employers could utilise their social 
structures and indunas to exercise control over them. Migrants mainly occupied unskilled 
posit ions, but different groupings laid claim to certain job categories and were able to 
avoid the worst jobs.13 Posel notes, for instance, that one of the key failures of the influx 
control in the 1950s was persistent labour shortages in ‘heavy manual categories’ in 
industry and in municipal and domestic service.14  
 
In the case of African women, the urban-rural divide and the gendered application of 
influx controls and employment practices shaped the labour market. Posel notes that due 
to mass political resistance in the 1950s, the apartheid government was initially unable to 
extend pass laws and labour bureaux to African women. This meant that women had 
more freedom of movement and were able to take advantage of the informal township 
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economy (through beer brewing, trading, and prostitution) if they were not able to secure 
employment right away. Although women were generally concentrated in the service 
industry as domestic workers (an unpopular choice for many), African women were also 
employed in industries such as textiles, clothing, and food that conformed to notions of 
traditional gender roles. Even though women were usually employed in the lowest paid 
and less skilled grades of work, women in the industrial sector earned more than 
domestic workers. 15 Posel notes, however, that in most instances it was African women 
with urban rights who were able to secure employment in the urban industrial and 
commercial sector.      
 
The life choices of unskilled workers narrowed considerably after the government 
reframed its influx control policy in the late 1950s.16 Partly in response to the mass 
resistance of the 1950s (including the Defiance Campaign, the Congress of the People, 
and strikes and stay-aways organised by SACTU) and the shortcomings of influx control 
measures in regulating African urbanisation and labour flows, the government decided to 
keep permanent African urbanisation to an absolute minimum.  Instead of accepting and 
even creating conditions for a small stable African working class in the urban areas (or 
‘prescribed areas’), influx control became inextricably linked to the ideology of ‘separate 
development’. The reserves were converted to ethically based homelands, while urban 
municipalities divided their African populations into corresponding ethnic zones. The 
supply of African labour in the urban centres was also stringently controlled - labour 
quotas were imposed on urban establishments, labour intensive industries were 
encouraged to relocate to border areas, and the labour bureaux system was extended.      
  
The labour bureaux proved particularly cumbersome.17 In 1964 the government passed 
the Bantu Labour Relations Act that provided a comprehensive framework for the 
functioning of labour bureaux, which was streamlined and extended to the homelands 
under regulations promulgated in 1965 and 1968 respectively. In the prescribed areas all 
African male residents over 15 years of age were compelled to register as work seekers at 
the local bureau and had to report to the bureau within three days of becoming 
unemployed. Although the introduction of Administration Boards in 1972 were supposed 
 77 
to increase the mobility of labour between prescribed areas, African workers still found it 
difficult to gain legal employment or housing outside of the area in which they were 
originally registered.  
 
Those without Section 10 rights were only allowed to remain in prescribed areas for a 
maximum of 72 hours, unless they were in possession of an employment contract. Only 
male migrants could obtain such a contract after registering with a tribal bureau in their 
homelands. On registration these men were placed into a category of employment, which 
in theory they were allowed to select but to which they were often assigned against their 
will. They could be refused an oversubscribed category and some labour bureaux were 
zoned for providing employment to particular industries. This had important 
consequences as once assigned, migrants were expected to remain in that category for the 
rest of their lives unless given special permission to change. Registration, however, was 
only the first step and migrants still had wait for recruitment to secure an employment 
contract and leave their tribal area legally. 
  
While political repression and government control intensified, the urban economy 
expanded rapidly. Duncan Innes argues that by smashing open political resistance at the 
start of the 1960s, the government was able to pave the way for the most spectacular 
economic boom since the Second World War. 18 The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
increased by an annual rate of 9.3 % between 1963 and 1968, making the South African 
economy one of the fastest growing in the world.19 Innes notes that this growth could 
mainly be attributed to the expansion of manufacturing and construction. He claims that 
while manufacturing and construction increased their contribution to the GDP from 
23.7% in 1960 to 28% in 1971, agriculture dropped from 12.1% to 9.6 % and mining 
decreased from 13.8% to 9.3%.20 
 
With economic expansion came important structural shifts in the economy and 
production.  A marked increase can be observed in the concentration and centralisation of 
capital, especially in manufacturing, and it has been estimated that 10 of the largest firms 
controlled up to 70% of turnover in the sector.21 Maree argues that this concentration 
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changed the structure of industry and led to a rise in the number of intermediate (between 
200- 499 workers) and large (more 500 workers) establishments.22 In addition, growing 
foreign investment stimulated capital expenditure and mechanised production.23 
 
Labour was also restructured- the numbers of workers employed in industries outside of 
mining and agriculture grew and the racial division of labour was altered as more and 
more African workers were employed in semi-skilled positions.24 Although the 
emergence of this layer of semi-skilled workers was an uneven process that took some 
time to unfold, the proportion of African workers employed as semi-skilled machine 
operators rose steadily. In manufacturing, for instance, Owen Crankshaw estimates that 
the proportion of African workers employed as semi-skilled machine operators rose from 
65 to 86 percent between 1965 and 1990.25  
 
Nonetheless, as Crankshaw points out, industry still employed significant numbers of 
unskilled African workers. In 1965 unskilled workers constituted 70% of the total work 
force in construction and 39% in manufacturing. 26 These unskilled workers, however, 
were being placed under increasing social and economic pressure and migrants were 
constricted in both their urban and rural worlds. In terms of life in the urban areas, Phil 
Bonner and Noor Nieftagodien give us some indication of the growth in municipal 
hostels, especially in Vosloorus on the East Rand, and the disagreeable living conditions 
that migrants had to contend with.27 Migrants, especially on the Witwatersrand, were also 
frustrated by crime and the continual harassment from tsotsi youth gangs in neighbouring 
townships.         
 
On the other hand, migrants were finding it more difficult to bypass influx control and 
migrate to the urban centres, even illegally. This hemming in of migrants contributed to 
population pressure in the reserves, which was growing due to the flight of African 
tenants from white owned farms and the forced removal of ‘black spots’ from white 
South Africa. 28 Increasing strain was placed on the already precarious subsistence 
economy, giving rise to sprawling settlements with residents who did not have access to 
livestock or sufficient land to farm. Plots that were allocated got smaller and the number 
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of cattle dwindled. 29 With the erosion of the subsistence economy, the dependency of 
rural households on remittances and old age pensions deepened.  
 
Presented with no real future in the homelands, some migrants responded by trying to 
escape these conditio ns and setting up a new life in the urban areas. In spite of the 
tightening controls, they set out to gain Section 10 rights and brought their families with 
them, often setting up shacks in informal squatter settlements.30 Another significant 
response, especially to the reliance on a cash income, was large-scale female migrancy.31 
The influx of African women into urban areas facilitated the creation and growth of a 
stable and permanently settled African population and was frowned upon by the apartheid 
government.32 From the late 1950s government tighten the noose on women residing in 
the urban areas, while migrant women had to ‘run the gauntlet’ to secure urban 
employment. 33 For Africans without urban rights staying in the urban centres became a 
constant battle in the face of forced removals and the widespread repatriation of women. 
 
Communities responded in different ways. In Natal, for instance, residents of Cato Manor 
and Umkhumbane - squatter camps that served as a ‘residential haven’ for migrant 
workers with close ties to the rural areas – were at the forefront of resisting such 
measures.34 Significantly the women in Cato Manor played a leading role in the protests 
against the removal of African residents to KwaMashu.35 ‘Shebeen queens’ and petty 
brewers also responded violently to the Durban Municipality’s attempt to clamp down on 
the illegal sale of liquor and joined the campaign against local authorities. 36 In 1959 up to 
2000 women were involved in invading municipal beer halls, assaulting male patrons, 
spilling beer and destroying the municipal distillery and in 1960 nine municipal 
policemen who were part of a beer raid at Umkhumbane were killed by an angry mob. 
Clashes between Cato Manor residents and the municipality continued over the next few 
months, with women such as Dorothy Nyembe, Ruth Shabane and Gladys Manzi playing 
a leading role in the protests.37 In spite of such fierce resistance, the state eventually 
succeeded in extending control over African women. In 1964 Bantu Laws Amendment 
Act prohibited African women from entering urban areas, except with a visitors permit.38 
The state aimed to confine unattached women to the homelands and in 1967 the Bantu 
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Administrative Department declared that no African women (even those with Section 10 
rights) were allowed to apply for family accommodation. This meant that African women 
had to depend on men to secure urban accommodation and urban rights.   
 
Many rural women found employment in the decentralised border industries.39 Iris Berger 
notes that in the 1970s and 1980s women made up half to two-thirds of the homelands’ 
industrial labour force.40 The high number of women employed in the border industries 
was part of a broader trend and Berger argues that the proportion of African women 
employed in industry rose from 30 to 42.7 percent between 1969 and 1981.41 In addition, 
African women were beginning to make inroads into new industries, such as metal, and 
new types of work including sales and clerical work.42 Berger claims, however, that 
urban-migrant divisions between women became more pronounced and women with 
Section 10 rights had better chances of securing employment in urban-based industries. 
She also claims that in spite of spatial distance, there was a possible conflict of interest 
between relatively better paid women industrial workers in the urban areas and the 
migrant women in the lowly paid and labour intensive industries in the homelands.          
 
From the mid 1970s there was a marked decline in the demand for unskilled workers. By 
1985 the proportion of unskilled workers had dropped to 19% in construction and 13% in 
manufacturing. 43 The percentage of unskilled workers in manufacturing, construction, 
and gold mining combined dropped from 70% in 1960 to just over 50% in 1985.44 As the 
economy started to slow down in the 1970s, unskilled workers were not absorbed back 
into the urban economy and the level of unemployment soared to an estimated 21% by 
1979.45 Berger maintains that black women were particularly susceptible to 
unemployment and, in the face of a declining subsistence economy, migrant men were 
also hard-hit and placed in a desperate position.  46   
 
Lucas Tshabalala, a migrant metal worker interviewed by Sitas, aptly expressed this 
desperation. He claimed:47   
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…you realise you can’t get a job, it is a death sentence. The countryside is 
pushing you in the cities to survive. The cities are pushing you in the countryside 
to die. It’s a fear that you come to know after a week without food… 
 
The erosion of the migrant’s ability to negotiate and bargain is best illustrated by the 
callous realities of labour recruitment. In an article originally published in the Sash (May 
1974) Sheena Duncan noted that:48      
 
Migrant workers from the Bantustans are processed through labour bureaux which 
are more like cattle markets than anything else. Men register there as work 
seekers then hang around to wait recruitment. They wait days, weeks, months. 
Then comes the great day. The recruiting agent arrives. Two hundred and fifty 
men line up…He walks along the line and beckons those he chooses. This one 
looks wrong, this one looks young and teachable, this one is too old, this one 
looks too thin. This one says he doesn’t want to work at eight Rand a week…He 
must be too cheeky. ‘Get back in line, I don’t like cheeky boys.’ Those who are 
not picked must wait weeks, maybe months, until the next recruiting agent comes. 
The cheeky one won’t argue next time…His children are starving and a little is 
better than nothing.    
 
Migrants were forced into those ‘obnoxious’ categories of work that they had been able 
to avoid in the past. For instance, in Paul Steward’s study Mandlenkosi Makhoba, a 
migrant worker who was employed in a foundry on the East Rand, remarked:49  
 
[w]e get lower jobs than township people. In those places where workers are 
gently treated we are not needed. We are only needed in those places where there 
is rough work. 
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Bernie Fanaroff, a MAWU organiser, confirms this. He recalls that: 50  
 
…in Natal and Johannesburg they (migrants) constituted by far the majority of the 
metal industry at that time. It was only later that you had more urban workers 
coming in, with higher skills. People weren’t really taken into semi-skilled jobs at 
all until well in the 1980s. This was partly because of job reservation and partly 
because racism particularly in the heavy engineering field...no self respecting 
urban worker would work there because the conditions were very [bad].     
 
Both this lack of bargaining power and the move towards unionisation reflected a broader 
crisis in the migrant labour system. Sitas, who refers to the 1970s as the ‘lean years’, 
identifies a number of factors that fed into the discontent of migrants and fuelled worker 
resistance.51 These included: rural subsistence collapse; repression; exposure to rising 
levels of violence and criminality; acrimonious relations in the hostels; decline in wages, 
increasing political mobilisation in the townships; and transformations in conditions of 
control in the factories. He argues that migrant social structures and networks were 
placed under increasing strain and, in their attempt to create new forms of cohesion 
migrants became susceptible to union organisation.  
 
Barring the African Mine Workers Union (AMWU) in the 1940s and the 1946 mine-
workers strike, migrants were not organised (into unions) on a significant scale before the 
1970s and most of the factors identified by Sitas are symptomatic of a radical 
reconfiguration of social and economic relations in industry. An economy once hungry 
for unskilled, low-waged, and migrant labour was now increasingly based on mechanised 
production and semi-skilled machine operators. Established relations with employers (or 
what can be referred to as the ‘moral economy’ in industry) were destabilised. According 
to Sitas, unions provided migrants with a new sense of belonging and the means to 
renegotiate their relations with employers.  
 
African women also joined unions in unprecedented numbers.52 Hemson recalls that 
activists in the GFWBF were advised by other unionists to recruit women industrial 
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workers, who were paid low wages and live in deplorable conditions, and proved 
particularly keen on joining trade unions.53 The marked growth in the unionisation of 
African women requires a more systematic examination. An obvious contributing factor, 
however, was the growth of female employment in industry and Peter Alexander notes 
that first generation workers, or newly proletarianised workers, tend to be more militant 
than those workers who are seasoned in workplace resistance and trade unionism. 54 It 
may also be that, much like migrants, women workers found that unions offered one of 
the only viable means to resist excessive controls and secure their position in the urban 
areas. Scholars have long refuted the notion that women, as primary care givers, are more 
conservative than men and less prone to be involved resistance and it would appear that, 
at least in some instances, women trade unionists drew on a deeper tradition of popular 
resistance and political leadership provided by women in their communities (such as in 
the case of Cato Manor for instance).55 This may, in part, explain the militancy of women 
workers in the 1970s and the role that women, such as June Rose Nala and B. Tshabalala, 
played in providing the new unions with leadership. The reach of this fe male leadership 
was not restricted to unions with a large female membership, such as the National Union 
of Textile Workers (NUTW), or the umbrella structures of TUACC, but extended into 
predominantly male and migrant unions such as MAWU. 
 
Partly due to the cyclical booms and busts and uneven nature of the South African 
economy, African women and migrant male workers moved centre stage in the 1970s. 
Thus, while the growth in semi-skilled production workers would become significant, it 
is important to recognie that unskilled workers were also as important a component of the 
new unions, if not more so, especially TUACC. The organisational approach adopted by 
TUACC cannot simply be read off its membership composition and additional factors, 
including the organisational traditions inherited from previous movements, have to be 
explored.    
  
3.3. Legacies of the Past 
In spite of a marked decline in organised industrial activity in the mid 1960s and the 
emergence of new layers of workers unseasoned in the ways of unionism in the 1970s, 
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linkages with past movements were not entirely severed. 56 The emerging unions were 
unable to escape various forms of industrial resistance created by workers and their 
organisations in the past. Like the unions before them, the TUACC unions drew on and 
were moulded by the organisational traditions inherited from previous union movements.    
  
From the formation of the first trade unions in the late 1800s, the trade union movement 
in South Africa has both reflected and contested racial, gender, and sectional divisions 
within the working class. This was especially true of racial inequality, which was legally 
entrenched until the first democratic election held in 1994. Consequently, African 
workers were situated on the bottom rung of the labour market in terms of wages, 
working conditions, and rights in the workplace for most of the twentieth century.  
 
With the introduction of the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act, which laid the foundation 
of the modern industrial relations system, the rightlessness of African workers was 
entrenched.57 The Act excluded ‘pass bearing Natives’ from the definition of employee, 
which meant that African working class men were barred from becoming members of 
registered trade unions and prevented from participating in the dispute resolution and 
collective bargaining structures created for other workers. 58 They were denied the means 
to institute legal strike action and, although never declared illegal, employers were not 
compelled to negotiate with their unions. 
 
In spite of these constraints African workers organised themselves into unions. The first 
African union, the Industrial Workers of Africa (IWA) formed in 1917, was quickly 
followed by the mighty ICU that claimed a membership of over 100,000 at its apogee. 
Both organisations, which were loosely organised general unions, raised broader political 
concerns. van der Walt argues that the IWA, which he characterises as revolutionary 
syndicalist, viewed the ‘…working-class struggle by African workers as essential to the 
abolition of racially oppressive laws’ and in 1919 spearheaded a campaign against passes 
on the Witwatersrand.59 The ICU, which some view more as political organisation that a 
union, became a potent symbol of black resistance as it tapped into the plight of labour 
tenants who were being pushed off the land in the late 1920s.60  
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By the start of the 1930s both organisations had run their course. Not much has been 
written about the internal workings of the IWA, but Phil Bonner has criticised the ICU 
for failing to develop effective organisational strategies and structures.61 Instead of 
collective action, the ICU focused on individual complaints. Instead of direct action 
(strikes and pickets), ICU leaders relied on legal action and petitions to government 
authorities.62 Instead of building transparent financial controls and democratic structures, 
the ICU centered on theatrical mass meetings and personality cults around key leaders. 
Bonner notes that: 63  
   
Both Champion, the ICU’s Natal leader, and Kadalie bear this stamp. Each relied 
more on charisma than on organisation, and each saw the standing of the union 
being synonymous with his own. This was damaging, not only because it 
substituted populism with trade unionism, but because it also gave rise to a series 
of personal vendettas.       
 
African workers were mostly employed in the mining and agricultural sector, which were 
strictly controlled and notoriously difficult to organise. Following the expansion of 
secondary industry after the First and Second World Wars, African workers increasingly 
turned to industrial unions. Many of these affiliated to larger groupings or federations 
including the Federation of Non-European Trade Unions (FNETU) formed in 1928, the 
South African Trades and Labour Council (T&LC), which also organised workers of 
other races in registered and craft unions and was formed in 1930, and the Council of 
Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) formed in 1941.  
 
The formation of industrial unions did not guarantee sound organisational principles or 
struc tures and, much like the ICU, leaders continued to act with little accountability while 
unions failed to combine the political and economic demands of workers into an effective 
line of attack. For instance, Baruch Hirson argues that the CPSA controlled FNETU was 
influenced by the broader revolutionary directives of the Profintern and rejected basic 
reforms. These unions, therefore, failed to relate to the immediate demands of workers. 64 
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Jon Lewis makes a similar argument, claiming that ‘ultra left’ policies and the 
federation’s close relationship with the CPSA, which was beset by internal leadership 
conflicts, hastened the decline of FNETU during the Depression. 65 He, however, also 
highlights the negative impact that curbs upon civil liberties, especially the introduction 
of the 1930 Riotous Assemblies Act, had on African unions.66   
 
CNETU emerged during the Second World War, a period in which employers became 
more dependent on African labour, and rivalled the ICU in terms of numbers. 67 As noted 
above, one significant aspect of CNETU was that the AMWU, one of the federation’s 
largest affiliates, organised migrant mine workers. Moodie argues that that AMWU was 
able to tap into traditional sources of resistance in the mines, especially on the East Rand, 
and the 1946 strike demonstrated that migrant mine workers were willing to support the 
demands of a union as long as these coincided with their own interests.68  
 
CNETU was also constrained by various forms of repression. Although punitive action 
against unions and  strikes was briefly relaxed during the first part of the War, the 
government passed War Measure 9, which banned strikes in war industries and essential 
services, and War Measure 145, which prohibited strikes by African workers, in 1942. In 
addition, AMWU had to work around War Measure 1425, passed in August 1944, which 
prevented African union from meetings on the mines. CNETU received its biggest blows 
from the defeat of the 1946 mineworkers strike and the subsequent collapse of AMWU.  
 
Like the unions before, many of CNETU’s weaknesses were also organisational in 
nature. Peter Alexandra argues that CNETU affiliates lacked democratic structures and 
members were unable to hold their leaders accountable or keep their organisations free of 
corruption. 69 Echoing criticism of the behaviour of leaders in the ICU, concerns were 
raised that officials did not differentiate between membership dues and their personal 
finances. The federation was also subject to political wrangling between the CPSA and 
ANC on the one hand and more left wing ‘Trotskyist’ tendencies on the other. Baruch 
Hirson further argues that one of the key failures of CNETU was that it was unable to 
relate to local township struggles such as the Alexandra bus boycott. 70  
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CNETU has been credited with the development of an assertive independent African 
trade unionism, but Lambert argues that CNETU affiliates had to rely on the goodwill of 
registered trade unions to raise concerns in talks with employers. Some of the more 
enlightened registered unions in the T&LC - including the Textile Workers Industrial 
Union (TWIU), Food Canning Workers Union (FCWU), National Union of Laundry, 
Cleaning and Dyeing Workers (NULCDW), and Garment Workers Union (GWU) - made 
great strides in overcoming racial barriers in the 1930s and 1940s. There was a loophole 
in the Industrial Conciliation Act and African women, who did not have to carry passes, 
were admitted as members in some cases. There were other instances of cross-racial 
solidarity and Lewis notes that the Witwatersrand and Vereeniging local committees of 
the T&LC supported the 1946 mineworkers strike.71     
 
Most of the African workers employed in industry were male and, without organisational 
rights of their own, African unions became dependant on registered trade unio ns and this 
undermined non-racism and democracy. Since registered unions did not want to forfeit 
their rights by admitting African male workers as members, African workers were 
usually organised into separate structures or parallel unions. These separate structures 
were not able to negotiate with employers directly, which prevented African workers 
from holding representatives accountable.       
   
At the beginning of the 1950s the union movement seemed in crisis once again. The 
T&LC splintered, largely over the question of organising African workers, while internal 
leadership divisions plagued CNETU.72 The economy slowed down after the War and the 
bargaining power of African workers declined as thousands of white soldiers returned 
home. To compound all of these problems, the newly elected National Party curtailed 
African political and industrial organisation by passing the Suppression of Communism 
Act (1950) and redesigning the industrial relations system in line with apartheid policy.  
 
In accordance with the recommendations of the 1951 Botha Commission, the Industrial 
Conciliation Act (No. 28 of 1956) was amended to prevent any further registrations of 
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racially mixed unions.73 This time all Africans (including women) were excluded from 
the definition of employee and a totally separate industrial relations system was created 
for African workers under the Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes Act) (No. 48 of 
1953). Provision was made for works committees; regional Bantu labour committees; a 
Central Bantu Labour Board; and a host of Bantu labour officers, who were supposed to 
serve as an interface between workers, employers, and various government 
departments.74 Although the jurisdiction of works committees proved extremely limited, 
workers were at least able to choose their representatives. This is where any elected form 
of representation ended and industrial relations structures for African workers were 
mainly controlled by officials appointed by government ministers and so forth.  
 
A central theme that emerges from the 1950s onwards is that the government feared that 
African unions would be used to achieve political ends. By creating these separate 
institutions, government officials hoped that African trade unions would be rendered 
powerless and automatically decline.75 This sentiment was expressed by the Labour 
Minister in his response to the Botha Commission’s recommendation to allow for the 
limited registration of African trade unions. He complained that, ‘…whatever form of 
control is introduced you will not be able to prevent them [African trade unions] from 
being used as political weapons’ and argued that if the institutions created by the 
government were successful, ‘Natives would have no interest in trade unions and trade 
unions will probably die a natural death. 76            
 
This fear that African unions would become politicised was soon realised, however, and 
in May 1955 the surviving unions of CNETU and the left-wing unions from the T&LC 
came together to set up SACTU. The new federation formally aligned to the Congress 
Movement and specifically aimed to combine the economic and political concerns of 
workers. As the chairman of SACTU’s inaugural congress, Piet Beyleveld, expressed in 
his address:77 
 
You cannot separate politics and the way in which people are governed from their 
bread and butter, or their freedom to move to and from places where they can find 
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the best employment, or the houses they live in, or the type of education their 
children get. These things are of vital concern to the workers. The trade unions 
would therefore be neglecting the interests of their members if they failed to 
struggle for their members on all matters which affect them. The trade unions 
must be as active in the political field as they are in the economic sphere because 
the two hang together and cannot be isolated from each other.  
  
As noted above, this two-pronged approach was unevenly implemented in SACTU and 
Lambert maintains that there were important regional variations. SACTU unions in Natal 
broke significantly with the past and developed a new method of organisation that was 
better suited to the hostile environment in which African workers had to organise and 
combined workers economic and political struggles without neglecting trade union 
organisation. Referred to as ‘political unionism’, this approach was designed to overcome 
the constant victimisation of union members and, in so doing, strengthen the weak union 
base in the region. 78  
 
One of the most prominent features of political unionism was that it sought to use 
nationa l sentiment and the popular struggles of the Congress Movement to attract the 
support of workers. Unlike the early general unions, political unionism energised shop 
floor organisation by encouraging the formation of factory committees (small politically 
conscious groups) that operated in a semi-clandestine manner until enough members had 
been recruited for a union. These ‘new model unions’ were based on democratically 
elected workplace committees and rooted in strong workplace organisation. Politics 
remained central and unions were required to educate and raise the consciousness of their 
members by linking broader political issues to more immediate ‘bread and butter’ 
concerns.  
 
Another important aspect of SACTU in Natal is the extent to which migrant workers 
were mobilised. Magubane et al note, for instance, that in April 1960 a ten-day strike by 
workers from Cato Manor, which constituted about 20% of Durban’s workforce, caused 
substantial disruption to industry and commerce.79 This was followed by a strike by 
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workers from Clermont and SJ Smith hostel in Lamontville that was 85%- 90% effective, 
with the greatest support coming from migrants.80      
 
Lambert claims that this new organising method proved quite effective. When SACTU 
was formed in 1955, the 10 Natal affiliates proved to be the weakest. By 1961 the 
province boasted 26 unions and membership had increased from 5,900 to 23,000.81 
Moreover, Lambert suggests that rather than negate the possibility of creating an 
independent working class movement, this new approach enabled the Natal unions to 
influence the political agenda of the Congress movement and begin ‘a process of 
proletarianising the ANC’.82     
 
Lambert argues that older more established unions, with their ‘orthodox’ approach to 
trade union organisation, dominated SACTU in the Transvaal and the Western Cape (the 
NULCDW in the Transvaal and the FCWU in the Western Cape).83 Barring the African 
Textile Workers Industrial Union (ATWIU) at the Amato textile plant in Benoni that 
organised a significant proportion of SACTU workers on the Witwatersrand, organisation 
in the Transvaal centred on officials who were preoccupied with bureaucratic procedure 
and ‘proper’ structures. 84 As a result unionisation in the Transvaal proved superficial and 
less able to withs tand employer and state victimisation and repression. In addition, unions 
such as the NULCDW and African Union of Laundry, Cleaning and Dyeing Workers 
(AULCDW) were resistant when it came to taking up political campaigns. Lambert 
points out that this reluc tance was further compounded by the attitudes of political 
leaders in the province. While many of the leading figures of the Congress movement 
were based in the Transvaal, they were mainly concerned with ‘high- level politics’ and 
did not involve themselves in the day-to-day grass roots activity of the unions. Rather 
than influence the politics of the Congress movement as the Natal unions set out to do, 
Lambert shows that unionists in the Transvaal felt overwhelmed by Congress and feared 
that SACTU would loose its identity. 85  
 
In the Western Cape the mainly Coloured FCWU, which had developed along 
conventional collective bargaining lines, focused on working through industrial relations 
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mechanisms and also prioritised wages and working conditions over political action.86 
Lambert notes that the union, the strongest affiliate in SACTU, was modelled on the best 
of the British industrial trade unions and was not only well organised and disciplined, but 
also developed democratic structures that allowed workers to hold their officials 
accountable.87 The FCWU also developed factory committees to enable the union to 
respond to the problems of workers in factories. Unlike the factory committees in Natal, 
which linked economic and political issues and provided political education, the factory 
committees in the FCWU were used to collect subscriptions, check the details of 
members and inform the secretary of disputes.88  
 
Lambert notes, however, that while the FCWU tended to leave political issues and 
struggles to the ANC, local branches of the union were actively involved in civic issues 
such as health, housing, education and transport. The FCWU was often the only 
organisation in small country towns (many of which functioned as company towns) and 
the union took the lead in fighting for social improvements. The FCWU may have been 
much more constrained when it came to taking up political struggles when compared the 
SACTU unions in Natal, but was not narrowly economistic and it is for this reason that 
Goode has labelled FCWU’s organisational approach ‘Social Welfare Unionism’.89  
 
The FCWU’s Port Elizabeth branch, which had developed a strong relationship with local 
Congress structures, appeared to be an exception. 90 Anxious to prevent the Langeberg 
Kooperasie Beperk from implementing a wage cut in 1959, the union relied on the 
Congress movement to rally the support of the community and prevent the company from 
recruiting scab labour. The ANC also threatened an international boycott and LKB was 
pressurised into restoring wages to the old level. Lambert argues that this joint action did 
not mean that the FCWU transcended its orthodox style.91 Other branches failed to 
provide their fellow PE workers with support and, given the weak response to economic 
action, it was unlikely that the national leadership could mobilise members to back wider 
political action.  
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According to Janet Cherry, however, the activities of the FCWU’s PE branch have to be 
located within the local working class traditions of resistance. She argues that the trade 
unions were relatively weak in PE during the post-war period and working class 
resistance centred on community issues.92 The CPSA and ANC often played a leading 
role in directing these struggles, but Cherry argues that the leaders in these organisations 
were drawn from the working class and, as a result, the Congress movement took on a 
working class character. The ANC-SACTU alliance that developed in PE should, 
therefore, be viewed as a working class movement, or at least, a mass movement in which 
the interests of the working class were hegemonic.93 Cherry argues that little distinction 
was made between trade union and political work – the Congress Movement supported 
labour struggles and workers and trade unions threw their weight behind Congress 
campaigns.94  
 
SACTU’s success in sustaining the branches of more established unions and establishing 
new industrial unions was limited and Cherry doubts that the trade unions would have 
been able to survive independently of the ANC’s active encouragement and support of 
workers’ struggle. 95 Cherry argues, however, that in the case of PE the strength of 
SACTU lay in the general union, which was initially established to unionise the 
unorganised and hive them off into industrial unions, but ultimately served to mobilise 
workers into a broader working class movement by taking up concrete demands and 
participating in political campaigns.96  
    
At the end of the 1950s a more conservative form of African trade unionism emerged. 
With the support of the International Confederation of South African Labour (ICFTU), 
the Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA), that was formed in 1954 and 
consisted of the moderate craft and registered trade unions that broke from the T&LC, 
helped to set up the Federation of Free African Trade Unions of South Africa 
(FOFATUSA) in 1959. Very little is known about this federation, although it has been 
claimed that FOFATUSA represented a deliberate attempt by TUCSA to undermine 
SACTU by forming an anti-communist alternative.97 Prominent affiliates included the 
National Union of Clothing Workers (NUCW), run by Lucy Mvubelo who was a former 
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SACTU activist, and the African Motor Workers Union, led by Jacob Nyaose from the 
Pan African Congress (PAC).98 FOFATUSA claimed 17 affiliates and just over 18,000 
members, but was not particularly active.99  
 
Little use was made of the separate industrial relations structures that were established by 
the apartheid government for African workers. By  1972, for instance, only seven Bantu 
Labour Officers existed throughout the whole country. By 1973 as few as 24 statutory 
works committees and 12 regional committees were in existence.100 This indicates that, as 
in the past, employers mostly relied on other laws and punitive measures to repress 
African industrial organisation and resistance. Security legislation was widened after 
1960 and, although SACTU was not banned, the federation was used as a front for 
recruiting MK operatives and by 1966 up to 160 SACTU officials had been arrested 
under the 1962 Sabotage Act. 101 By 1963 SACTU ceased local operations and went into 
exile.  
  
Soon after SACTU’s collapse, FOFATUSA took a decision to dissolve. The demise of 
these federations had disastrous consequences and, according to Muriel Horrell, the 
number of African unions dropped from about 53 in 1961 to about 15 in 1967.102  These 
figures reflect very poorly on TUCSA, which became the only federation open to African 
workers. Informed by a misplaced sense of paternalism, TUCSA officials set out to 
control independent initiatives and place African unions under the firm control of 
registered unions. 103 TUCSA’s commitment to African workers proved fickle and once 
African organisation waned, African unions were strongly encouraged to disaffiliate and 
in 1969 the last two African affiliates were expelled. 104 It has been speculated that 
TUCSA was pushed into this decision by the Minister if Labour.105 It should be noted, 
however, that many TUCSA’s affiliates voted in favour of this decision in a climate of 
heightened industrial turmoil amongst white workers, fuelled by fears that lower paid 
African would replace white workers.106       
  
By the late 1960s unions that organised African workers had left a mixed and regionally 
distinct organisational legacy. Some unions, such as the FCWU in the Western Cape, 
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were well organised and SACTU affiliates in Natal successfully combine the economic 
and political demands of workers without becoming totally subordinated to the Congress 
movement. Most African unions, however, struggled to establish sound democratic 
structures and either failed to champion the political demands of workers or became 
dominated by the interests of other classes or nationalist movements. Even though 
African trade unions in SACTU were encouraged to run their own affairs, established 
SACTU affiliates decided to maintain their registration and comply with 1956 
regulations, which compelled unions to organise African workers into separate structures, 
in order to hold on to their basic organisational and bargaining rights. 107 While SACTU 
unionists were aware of and debated the possible dependence of African trade unions on 
registered trade unions, TUCSA purposely set out to control African unions and, in so 
doing, ultimately contributed to their demise.     
 
These past organisational traditions were imbedded in the consciousness of new 
generations of workers. For instance, in a survey conducted by Eddie Webster of the 
TUACC unions in 1975, one of the respondents claimed to have been a member of the 
ICU. This was not necessarily a typical experience, but there are indications that previous 
generations passed down stories of their own experiences. In interview with B. 
Tshabalala, a worker leader in MAWU, relates finding her father’s ICU card and 
speaking to him about the union.108 Similarly, in her study of Sarmcol workers, Bonnin 
maintains that the older workers who learned from the old SACTU union (the Rubber and 
Cable Workers’ Union) played an important part in keeping the legacies of past struggles 
alive and interpreting the lessons of these struggles for younger workers.109 CNETU, 
which was mainly based on the Witwatersrand, was noticeably absent in the recollections 
of workers, but up to 11% of those who responded to Webster’s survey had once 
belonged to SACTU. In addition, some of the activists and organisers who  played a 
leading role in reviving union organisation in Natal were initially schooled in SACTU.110  
 
3.4. The Revival of Political and Industrial Resistance in the Late 1960s  
The description of the 1960s as a ‘decade of darkness’ overemphasises the break in 
political and industrial resistance and obscures the way in which resistance may have 
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continued in different and more clandestine forms. The lessons learned from older union 
movements would, however, become an important point of reference for workers and  
unionists in the 1970s. In addition, there were already signs of renewed aboveground 
political activity and industrial resistance towards the end of the 1960s.  
 
As of late more scholars have started paying more attention to the underground activity of 
the ANC and PAC in the 1960s, particularly the armed struggle, as well as the 
aboveground organisations dominated by liberals.111 Martin Legassick and Chris 
Saunders also highlight the unorganised and hidden forms of day-to-day resistance. They 
write that in the 1960s, ‘[d]aily life went on, and under the quiet veneer on the surface, 
the consciousness of many of the oppressed was changing. The full story of day-to-day 
resistance of ordinary people is one that, for want of sources may never be adequately 
told.’112  Although much remains obscured, this day-to-day resistance – which intersected 
with more organised forms of underground activity at times- contributed to the 
radicalisation of youth and the working class.  
 
Omar Badsha, who was instrumental in the revival of trade unions in the early 1970s, 
argues that from 1968 a shift started to take place in Natal. 113 Attempts were made not 
only to revive the Natal Indian Congress and other Congress structures, but university 
students were radicalised by the ‘New Left’ in Europe and America. Black students were 
increasingly drawn to the ‘Black Power’ movement in the USA and Steve Biko, the 
father of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), started to organise students in the 
Medical School. Badsha recalls that it was within this context that a number of cultural 
and study groups, such as the ‘Handle in the Clay’ and ‘3 Arts Society’ were set up by 
youth. These were meant to raise political consciousness and even included young 
garment workers.114     
 
Although such activity had not yet infiltrated African townships, which were still 
extremely oppressive, African workers were also becoming more assertive. The 1969 
dockworkers’ strike in Durban, estimated to be the largest strike undertaken by African 
workers that decade, was followed by a strike of 13,000 Namibian migrant workers in 
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1971 and another large dockworkers’ strike in Durban and Cape Town in 1972.115 These 
actions were already leading to more organised forms of resistance and a strike involving 
300 bus drivers at PUTCO in June 1972 led to the creation of the Transport and Allied 
Workers Union (TAWU) on the Witwatersrand.116 While the number of officially 
reported strikes remained low, the number of workers involved in strike activity 
increased from 1968 onwards (see table below).  
 
Table 1. Disputes and industrial action by African workers, 1960- 1984  
Source: Annual reports of the Department of Labour/ Manpower 1960- 1984.117 
 Year Number of reported 
strikes  
Number of workers 
involved  
1966 14 1374 
1967  20 1302 
1968  17 665 
1969 37  
 
3284 (includes dockworkers 
in Durban)  
1970 28 2157 
1971 22 2456 
1972 16 3374 (includes dock 
workers in Durban and 
Cape Town)  
 
Friedman claims that these early strikes ‘were only straws in the wind’, but they were, 
nonetheless, significant. 118 This was particularly true of the 1969 dockworkers’ strike, 
which Hemson argues was one of the most significant events in the post- Sharpville 
period of resistance and signalled the revival of working class action. 119 It is also worth 
noting that migrant contract workers led this revival. Workers were dismissed en masse 
and the strike was eventually broken, but Hemson goes on to argue that:120 
 
The late 1960s marked a new sense of urgency in the black working class and a 
determination to resist whatever the consequences. Throughout the 1960s the 
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objective conditions of proletarianisation were becoming evident in longer 
contracts and greater rural impoverishment; the subjective conditions were now 
coming to the fore.  
  
Workers had also learned to adapt their organisation to the fierce repression by employers 
and Hemson claims that the strike was largely made possible by the underground 
organisation of workers, which rebutted the view that apartheid was an all-pervasive 
system of oppression from which they had no escape.121   
 
The new workers movement in Natal did not emerge in a vacuum, but grew out of the 
early political radicalisation, especially of young students, and the growing assertiveness 
of African workers. Constantly aware of the repressive power of the state, activists and 
workers adopted a variety of tactics to deflect attention and minimise victimisation. The 
first organisations set up to recruit and organise workers in the early 1970s drew on 
similar methods.  
 
3.5. Conclusion  
A number of factors contributed to the revival of trade unions in Natal. Although the 
economic boom stimulated shifts in the economy, which laid the basis for large industrial 
unions through the creation of a large body of African semi-skilled production workers 
that were concentrated in large establishments, the unions in Natal also organised a large 
proportion of unskilled and migrant workers. The rural struggles of the 1950s and early 
1960s had not been able to arrest the collapse of the subsistence economy nor the 
extens ion of government control into the rural reaches of South Africa, and with an 
increasing dependency on wages and pensions, migrants shifted their attention to issues 
such as wages and unemployment. Left with fewer choices as the net of influx control 
laws and labour bureaux regulations began to tighten, they spearheaded much of the 
working class activity in the early 1970s. They were joined by large numbers of African 
women workers, who were increasingly drawn into industry during the boom of the 
1960s.  
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In spite of the suppression of political opposition in the early 1960s and the subsequent 
collapse of trade union organisation, connections with previous worker movements had 
not been entirely severed. Knowledge of these movements was passed down to younger 
generations and a small proportion of workers organised by SACTU in the 1950s also 
participated in the emerging unions. The lessons to be learned from past movements  – 
particularly the repression of SACTU and the conservative parallelism of TUCSA – also 
became important points of reference for workers and unionists in the 1970s.  
 
In the case of Natal, the new workers movement did not emerge out of a vacuum. From 
the late 1960s attempts were made to revive political activity in the region and the 1969 
and 1972 strikes by Durban dockworkers represented a new assertiveness amongst 
workers and a willingness to challenge employers and the state. The fear of repression 
continued to feature as a central concern for activists and workers alike and shaped the 
way in which they organised. Much collective organisation and political education 
remained hidden, but there were attempts to set up legitimate structures (such as cultural 
groups) to serve as fronts for broader political activity. This strange combination of 
clandestine organisation and legality would all be present in the workers movement that 
emerged in Natal during the 1970s.   
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Chapter 4: 
‘The Durban Moment’, 1970 – 1973. 
4.1. Introduction  
Referred to as ‘the Durban Moment’, activists and scholars often describe the first few 
years of the 1970s in Natal as a time of ideological renewal and debate around the form 
that future resistance against apartheid should take. Eddie Webster, for instance, argues 
that the Durban Moment marked the emergence of new ideologies such as Black 
Consciousness and a new kind of Marxism, which led to a much more critical reflection 
on the tradition of trade unionism in South Africa.1 Workers and activists from diverse 
political and trade union backgrounds were drawn together and created a distinct regional 
approach to organising workers. This chapter seeks to trace the origin and early formation 
of this approach. 2  
 
4.2. The Formation of the General Factory Workers Benefit Fund  
It is often noted that the 1970s started with a number of independent initiatives, or worker 
centres orientated towards educating African workers about their rights in different parts 
of the country. 3 The GFWBF, established in Durban in June 1972, was one of these. The 
GFWBF pulled various activists and groupings that were committed to the unionisation 
of particularly African workers together and was also shaped by the worker members, 
who drew on their own forms or organisation.  
 
A few years prior to the 1973 strikes, moderate unionists in TUCSA raised concerns over 
possible industrial unrest by African workers and African unionisation became a topical 
issue. In an address to students at the University of the Witwatersrand in April 1970, J.A. 
Grobbelaar, the General Secretary of TUCSA, warned that industrial strife at the level of 
the 1922 strike would be repeated unless fundamental rights were granted to African 
workers. 4 He claimed that,‘[p]erhaps the most alarming feature of all …was the fact that 
any industrial strife would almost certainly be allied to racial strife.’ Rejecting 
government arguments that African workers were not yet ready for trade unions, 
Grobbelaar argued that, ‘[t]here is no valid reason why Bantu trade union leaders and 
officials cannot also be trained in a manner which will ensure industrial peace…’ adding 
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that, ‘[i]f this is not done, a trade union movement, which will probably not be to our 
liking, is almost certain to emerge.’5 
 
In August 1970 Anna Scheepers from the Garment Workers Union, an affiliate of 
TUCSA, called for the establishment of an advice centre for African workers, who did 
‘not have trade unions to represent their interests.’6 She saw such a centre, which would 
provide leaflets and lectures on workers rights, operating under TUCSA and being 
sponsored by employers. There is no indication that TUCSA supported the initiative at 
this time. Nevertheless, changes to existing labour legislation, including the exclusion of 
the homelands from the Industrial Conciliation Act, and growing criticism from 
international trade unions and the ILO of apartheid policies ensured that African workers 
received further media attention. 7   
 
Even employers jumped onto the bandwagon and in October 1972 the Rand Daily Mail 
reported that ‘Natal employers have taken the lead in tackling the problem of unorganised 
African labour’ when the Natal Employers Association decided to host a ‘high-powered’ 
seminar on ‘The Industrial Representation of the Bantu.’8 The main purpose of the 
seminar was to allow employers and unions (registered trade unions) to thrash out their 
ideas on establishing effective channels of communication with African workers. The 
seminar was to include input from two opposing academics – Frances Wilson, who called 
for the admission of Africans in registered trade unions and J.P. van der Merwe, who 
promoted the notion that African workers should form ‘indigenous’ unions in their 
homelands.9 Although subsequent reports of the seminar indicate that employers and 
most trade unionists denounced the ‘van der Merwe plan’, no alternative model was 
agreed on. 10   
 
While TUCSA and employers aired their fears about the emergence of an uncontrollable 
and politically conscious African union movement, initiatives were already underway to 
reorganise workers. These came from a number of different sources. Firstly a number of 
political activists from the ANC, SACTU and the Natal Indian Congress (NIC)- including 
Alfred Dlomo, Griffiths Mxenge and Rowley Arenstein- believed that the time had come 
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to revive SACTU in South Africa.11 Clandestine meetings were held and membership 
cards were printed. Two organisers, namely Bekisisa (Harold) Nxasana, who was 
previously active in the ATWU affiliated to SACTU and who had previously been 
detained for his political activities, and Alpheus Mthethwa, played a key role in the 
attempt to resuscitate SACTU.12 They based themselves in the furniture industry as sales 
representatives to allow them some freedom of movement and succeeded in recruiting up 
to 100 workers.13 Close linkages to individuals from the ANC soon attracted the attention 
of the security police and Nxasana recalls that he was continually harassed. Believing that 
the revival of SACTU was unsustainable in the long run, SACTU unionists abandoned 
their original scheme and with the approval of ANC underground leaders in the region 
threw in their lot with other initiatives that shared their goal of organising African 
workers. 14     
 
University students and lecturers was one such grouping. Friedman argues that in the late 
1960s the student movement was restructured with the formation of the South African 
Student Organisation (SASO). While black students were attracted to the new 
nationalism of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), white students, alienated by 
the BCM, re-read Marxism and turned to the workers movement.15 David Hemson, the 
president of National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) from 1968-1969, who 
went on to play a prominent role in the re-organisation of African workers before he was 
banned in 1974, confirms this. He recalls:16   
 
…at that time it was the rise of Black Consciousness and there was a turning 
away by black students from cooperation with white students and quite a debate 
about that. It wasn’t really fierce, but it was quite polarising .. white students 
seemed to be a bit sort of bewildered by what was happening, although they had 
been partially radicalised by what happened in [19]68 internationally. But, people 
like Steve Biko, who I knew reasonably well, would sort of joke that [white] 
students would just become the managers of the future … 
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These developments, however, need to be situated within the broader radicalisation of 
youth across the racial spectrum at this time. Disillusioned by the perceived conservatism 
and failure of older generations to challenge apartheid, youth looked for new ways in 
which to achieve national liberation. This radicalisation played out in various ways, with 
the 1976 student revolt in Soweto being the most dramatic. The revival of the worker 
movement in Natal was also influenced by this development and it is with this in mind 
that Friedman’s portrayal of black and white students needs to be fleshed out.               
 
In the first instance it would appear that much like the emerging union movement there 
were regional variations in the development of the BCM. In Natal the BCM was rooted in 
a movement of young black professionals that centred on various cultural forms that 
conveyed political messages about the self-emancipation of black people. Here the 
tensions between white students in the workers movement and black students in the BCM 
appear more pronounced. Although these students believed that they were travelling on 
two distinct roads to liberation, they maintained an ongoing dialogue and kept score of 
each other’s successes. Hemson explains that:17     
 
there was a bit of competition, a bit of rivalry …irritation, mutual irritation, but 
they actually also sort of respected us for having the right idea and carrying it 
through. It was kind of mutual respect…  
 
Cultural differences between BCM and the workers movement in Natal soon surfaced. 
Hemson remembers one occasion when workers met up with BCM members that were 
holding weekend discussions at the Ecumenical Centre in Pietermaritzburg:18 
 
…there was a lot going on that the workers didn’t approve of, like sex (laugh). It 
caused a lot of comment. Loud music and drinking, and smoking dope and you 
know all those sort of things. And then suddenly we, we being the trade union 
organisers…were being very disciplined and showing workers that we worked in 
a different way. But [workers] were scandalised by Black Consciousness…  
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On the Witwatersrand BCM took on a much more respectable and working class 
character.19 Transmitted through the churches, the message of Black Consciousness 
extended into the ranks of worker structures. These included the Young Christian 
Workers (YCW), the UTP, established in 1971, and BAWU, originally the Black Sales 
and Allied Workers Union that broke from the UTP. The influence of Black 
Consciousness has important implications for how we understand the emerging union 
movement and the evolution of distinct trade union traditions. The UTP, for instance, 
claimed to have adopted an economistic approach to unionisation, which sought to 
distance African unions from political issues and encourage the move towards a more 
sophisticated industrial relations system that institutionalised industrial conflict.20 
Nonetheless, UTP policies were influenced by Black Consciousness and Lowry claims 
that ‘[w]hen the UTP was established, Black Consciousness was the most important form 
of black resistance left in the country, and this helped to ensure that the UTP espoused 
the cause of black leadership in the trade union field.’21     
 
In the second instance, white university radicals who became involved in the union 
movement were not necessary homogenous. Rebelling against the liberalism that was 
pervasive in the English-speaking academy, a group of students were inspired by the 
‘New Left’ in Europe and America and, stressing the centrality of class divisions within 
capitalist society, developed radical interpretations of South Africa and the world. 
Andrew Nash has attempted to define the philosophical underpinnings of these 
interpretations - mainly through an analysis of the work of Richard Turner (a philosophy 
lecturer based at the University of Natal who played an instrumental role in encouraging 
students to become involved in the workers movement).22 The value of Nash’s category 
of ‘Western Marxism’ to describe these ideas - even the extent to which Turner can be 
classified as a Marxist- is debatable. More importantly, Nash fails to establish the 
centrality of Turner’s work, as opposed to any other text, and by viewing almost two 
decades of trade union history through a prism of the Turner’s principles he ignores the 
role of historical agency and ideological difference.  
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This is not to say that Turner, who promoted notions of workers’ control and 
participatory democracy and accentuated humanism and the importance of individuals 
achieving their full potential in society, was not influential.23 On the contrary, notions of 
workers’ democracy would have a tremendous impact on the trade union movement. 
However, Turner’s influence, curtailed by his banning in 1973 and cut short by his 
assassination in 1978, was more nuanced than Nash suggests. Rather than establishing a 
coherent school of thought that was simply adopted by a generation of unionists, Turner 
was instrumental in providing various forums and opening up spaces for radical debate.24  
 
‘Left’ Marxists, for want of a better term, are best understood as a nebulous grouping 
who were informed by a kaleidoscope of radical thinkers. They were, however, held 
together by a couple of basic assumptions. Firstly, they rejected the totalitarianism of 
Soviet socialism. They were drawn to the works of Antonio Gramsci and Rosa 
Luxemburg as well as relatively more egalitarian readings of Marx and Lenin that 
featured in publications such as the New Left Review . In the second instance they had 
little faith in the armed struggle and believed that a mass based resistance movement 
inside the country would provide a more effective opposition to apartheid and believed 
that strong worker organisations could lay the foundation for such a movement.  
 
Buhlungu argues that these white activists ‘emphasised the primacy of class and class 
struggle and downplayed the necessity of the struggle for national liberation of black 
people.’25 Oral evidence suggests, however, that Left Marxists did not necessarily do so, 
but rather argued that workers should lead the national liberation struggle. Pat Horn, who 
played a central part in developing workers’ education in the Cape and Natal before she 
was banned in 1976, explains this position:26  
   
We were talking about national liberation, but we wanted to make sure that 
national liberation was going to be owned by the workers, run by the workers. I 
mean everybody knew that there was going to be national liberation at some 
point, and everybody was fighting for it in a different way. Some people went into 
exile to fight for it from outside, some people fought for it from the inside. The 
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people who were Marxist, who believed in the working class struggle, did it 
through workers and most of them at that time were linked to one or other of these 
trade union movements. …The question was- was it going to be a change that was 
beneficial to workers or not? Anybody who was a Marxist had a concern about 
that, that it shouldn’t be a bourgeois revolution…But we basically believed that 
whatever happened in the national liberation struggle, a strong working class 
leadership would ensure a more working class content to that revolution.  
 
There were important points of divergence, however, and while some Left Marxists 
promoted the formation of a politically independent workers movement, others believed 
that workers’ should form their own political party or that nationalist organisations could 
be won over to a socialist programme.  
 
The Left Marxists were not the only group of students or youths who were attracted to the 
cause of workers and they worked alongside activists who were loyal to the ANC, SACP 
and other Congress structures. David Davis, who played a central role in the Wages 
Commission was considered an enthusiastic SACP supporter. In addition, Omar Badsha, 
who was involved in the initial revival of SACTU, argues that Indian and Coloured 
students also attempted to make contact with workers and participated in local meetings 
of registered unions. They were also part of the ideological renewal that was unfolding in 
the region and attended the weekend seminars initiated by Rick Turner. Hemson also 
refers to a group of Muslim youths who briefly assisted the ne w workers movement in 
making contact with Indian workers and arranging suitable venues for meetings. Youth 
played a central role in revitalising political resistance in the 1970s, but their part in the 
revival of the unions as well as the unionisation of young African workers needs to be 
explored more systematically.    
 
Radical students established contact with workers in two ways. The first was through the 
Wage Commission, established in 1971 at the Durban and Pietermaritzburg campuses of 
the University of Natal, which researched the conditions of African workers and 
informed them of Wage Board determinations through leaflets and public meetings.27 
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(The Wage Commissions, which operated under NUSAS, were later set up at other 
English medium universities.) There were already incipient forms of organisation 
amongst abattoir and metal workers and the Wage Commission students tapped into the 
secret collective formations of the dockworkers, which proved instrumental in organising 
the strike in October 1972.28 In was difficult for white students to make contact with 
African workers in a racially divided society such as South Africa and as David Hemson 
explains:29    
 
The workers would raise their eyebrows, but then later they were actually quite 
proud of us. They thought we were all hippies or something like that and then 
later we got quite a lot of respect because we stood our ground when different 
things were happening that were threatening.  
 
The second point of entry was through a group of registered TUCSA unions based at 
Bolton Hall (named after James Bolton) in Durban. Unionists such as Harriet Bolton, 
general secretary of both the registered garment and furniture unions, and Rob Lambert, 
assistant general secretary of the Furniture Workers Union, supported the formation of 
non-racial trade unions and proved solid allies. After the GFWBF was formed, students 
were hired as organisers in registered unions  and  adopted a ‘parallel strategy’ of 
attempting to organise workers on the one hand and working through the barga ining 
structures that were open to registered unions to raise the concerns of African workers on 
the other. Most of the registered unions in TUCSA, however, were not that keen on 
organising African workers and Holton Cheadle recalls that this strategy only worked in 
the case of the TWIU, which was led by Bolton. 30     
 
The GFWBF pulled the various initiatives to re-organise African workers- including 
SACTU activists, university based radicals and registered trade unions- together. 
Industrial action usually led to widespread dismissal and migrants were forced to return 
to their homelands. Hemson argues that the GFWBF was established to overcome the 
fear of victimisation through dismissal and build a base from which to organise unions by 
creating an associatio n on the widest and least controversial grounds.31 Drawing on the 
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example of the early mutual societies that gave rise to trade unions in Britain, activists 
opted for the creation of a benefit society. Worker members – from textiles, motor 
assemblies, abattoirs and the docks- chose to establish a society that would provide 
funeral benefits.32  
 
By this time benefit societies had become an established feature of working class culture, 
and while the nature and significance of benefit societies in Natal requires further 
investigation, Delius indicates that such societies, particularly burial societies, became a 
prominent aspect of Pedi migrant organisation on the Rand from the 1940s onwards.33 He 
also notes that the formation of these societies emerged out of shifts in the employment 
and accommodation patterns of Pedi migrants. With increasing numbers employed in 
secondary industry and living in closer proximity to the city-centre and African 
townships, these migrants were able to escape the isolation and control that came with the 
closed compounds of the mines and the back yard rooms of domestic workers. They were 
able to meet more freely and were able to access a wider group of men that came from 
their regions.  
 
Benefit societies were not necessarily conservative or limited in nature and, as Delius 
documents, Pedi migrants used their burial societies to mobilise support for rural 
resistance against the introduction of Bantu Authorities in the 1950s. Through the 
GFWBF the radical potential of a mutual aid societies was soon realised. The GFWBF 
not only bridged the gap between cautious and more politically aware workers, but also 
served as a compromise between activists from diverse backgrounds and workers with 
their own modes of organisation.34  
 
Much like the burial societies of Pedi migrants on the Witwatersrand, meetings were held 
on a democratic basis with the aim of achieving consensus amongst participants. 
Referring to the regular Saturday meetings of dockworkers who belonged to the GFWBF, 
Hemson writes:35  
 
 116 
Initially the meeting took the form of ‘hearings’ at which workers told officials 
more about the labour process…With time the meetings evolved into a type of 
executive committee of a trade union as a chairperson was elected with a 
committee…the meetings were strongly democratic, with the elected leadership 
cautiously putting forward their views and attempting to reach consensus.  
 
In addition, the GFWBF provided an unexpected source of income and financed a 
complaints service and educational seminars for workers.36 (Maree, for instance, 
estimates that by the end of November 1973 the organisation had managed to raise 
R9,460.00.37) As a result, the new workers movement was able to develop an 
independent resource base, reducing dependence on registered unions.     
 
As noted previously, activists were deeply concerned about the nature of trade unions. 
Influenced by the British shop stewards’ movement and other historical examples of 
revolutionary worker combinations (such as the Parris Commune; the factory councils in 
Russia and Italy; and Spanish Anarcho-syndicalist unions), activists thought it best to 
establish democratic forms of worker organisations that were based on factory floor 
organisation. Activists in the WPWAB, which was also comprised of a mix of unionists 
that had been active in SACTU and radical students, were sceptical of the reformist and 
bureaucratic nature of trade unions and aimed to set up worker councils as opposed to 
trade unions.38 It would appear that the members of the GFWBF were initially undecided 
when it came to what type of trade unions to promote. The first attempts at unionisation, 
for instance, took the form of a general union amongst dockworkers.39  It would appear 
that partly due to their dealings with the registered unions, however, a preference for 
industrial unions soon emerged. It was argued that industrial unions were more suited to 
the existing industrial relations framework, promoted collective bargaining, and could be 
used to foster interracial solidarity within industries.40   
 
The formation of the GFWBF represented a very important step towards unionisation. 
Comprised of activists and trade unionists from various political backgrounds and a 
nucleus of African workers, the GFWBF was shaped by the democratic traditions of 
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workers and established an autonomous resource base to facilitate organisation. The 
GFWBF, however, would soon be overtaken by one of the largest strike waves since the 
Second World War.    
 
4.3. The 1973 Strike Wave and Radicalisation of New Layers of Workers   
In spite of Grobbelaar’s dire warnings at the beginning of the decade, the 1973 strikes 
seemed to take everyone by surprise. Friedman notes that while less than 23,000 workers 
downed tools between 1965 and 1971, up to 90 000 went out on strike during 1973 and it 
is often said that the strike wave marked a new mood of working class militancy.  41  The 
strikes also pointed to the radicalisation of new layers of workers- unskilled migrants and 
African women in the textile industry - and reflected both old and new modes of worker 
protest in Natal.  
 
The strike wave was triggered by migrant workers employed at the Coronation and Brick 
Company who encouraged their fellow workers to down tools in a demand for higher 
wages in January 1973. 42 Although the company was relatively isolated since it was not 
situated in a major industrial area, the strike became a public affair- strikers were seen 
marching in the streets and the event was widely publicised in the press. After an 
intervention by Paramount Chief Goodwill Zwelithini, the strike was resolved and 
workers won a slight increase of R2,07 a week.43 By this time strikes were already 
beginning to spread to other establishments - such as the transport firm AJ Keeler, the 
tea-packing plant TW Beckett and Co., several firms that employed African ship painters; 
and Motorvia that employed African convoy drivers. 44 The IIE’s report argues that even 
though only a few scattered strikes had taken place by mid January, not all of which were 
successful, they were considered significant and attracted much media attention. 45             
 
Towards the end of month the strikes spread into Durban’s main industrial centres – 
Pinetown-New Germany and Jacobs-Mobeni - when textile workers, mostly employed by 
Frame, downed tools. A 16% hike in rail fares led to rumours of a train boycott and, even 
though it never went ahead, the strike wave gained momentum. On the 5th of February 
3000 municipal workers (employed by the Durban Corporation) came out on strike and 
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within two days this number had increased 16,000 municipal workers on strike. By the 
end of March strikes were taking place in other parts of Natal - Pietermaritzburg and Port 
Shepstone- and an estimated 160 strikes had taken place at a 146 establishments 
involving over 60,000 workers. The strikes included a wide range of participants and 
united Indian and African workers, men and women, migrants and urban-based 
workers. 46  Industrial action was concentrated in the textile and metal industry, with 26 
establishments affected in the textile industry (ropes and matting; bags and twine; and 
knitting are included) and 22 establishments in the iron, steel, engineering and 
metallurgical field. 47     
 
The strikes have been described as a spontaneous rising by workers spurred on by low 
wages and the rising cost of living caused by inflation. (It has been estimated that the 
prices of food, clothing and transport had risen by 40% between 1958 and 1971, by 
another 40% during 1971-3 and another staggering 30% in 1972-3.48)  The IIE’s report 
argues, however, that these grievances cannot in and of themselves account for the timing 
or location of the strikes, which were concentrated in Durban.  
 
The Durban Chamber of Commerce distributed a confidential letter, dated the 9 February 
1973, which speculated on the causes o f the strikes and suggested that:49 
 
Apart from the economic factors which might be particular to Durban, it must be 
remembered that the local Bantu labour force is drawn predominantly from Zulus 
and is, in this way, more ethnically homogenous than the labour force on the 
Reef. There is the possibility that the existing unrest has in certain cases been 
used to further political or other ulterior aims. It may also be that the large and 
better skilled Indian community has also served to limit the wage rate and  job 
opportunities.  
 
The study by the IIE counters these arguments and demonstrates that wages levels and 
the cost of living in Durban did not deviate in any significant way from those in other 
urban centres. The same is true of the ethnic composition of the workforce. According to 
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the IIE’s report, the structure of the Durban work force was not unique and resembled 
that of Port Elizabeth, where a large part of the African workforce was drawn from one 
language group and an ‘intermediate’ Coloured populatio n was present. In addition, no 
clear system of stratification existed dividing Indian and African workers and many 
Indians not only found themselves in the same job categories as African workers, but also 
participated in the strikes. It is also important to add that while there was a tendency for 
the workforce to become more homogenous with the consolidation of the homelands and 
the operation of the labour bureaux, migrants in Durban were drawn from other parts of 
the country, especially the Transkei.  
 
It has been pointed out that the strikes were implicitly political and that the high wages 
workers demanded could only be met if society was radically transformed.50 Employers, 
government officials and more conservative newspapers speculated that communist 
agitators were behind the strikes. Mindful of this ‘rooi gevaar’ mentality, the IIE’s 
discussion of outside influences is quite cautious. While there was no one organisation or 
grouping responsible for the strikes, the initial activity of the Wage Commission,  
SACTU, and the newly formed GFWBF clearly heighten the consciousness of numerous 
workers. 
 
To understand how a few scattered strikes transformed into a massive strike wave, more 
immediate factors must be considered. The strikes were very public and, by seeing what 
others were able to accomplish, workers were encouraged to follow suit. Not only did 
strikes receive a considerable amount of press attention, but workers also struck at their 
factories rather than stayed at home. The IIE reported that ‘…the sight of large crowds of 
workers out on strike encouraged workers in neighbouring factories, and the strikes 
spread geographically road by road.’51 A picture emerges of thousands of strikers 
marching up and down the streets and, referring to an incident when electricity workers 
marched from the depot up Umngeni Road, Mthethwa remembers that, ‘I had never been 
involved in such a situation. It was like seeing the beginning of a revolution.’52 In 
addition, it has been argued that the existing networks amongst workers played a part and 
news of the strikes also travelled by word of mouth.      
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Related to this, textile workers fuelled much of the strike wave. The militancy of textile 
workers, particularly at the Frame Group, set the tempo for other workers and inspired  
them to take action. 53 B. Tshabalala  recalls: 54 
 
…on the day when Mr. Frame had his first strikes. Our boss saw the road full of 
striking workers. He called us together and asked us what we wanted. First he said 
he didn’t want us to go on strike. And so we must tell him what we wanted. We 
told him he must give us a five [R]and increase.  
 
After some negotiation management agreed to a R2,02 increase and a committee of seven 
was elected to represent workers. B. Tshabalala goes on to state: 
 
[A] year later it was strike time again at Frame Group. In our factory the boss 
called us and asked why we had not told him something was wrong. And so we 
asked him for money again. This time we got and increase of three [R]ands and an 
allowance.  
   
At this point the textile industry mostly employed African women, who constituted up to 
70% of the workforce.55 According to Hemson, women textile workers were very militant 
and spearheaded industrial action. They ‘were prepared to move’ and ‘set the pace’ for 
other more conservative workers. 56 Strikes in the textile industry maintained momentum 
and in August of that year a large strike engulfed the Wentex Mill in Jacobs and in early 
1974 workers at Pinetx, owned by the Frame Group, also downed tools over the Cotton 
Wage Order.57      
 
State officials and employers were alarmed by sheer size of the strike wave and feared a 
violent eruption might lead to a general strike. Strikes by African workers were illegal, 
but the police were advised not to take action against strikers unless absolutely necessary 
and with minimum force. There were instances where strikers were arrested - including 
106 municipal workers who marched through the city-centre and refused to obey an order 
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to disperse and another 150 building workers who staged a march near a shopping and 
business district- but they received relatively light sentences.  
      
The Durban Chamber of Commerce advised their members on the following course of 
action in the case of a labour stoppage: 58 
 
1.) Notify the Department of Labour (Telephone number 28371). 
2.) Advise your workers that you will consider their demands. 
3.) Advise the workers that there will be no pay for the time that they are on 
strike. 
4.) If you consider that your present rates of pay are fully justifiable stand by 
these and in no circumstances move from that stand. 
5.) If you feel that an increase in minimum wages is necessary determine this 
increase and tell them of your decision. Thereafter stand by your decision. 
6.) Do not attempt to bargain as this will only encourage the Bantu to escalate 
their demands. Action must be positive, definite and final. 
7.) Grant increases of a definite amount in preference to percentages on earnings. 
Percentages are not easily understood by the Bantu and across-the-board 
increases are of greater benefit to the lowest paid workers. 
8.) Do everything possible to avoid violence but if this should arise, call the 
police immediately. 
9.) Handle the press carefully- they may not trespass on your premises but it is 
usually wise to give them reasonable and accurate information.  
10.) Stoppages to date [9 February 1973] have been mainly good-natured and 
the tactful police action has contributed greatly to this. Make every effort to 
keep it this way.  
 
These suggestions give much insight into employers’ attitudes, but in the context of the 
strikes, employers were slightly less arrogant and demeaning and in many instances did 
bargain with workers. Even though workers did not win the increases they demanded, 
most of the strikes led to slight wage improvements. The only exception was the building 
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and construction sector. An official report submitted to Parliament at the end of March 
noted that in all of the five strikes that took place in the building and construction 
industry workers ‘resumed work on existing employment conditions’. 59 The strike wave 
was not without consequences and workers were victimised and dismissed. Even so, the 
relatively restrained actions by police, the courts and employers increased the confidence 
of workers who had rarely dared to challenge their employers in the recent past. African 
workers were not only willing to risk strike action, but frequently took part in mass 
meetings and marches and would often sing, chant, heckle their employers, and brandish 
sticks on such occasions.  
 
In so doing, workers relied on a variety of traditions of resistance and it is often noted 
that they chanted the old Zulu war-cry ‘Usuthu’ and traditional and homeland leaders, 
such as Paramount Chief Goodwill Zwelithini and Barney Dladla, intervened in the 
strikes.60 The IIE’s report highlights the progressive role of Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha 
Buthelezi, who openly criticised the apartheid government, and argues that by drawing on 
cultural symbols and the support of traditional leaders, strikers situated themselves within 
the broader Zulu and African political tradition. Harry Gwala, on the other hand, is more 
critical and in an interview he states that:61  
 
The workers were not shouting ‘Amandla!’ They were carrying sticks and 
shouting ‘Usuthu!’. There was no Inkatha then, but what they did reflect was the 
work that had been done by the apartheid regime on dividing people on tribal 
lines.       
 
Barring Hemson’s study on dockworkers, there is very little discussion in the literature on 
how workers related to traditional leaders and homeland politicians. Following the 
creation of KwaZulu, traditional leaders and politicians were integrated into and 
benefited from the apparatus designed to control migrants and the growing numbers of 
unemployed. According to Hemson, these leaders also had an important political function 
and while they promoted regional and rural identities, they also decried national 
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oppression and opposed apartheid in order to gain legitimacy and persuade workers to 
exchange their urban- industrial rights for citizenship in a remote homeland.62  
 
Tapping into this opposition to apartheid, workers had made appeals to traditional leaders 
to intervene in workplace relations. For instance, after the 1969 strike dockworkers 
continued to organise and asked the Paramount Chief to get rid of a particularly 
authoritarian compound manager/ supervisor by the name of J.B. Buthelezi (paternal 
uncle of Chief Buthelezi).63 Thereafter the dockworkers invited Chief Buthelezi to 
address workers at a mass meeting.64 These workers believed that the position of leaders 
such as Chief Buthelezi would not only shelter them from employer victimisation, giving 
them space to organise on a collective basis, but could also be used to unite and attract 
support from other workers. The dockworkers turned to traditional leaders at time when 
they were becoming increasingly concerned about J.B. Buthelezi and the role of indunas  
and it was also suggested that the presence of Chief Buthelezi at the mass meeting would 
scare those indunas intent on carrying out the orders of management.  
 
Balancing legal and institutional control with the need to gain political legitimacy, 
traditional leaders and KwaZulu politicians vacillated in their support of workers’ 
struggles. In the case of the dockworkers, J.B. Buthelezi was only removed for a short 
period, while Gatsha Buthelezi redirected workers to Barney Dladla who ignored their 
request to attend a workers’ meeting. For Hemson this demonstrated that ‘[t]he 
collaborative African petty bourgeoisie, so freely available to meetings of overseas 
academics, churches, and businessmen, were being faced with the contradictions of their 
position…’ and were unwilling to confront the workers whose exploitation contributed to 
their incomes.65 Dockworkers briefly considered raising money to cover the travel and 
accommodation costs of Dladla to shame him into coming. 66 It was only after the 1972 
dockworkers strike and in response to growing international criticism that KwaZulu 
government officials claimed that they would do everything in their power to ge t African 
unions legalised.67 
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During the 1973 strike wave traditional leaders and politicians (in Durban and later in 
East London – see below) demonstrated that they were much more comfortable in the 
role of mediator or ‘peace keeper’. Paramount Zwelithini visited the Coronation factory 
in the latter part of 1972, which may have raised workers’ expectations of receiving 
higher wages, but once on strike he told workers to return while he negotiated with 
management.68 Strikers did not want to halt the momentum of their action and once again 
traditional leaders and workers appeared at odds. It was only after Price Sithela Zulu 
warned them that they would lower the dignity of the Paramount if they did not accept his 
word that workers called off the strike. Zwelithini did not meet the Coronation 
management as planned and workers had to negotiate an increase on their own.  
 
Zulu symbols were also by no means the only cultural elements that surfaced during the 
strikes. According to Hemson et al, ‘all sorts of traditions were welded together’ and 
references were made to rural struggles, such as the 1960 Mpondo revolt, and in some 
instances strikers sang the old SACTU songs of the 1950s. 69  
 
Another aspect of the strikes that is frequently commented upon is that in the majority of 
cases strikers attempted to minimise victimisation by refusing to elect representatives and 
demanded that management negotiate with them en masse. Workers, particularly 
migrants, had deployed similar methods in the past, which were based on established 
social networks and collective organisation that were profoundly democratic in nature 
and autonomous from managerial control or influence. In his study of the black miners 
strike of 1946, Dunbar Moodie documents that when the moral economy in the 
compound was upset- usually by an induna or a compound manager that implemented 
regulations too enthusiastically - workers in each room would discuss their complaints 
and instruct their isibondas (leaders chosen by men in their rooms who tended to be older 
and well respected, but were independent from management) to discuss the matter with 
others.70  After much consultation, a meeting would be called at a given time outside the 
compound manager’s office and spokesmen would often shout out demands or outline 
their grievances, which also served to confirm the consensus amongst workers. Moodie 
notes that mangers who refused to negotiate with such gatherings ran the risk of direct 
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action, which often took the form of riots.71 Similarly, Hemson notes that during the 1969 
dockworkers strike workers also refused to elect representatives, confronted management 
en masse, and shouted their demands in unison. 72 Much like the migrants on the mines, 
this form of collective action did not point to the absence of collective organisation, but 
was orchestrated by secret networks of workers that aimed to ‘build up demands of the 
workers through discussion’ and ensure that the leader were not separated from the 
workers. 73   
 
There were instances during the strikes where workers from different factories and 
industries linked up. Near Hammarsdale, for instance, 7000 workers from 12 different 
industries held a mass meeting to discuss a joint offer made by employers.74 Textile 
workers also held a couple of mass meetings, at which they formulated a general demand 
for a R5.00 increase.75 The IIE report notes that textile workers were particularly well 
coordinated, mostly because one employer dominated the industry and the registered 
TWIU tried to intervene and provide workers with assistance. Organisers from TWIU 
tried to negotiate on the strikers’ behalf at Smith and Nephew and Consolidated Textile 
Mills (CTM) and managed to secure an increase for male workers at Smith and 
Nephew. 76 Another stoppage took place at Smith and Nephew in November 1973 when 
management set new wage levels without consulting the TWIU.77 Workers also 
demanded that the company recognise unregistered trade unions, leading to the historic 
recognition agreement between the NUTW, the TWIU, and Smith and Nephew.    
 
During the strike a group of textile workers coalesced around the GFWBF, laying the 
foundation for future unionisation. Omar Badsha recalls:78  
 
Then the Frame factories came out and a clear leadership emerged, there was a 
core of people coming to the office who were leaders… there was Junerose Nala, 
Tsitsi Khumalo, Gugu Bayela,…They made an enormous impact on all of us 
because now we had a leadership which you could relate to, who had the contact, 
the energy, experience and they were committed to building.     
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The GFWBF did not have the funds to hire these new leaders as organisers, but unionists 
asked them to apply for UIF and come and work with them.     
 
The strikes in Durban triggered industrial action in other parts of the country, particularly 
in East London and on the gold mines. According to Hemson et al, a strike by 200 
machine operators in September 1973 at Anglo American’s Western Deep Level over 
narrowing wage differentials precipitated a series of incidents on the Witwatersrand and 
Free State mines in which workers demanded higher wages, an end to the compound 
system, and the immediate repatriation of foreign workers.79 The mines were strictly 
controlled and repressed working class action. As a result, far more violence flared than 
the Durban strikes - police brutally attacked workers and reports also surfaced of ‘ethnic’ 
conflicts and struggles with foreign workers. By September 1976 some 193 black 
workers had been killed and another 1,278 injured.80 The mining industry was in a 
considerable amount of flux and it would not be until the formation of the National Union 
of Mineworkers (NUM) that African mineworkers were unionised.  
 
In 1974, between July and August, workers in East London also flexed their muscles 
giving rise to a series of strikes involving 22 firms and up to 5000 workers while a large 
strike of some 3500 workers also took place in neighbouring Kingwilliamstown. 81 Gerry 
Mare (Richard Turner) argues that these strikes shared much in common with those in 
Durban. Sparked by a strike at Car Distributors and Assemblies, strike action quickly 
spread in successive clusters through the industrial areas and were relatively peaceful. 
Workers mostly demanded a substantial increase in their wages and traditional leaders, 
such as Lennox Sebe (Chief Minister of the Ciskei) and Chief Matanzima (Chief Minister 
of the Transkei), were also drawn in and attempted to mediate, often calling for strikers to 
return to work. There were important differences, however, and strikers in East London 
stayed out for longer and elected representatives to negotiate with management.  
 
The strikes in Durban transformed the conditions under which the GFWBF had to 
organise. Workers became more confident and willing to challenge their employers and 
their struggles forged an assertive layer of working class leaders. In the absence of a 
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central organisation to coordinate the strike, workers relied on their own traditions of 
work-place resistance. All these factors would prove instrumental in the creation of new 
unions. 
 
4.4. The First Inde pendent Trade Unions and the Emergence of Worker Leaders     
The formation of new unions represented an important turning point. Apart from 
grounding the workers movement by organising African workers on a significant scale, 
the new unions quickly carved out a space of their own. Even though white middle class 
unionists would continue to play a prominent role, as both Maree and Buhlungu suggest, 
African workers and their leaders also played a pivotal role in the creation of new union 
traditions.  
 
Mthethwa remembers that, ‘there was a wind of change…people in the industry were 
beginning to say ‘No!’ they were not earning enough. The working conditions were not 
good enough…’82 The GFWBF proved popular and Mthethwa recalls that ‘there was no 
other alternative for workers’ and they all flocked to the offices of the GFWBF.83 
Cheadle also remembers that there was a political vacuum in the country and workers 
were keen to become involved.84 By September 1973 the GFWBF claimed a membership 
of 8000.85  
 
The GFWBF responded by setting up the Central Administrative Services (CAS) in 
March 1973 to provide any new unions with administrative support. CAS also included 
registered trade unions based at Bolton hall, which were encouraged to assist with the 
unionisation of African workers. 86 In addition to the TWIU, these included the garment, 
furniture and the motor assemblies unions. Representatives from projects such as the 
Wage Commissions and UTP were also involved.87  
 
In April the Metal Allied Workers Union (MAWU) was formed. MAWU’s first branch 
was established in Pietermaritzburg in June and drew on workers from Alcan Aluminum 
and Scottish Cables. MAWU’s second branch, set up in November, was based in Durban 
and grew out of the previous efforts of SACTU and mainly organised in Leyland and the 
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Non-Ferrous Metal Works.88 In September 1973 the National Union of Textile Workers 
(NUTW) was formed and, according to Maree, about 500 workers, many of whom were 
women, from a range of different companies including Smith and Nephew; Dano 
Textiles, Nortex, Seltex, Frametex, Afritex, attended the launch of the union. 89 By 
October the union already claimed a paid up membership of about 1300. 90 The GFWBF 
also recruited workers in the furniture and chemical industry –creating a nucleus for the 
Furniture and Timber Workers Union and the Chemical Workers Industrial Union 
(CWIU), both of which were officially launched in 1974.  
 
Both MAWU and the NUTW established cordial relations with the registered trade 
unions, but chose to operate independently. The creation of these independent non-racial 
trade unions in Natal jarred with those registered trade unions linked to CAS, particularly 
the Garment Workers Union91, as well as other African unions. Unions linked to the 
UTP, for instance, were angered by being deprived of the opportunity of organising in 
Natal and it was reported that Jane Bandes (later Hlongwane), secretary of the union of 
the Engineering and Allied Workers Union (EAWU), ‘claimed to have been unforgivably 
slighted’ by the formation of MAWU.92   
 
In May 1973 the Institute for Industrial Education (IIE), largely initiated by Richard 
Turner, was established and aimed to extend the educational component of the workers 
movement, was established. 93 In addition to developing a close relationship with the 
GFWBF, representatives from the TUCSA, UTP and the South African Institute of Race 
Relations were included on the Working Committee that ran the new education 
structure. 94 The IIE registered as a correspondence college under the Bantu Education 
Act (1953), which ensured that the IIE was officially recognised and allowed to conduct a 
limited amount of face-to-face teaching. 95 The IIE launched a newsletter called the South 
African Labour Bulletin for unionists who were in need of detailed analysis of pressing 
issues.96 The Labour Bulletin, which maintained close links with the emerging unions, 
started to operate autonomously from December 1975 and is still in operation today. 97          
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Many of the activists from the GFWBF went on to participate in the new unions. The 
presence of minorities in racially mixed and African trade unions was not new and 
contributed to notions of non-racism in a racially conflicted society. Writing of the 
emerging unions more generally, Maree and Buhlungu argue that the white university 
trained intellectuals of the 1970s differed from previous generations in that they tended to 
dominate important positions and left a distinct imprint on the unions. In the case of the 
new unions in Natal, however, activists (or intellectuals) were drawn from a variety of 
different backgrounds and communities. Although some had not received any university 
training, they were politically astute and the role of unionists such as Badsha (organiser 
for the Chemical Workers Industrial Union); Mthethwa (secretary of MAWU) and 
Nxasana (an education officer in the IIE, translator, and a member of the South African 
Labour Bulletin ’s editorial board) should not be underestimated. All of the activists from 
the GFWBF were still quite inexperienced and had limited contact with workers inside 
factories. Consequently, they relied a great deal on the workers leaders that emerged with 
the strikes and the new unions.         
 
This working class leadership was uneven. According to Badsha, many of the workers 
recruited in the early 1970s- particularly in the chemical industry- were migrant and 
unskilled. Migrants were not only less educated than their urban counterparts, but were 
also unschooled in the traditions of unions and, not surprisingly, Badsha describes the 
leaders from this section of workers as the ‘poorest of the poor’.98 It is within this context 
that worker education became a vital part of unionisation as it allowed for the 
development of shop stewards in unions with a migrant base.  
 
They were joined by another type of leader – drawn mainly from the textile and furniture 
industries- who were usually urban based and tended to be more skilled and educated 
than their migrant counterparts. 99 Badsha remembers that: 100 
 
the one place with people with skills was in some of the textile factories, from 
Clermont, with high school education and their first stop was the textile 
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factories…they came from the townships and they were very young, very young, 
and constituted the leadership. 
 
In addition, older unionists previously organised by SACTU also became prominent.  
 
The new unions may have altered the organisational landscape of the workers movement, 
but their existence did not guarantee their survival. Repression was a looming threat. As a 
result, the new unions sought out additional allies to strengthen their position.  
 
4.5. Political Alliances and the KwaZulu Homeland   
After the strikes the emerging workers movement in Natal decided to work with the 
KwaZulu homeland government. Tainted in hindsight- particularly by the violent conflict 
that surrounded Inkatha in the 1980s and 1990s- this association has been downplayed 
and political alliances are only discussed in as far as they relate to dealings with 
nationalist movements that were banned. Building on Hemson and Maree, this section 
argues that these dealings with the KwaZulu government did not only form an integral 
part of the new union movement’s strategy to avoid state repression, but went on to 
mould the political culture of the new workers movement.  
  
Before considering the relationship with the KwaZulu government, it is necessary to 
locate the new unions within the broader political context and concerns of the time. 
Determined to avoid the same measure of repression that SACTU had to deal with in the 
1960s, activists decided to distance the GFWBF from banned organisations such as the 
ANC and emphasised the need to gain some sort of legal sanction. 101 Although the 
registration of the GFWBF under the Friendly Societies Act was unsuccessful, founding 
members attempted to portray the GFWBF as a politically benign organisation to deflect 
harassment by the state and employers. In a climate of widespread apathy it was further 
anticipated that legally sanctioned organisations would appeal to ordinary workers who 
did not view themselves as political dissidents.102  
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To some extent this focus on creating a legal structure that operated openly fed into 
notions of workers democracy. It was argued that such a structure would facilitate the 
development of clear lines of accountability within working class organisations and 
prevent decisions from being taken undemocratically by individuals or organisations that 
were not under the control of workers.103 For the most part, however, this strategy was 
used to attract members and secure the survival of a still very vulnerable workers 
movement and, as will be demonstrated, it was only later that the political independence 
of the workers movement became a significant aspect of the workers’ control tradition. 
 
As Baskin notes, the caution on the part of activists did not mean that they were no longer 
motivated by broader political concerns and the GFWBF’s strategy should be 
differentiated from the economism of the UTP.104  The fear of repression, however, led to 
a political silencing within the workers movement. Mike Murphy, for instance, argues 
that speaking openly about politics in the unions was ‘a kiss of death’ and Badsha recalls 
that:105 
 
We came to the movement with a political agenda: national liberation and a class 
base for national liberation. We never articulated it, you could never articulate it 
then. Most of us kept our political allegiances hidden.  
 
Although a lot more political space had opened up in the 1980s, similar conditions 
prevailed in the unions and Bafana Ndebele recalls that anyone who tried to discuss 
political issues publicly would automatically be regarded with suspicion.106   
 
The transmission of political ideas in the trade unions during the 1970s and early 1980s 
needs further investigation, but it would appear that educational courses and seminars 
served as one of the mechanisms through which broader political issues could be raised. 
In the case of dockworkers before the 1973 strikes, Hemson maintains that the political 
aims of the workers movement were presented in discussions with ‘advanced’ workers in 
secure surroundings. 107Any evidence that African workers were being exposed to 
socialist or communist ideas would have, and indeed did, result in the arrest and banning 
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of unionists. This meant that political education had to take place on a more subtle level. 
The importance of understanding class divisions within South African society emerged as 
a central theme in worker education, but while there was a general commitment to 
forging unions into a battering ram against apartheid, the political goals of activists were 
not thrashed out or translated into an articulate political programme (at least not openly).    
 
For Hemson the failure to provide decisive political leadership was also imbedded in the 
consciousness and strategies of activists (or intellectuals) within the movement. He 
claims that the political consciousness of GFWBF activists was constituted around a 
radical rather than a revolutionary critique of apartheid society, reflecting rather than 
leading the struggle of workers.108 Leading unionists adopted an evolutionary approach to 
the development of working class political consciousness and believed that the workers’ 
movement would inevitably came into conflict with the state, which would raise 
fundamental contradictions and allow for more advanced arguments to explain the class 
nature of apartheid society without loosing the support of more conservative workers. By 
focusing on popular economic demands and the legality of unregistered trade unions the 
incompatibility between authentic working class organisation and the apartheid state 
would be exposed.109 This would force the development of class-consciousness, 
especially of those workers who were motivated by an overriding concern for job and 
family security.         
  
It is partly for these reasons that activists in the GFWBF were caught off guard when 
dockworkers began searching for allies outside of the working class in the form of 
traditional leaders and KwaZulu politicians.110 Hemson argues that unionists found 
themselves suddenly confronted with an issue that they believed would only be raised 
further in the evolution of the workers organisation. 111 The problematic position of 
homeland leaders and their relationship to the working class had not been discussed 
systematically in the unions and while unionists celebrated the democratic and 
autonomous aspects of working class culture and organisation, they remained silent on 
the undemocratic nature of traditional and homeland political structures.         
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This was unfortunate since the way in which workers related to traditional political 
structures was open to some contestation. Delius, for instance, demonstrates that in the 
1950s the ANC and SACP made great strides in influencing the consciousness of young 
Pedi migrants in the 1950s and encouraged them to extend democratic principles to rural 
customs. During the Sekhukhuneland revolt they mobilised around the grievance that the 
chieftainship would become an instrument of the hated Bantu Authorities and Trust. 
Although they celebrated the office of the chief, migrants promoted the ideal that a chief 
is a chief by the people (kgosi ke kgosi) and transformed existing political structures by 
demanding participation in the inner councils of the Paramount, which for the first time 
allowed young men to have a decisive say.112 
 
Added to this, workers were not homogenous and relations with traditional Zulu leaders 
could be divisive. Without any prospect of owning land or cattle, workers’ ties to the 
rural areas started to unravel. In spite of tightening controls that forced workers to return 
to the homelands annually, many migrants sought to loosen their connections to the rural 
areas and obtain urban rights. They moved to the cities with their families and lived in 
squatter camps close to their factories or neighbouring townships.113 Badsha, for instance, 
remembers that a lot of the migrant chemical workers employed at the AE & CI came 
from the Transkei and many brought their families with them and set up shacks at 
KwaMakuta.114 Hemson also refers to the migrant women workers in the textile industry, 
many of who were also from the Transkei, and recalls that they wanted to break away 
from rural life.115 
 
Following the formation of the new unions, a push was made to establish more formal 
relations with officials from the KwaZulu homeland. Some unionists viewed Buthelezi, 
who was in talks with the ANC, as one of ‘…the most outspoken of the homeland leaders 
in attacking the South African government’ and a ‘…leader in the revival of Black 
politics in South Africa…’.116 Reflecting the strategies deployed by workers, they 
encouraged strategic alliances with above board organisations that could provide the new 
workers movement with an additional layer of protection. Developing relations with the 
KwaZulu government fitted neatly into this plan. It has been argued that there was 
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widespread support amongst workers for leaders such as Chief Buthelezi and, with the 
apartheid government reluctant to act against homeland leaders, an alliance with the 
KwaZulu government could shelter the unions from state and employer vindictiveness.117  
 
Maree divides the union movement’s dealings with the KwaZulu government into three 
phases. The first phase was characterised by cooperation and when CAS approached 
Chief Buthelezi he ‘warmly accepted the idea’ of working with the unions and appointed 
Barney Dladla to deal with labour issues.118 Dladla was invited to speak at both MAWU 
and the NUTW’s inaugural meetings. The IIE tried to develop a strong relationship with 
KwaZulu and invited Buthe lezi to serve as the Chancellor, and two representatives- 
Dladla and JAW Nxumalo- were given representation on the IIE’s council.119 Although 
Dladla and JAW Nxumalo were not always able to attend, their alternates (S. Ngobese 
and M.N. Zondi) were often present. At the same time Foszia Fisher and Laurie 
Schlemmer kept in close contact with Buthelezi to keep him informed of the unions’ 
progress. 120  
 
Others activists were much more critical of such arrangements, which would ultimately 
entrench the authority of homeland leaders that were considered collaborators.  121 Halton 
Cheadle recalls that the decision to work with KwaZulu was politically naïve, but 
unionists went along with the arrangement because it allowed them to work with Barney 
Dladla, who had thrown his weight behind the workers’ struggle during the strikes. 122 He 
became fairly popular amongst workers and it was believed that Dladla, who was linked 
to SACTU, sought to use the homeland government as a platform from which to launch a 
political opposition to the apartheid government.123 According to Murphy, Dladla also 
had a certain urban appeal, which may have allowed him to bridge the various rural and 
urban connections of union members.124  
 
When it came to dealing with political alliances and the state, the new union movement 
focused on developing a strategy that would prevent worker organisations from being 
repressed before they were given the opportunity to organise on a serious scale. This 
approach was based on gaining legal sanction where possible; distancing the workers 
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movement from banned organisations; and setting up alliances (first with registered trade 
unions and then with the KwaZulu government) that could offer black workers some 
form of protection. This strategy came at a price. While activists believed that the 
political consciousness of workers would be forged through day-to-day struggle, the fear 
of repression prevented them from articulating a coherent political programme. Rather 
than contest the role of homelands and the undemocratic aspects of traditional political 
structures, unionists sought to develop relations with KwaZulu officials. Alliances would 
not secure the ongoing survival of the new unions, which were quickly confronted with a 
range of challenges associated with the lack of trade union rights and racially skewed 
industrial relations and regulations.  
  
4.6. The Labour Relations Amendment Act: responses to the law  
Government officials and employers were deeply concerned about the strike wave as well 
as the revival of unions with African members. The strikes had barely died down when 
the government announced amendments to industrial regulations. The new legislation 
fortified the power of employers and represented a further attack on unregistered unions. 
Consequently, the new unions were forced to develop effective strategies to organise 
African workers under apartheid on a sustainable basis.        
 
The 1973 annual report of Department of Labour identified the lack of communication 
between employers and their African workers as one of the main factors that contributed 
to strike wave.125 In the survey conducted by the IIE most of the employers also cited the 
lack of communication as a leading cause of the strike action at their establishments.126It 
was partly due to this reasoning that the government decided to amend the Settlements of 
Disputes Act (1953), which was renamed the Bantu Labour Relations Act (LRA), to 
‘ensure effective methods of consultation and communication’ and expand the machinery 
through which to deal with industrial disputes.127 
 
In line with these aims the new LRA provided for the establishment of works and liaison 
committees. A liaison committee consisted of both management and elected worker 
representatives in equal proportion. Management was allowed to appoint the chairperson 
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of the committee, and the committee functioned as an advisory body that forwarded 
recommendations to management.128 On the other hand, a works committee, which had 
already been provided for under the Settlements of Disputes Act (1953), could only be 
established in the absence of a liaison committee. These committees consisted of elected 
worker representatives and were enabled to represent workers in negotiations with 
management over conditions of employment or any other matter affecting the interests of 
workers. In larger establishments where more than one works or liaison committee was 
formed, the LRA allowed for co-ordinating committees, which comprised of members of 
the respective works or liaison committees and had similar powers to those works or 
liaison committees in smaller firms.129     
 
Regional and national structures were also amended. The Minister of Labour was already 
empowered to appoint African members to the Regional Bantu Labour Committees, but 
was now required to select such appointments from liaison and works committees.130 In 
the case of a dispute, Regional Committees were also compelled to co-opt representatives 
from liaison and works committees in the trade or area effected.131 Finally, while only 
white Bantu labour officers were previously allowed to represent African workers at 
Industrial Councils, the LRA authorised the Central Bantu Labour Board to designate 
African members of a Regional Committee to attend Industrial Council when African 
workers were discussed. 132        
 
In addition to the lack of communication, the Department of Labour identified low wages 
as one of the factors that contributed to the strikes.133 The LRA aimed to speed up wage 
regulation by allowing the Minister to accept proposals made by employers on the wages 
and conditions of employment in trades not covered by Industrial Councils. If accepted, 
such a proposal would be become legally binding. 134      
   
Politicians were not only concerned about the strikes, but also discussed African trade 
unions. Members of the opposition, such Helen Suzman, argued that African workers 
should be accorded the same rights as other workers. The ruling National Party, which 
maintained that equal rights would undermine the position of white workers and lead to 
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undesirable race mixing, rejected this.135 Most government officials were convinced that 
a group of ‘agitators’ (identified as students from NUSAS, who, like the students in 
France in 1968, aimed to change the social order) were responsible for the Durban 
strikes.136They believed that African workers were simply not capable of organising trade 
unions and were prone to manipulation by sinister political forces. 137 For instance, Mr. 
Viljoen, the Minister of Labour, argued that should African trade unions be granted 
official recognition, the doors would be opened ‘militant influences’ that would be able to 
gain control of the unions, but which would ‘not to act in the interests of the Bantu’.138 
The new LRA, Viljoen hoped, would deprive African trade unions of ‘their life blood and 
any necessity for exis tence.’139    
 
The LRA reflected the ruling party’s views. African workers were required to rely on 
powerless structures to communicate their grievances and on a host of unaccountable 
individuals to represent their interests and negotiate on their behalf. African workers were 
still unable to participate directly in Industrial Councils; they did not have to be consulted 
on the proposals that employers were allowed to submit to the Minister on wages and 
conditions of work; and were barred from making direct requests for a Wage Board 
Determination. 140   
 
The LRA did have some positive attributes and included measures to protect workers 
who participated in works/ liaison committees and gave some African workers a limited 
right to strike. The Act forbade any employer from taking punitive action against any 
worker for participating in a works/ liaison committee or a Regional Committee and any 
employer who did so was subject to a fine of R600.00 or a two-year prison sentence.141 
Whereas the original Bantu Settlements of Dispute Act (1953) placed a total prohibition 
on strikes by African workers, the LRA provided mechanisms through which African 
workers- who were not employed by a local authority or in those industries deemed to be 
essential services- could conduct a legal strike.142 These reforms, however, did little to 
empower African workers. According to Maree, African strikers, even those who had 
followed the correct procedures under the Act, could be dismissed for breaking their 
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contracts under common law. 143 Without the right to picket (prevented under security 
legislation) and protection from dismissal, the right to strike was meaningless.144  
 
Unionists around the country were divided in their responses to the LRA. Maree and 
Friedman have documented the debates surrounding works/ liaison committees in detail. 
To sum up, the UTP linked unions in the Transvaal were already aware of the difficulties 
associated with organising African workers. Employers refused to deal with their unions 
and workers simply suspected of belonging to trade unions were dismissed. 145 For the 
UTP, and later the WPWAB, works committees (as opposed to liaison committees that 
could be controlled by management) offered workers some protection and could be used 
by unions to gain a foothold in factories.146  
 
It is difficult to gage the position of GFWBF. On the one hand, activists sought to boycott 
any participation in statuary workplace committees and argued that participation in these 
committees promoted collaboration with government and management and would  lead to 
the co-optation of African workers. 147 These objections were partly informed by 
experience. Firstly, it should be noted that activists and unionists were well aware of the 
incredibly difficult conditions under which workers had to organise and, through their 
dealings with the dockworkers, did have some experience in working with works 
committees.148 Workers were very suspicious of work-place structures under the control 
of management and feared that participation in these structures would lead to their  
victimisation. Even though dockworkers employed by Grindrods managed to take over 
the works committee and win a few concessions (such as a code of conduct around 
assault at the workplace) worker leaders were continually frustrated by management 
when it came to negotiations over wages and working conditions.149  
 
Yet, on the other hand, an entirely new strategy became possible when the NUTW 
secured a historic recognition agreement with Smith and Nephew. Such an agreement 
challenged the legal standing of unregistered trade unions, recognise them as the 
legitimate representatives of workers and allow them to negotiate with management on a 
plant level. The recognition agreement with Smith and Nephew, eventually signed in July 
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1974, was relatively far reaching and granted both the TWIU and the NUTW access to 
the factory and allowed for the elections of shop stewards.150 These rights came at a cost 
and the agreement included a ‘no strike’ clause.  
 
The boycott of statutory workplace committees jars with the GFWBF’s attempts to 
exploit legal avenues to win space and advance the rights of black workers under 
apartheid. The GFWBF, for instance, attempted to register under the Friendly Societies 
Act. Later this boycott of statutory workplace committees would be reviewed as the 
struggle for plant-based recognition became the key focus of the GFWBF unions. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
The GFWBF consisted of activists from different trade union and political backgrounds, 
including SACTU unionists, student radicals and sympathetic registered unions. The 
GFWBF also attracted a fair number of worker members, who imprinted the new 
movement with their own experiences of collective action and modes of organisation. 
Their financial contributions the GFWBF generated an independent resource base for the 
new movement and, by drawing on their own traditions, they deepened democratic 
practice.  
 
The GFWBF was only operational for a few months when the conditions under which 
workers had to organise were totally transformed by the 1973 strike wave. Alongside 
semi-skilled African and Indian workers, new layers of workers, unschooled in trade 
unionism, were radicalised and migrants and African women often spearheaded the 
militant activities of workers. Once again workers drew on their own traditions of 
resistance and adopted strategies to prevent the widespread victimisation of worker 
leaders. With a new sense of confidence amongst workers and the emergences of worker 
leaders, the workers movement was propelled forward giving rise to the MAWU and the 
NUTW.  
 
By the end of 1973 some progress had been made in defining the character and key 
approaches of the new workers movement in the region: democratic organisation was 
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considered the key to the worker movement’s success in enacting far-reaching change 
and the new unions chose to operate independently from registered trade unions. The 
independent unions were still small and vulnerable and to in order to secure their survival 
the GFWBF sought to establish strategic alliances with registered unions and KwaZulu 
homeland officials. The new workers’ movement was also distanced from banned  
organisations to avoid state repression.  
 
Much was still uncertain and undecided. Fearful of repression, activists downplayed their 
broader political agenda and union intellectuals failed to challenge the undemocratic 
nature of traditional political structures and the homeland system. In addition, the new 
unions did not have a clear strategy of how to relate to industrial structures such as works 
and liaison committees.  In spite of these weaknesses, the agreement secured by the 
NUTW allowed the GFWBF unions to development one of their core strategies in the 
fight for union rights.  
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Chapter 5: 
The Trade Union Coordinating Council, 1974- 1976. 
5.1. Introduction  
In January 1974 the new independent unions, the GFWBF and the IIE, established the 
TUACC. Maree argues that the TUACC was initially created to formalize relations with 
the KwaZulu government and it is was only after Chief Buthelezi withdrew his support 
that the TUACC was reconstituted as coordinating body that centralised union resources 
and the formulation of policy. 1 This chapter takes issue with Maree’s argument and 
maintains that the formation of TUACC marked an important step in the development of 
the workers’ control tradition. Even though TUACC may have been born out of a need to 
set up a body that could liase with other parties such as the KwaZulu homeland 2, TUACC 
aimed to unite the new unions in Natal into a ‘tight’ structure- rather than a loose 
association- that would allow the unions to develop common policies.3 The new unions 
already had much in common and TUACC provided a framework that enabled the unions 
to share ideas, consolidate their principles and organisational strategies, pool their 
resources and extend into other parts of the country.   
 
Sustaining the organisation of African workers proved incredibly difficult and between 
1974 and 1976 the TUACC unions confronted numerous obstacles that disrupted 
organisation. It was by working through these difficulties on a day-to-day basis that the 
unions adapted their approaches and the TUACC played a crucial role in providing a 
forum through which the unions could refine their methods, tighten up organisation and 
develop new tactics.         
 
5.2. Founding Principles and Organisational Strategies  
In one of the first meetings of the TUACC held in January 1974, Nxasana explained that 
in the same way that workers cannot be strong individually, unions cannot be strong and 
needed to unite.4 According to the Secretariat’s report to the Council meeting later that 
year in June, TUACC was formed because the new unions needed to act collectively if 
they wanted to grow and survive and the unions needed a body that could ‘enter into 
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dialogue with homeland governments, academics and other institutions concerned with 
the problems faced by the masses of unorganised workers’.5 The Secretariat argued that 
only with the formation of TUACC ‘could we evolve a common and broad based 
approach to the building of the unions’.6 The new unions were already working closely 
and TUACC adopted many of the policies and practices developed under the GFWBF. 
Even at this early stage TUACC adopted polices and strategies that would become a core 
part of the workers’ control tradition.                
 
Although the TUACC accepted ‘interested parties’ (such as the IIE) as members, it was 
structured to ensure that the elected representatives of workers dominated the 
organization. The TUACC consisted of a Council, which met every three months, and a 
Secretariat, elected by the Council, which implemented the decisions taken by the 
Council and took care of the day-to-day running of the organization. 7 Only trade union 
members were officially represented on the Council and even though representatives of   
‘interested parties’ were allowed to speak at Council meetings, they were given no voting 
rights.8  
 
One of the most distinctive of TUACC’s policies was that only ‘open’ trade unions would 
be allowed to affiliate. Open trade unions were defined as those that accepted all workers 
‘…regardless of race, religion or sex’.9 By insisting that workers of all race groups be 
organized into the same trade union, the TUACC challenged the long established practice 
of organizing African workers separately and fundamentally defied racial segregation 
within the trade union movement that had long been promoted the government.  Like the 
GFWBF, TUACC also supported the formation of broad based industrial unions. Ideally, 
such unions would organise on a national level and be united under a national federation 
to avoid the fragmentation of workers and minimise sectoral divisions.10 In addition, 
unregistered industrial unions would be able to cooperate with registered trade unions and 
thereby take advantage of the rights under the existing legislation.     
 
The TUACC unions tapped into workers newfound enthusiasm to unionise and recruited 
workers on a mass basis. However, Hemson, Legassick and Ulrich note that, even during 
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this formative period, TUACC emphasised the development of worker leaders and the 
creation of shop stewards structures.11 They claim that mass mobilisation existed 
alongside strategies of in-depth factory organisation. Due to the lack of resources and 
experienced organisers, however, unions were not always able to cope and in some 
instances organisation proved haphazard.  
 
By mid 1974 the NUTW had recruited some 5000 members.12 According to Maree, the 
recognition victory at Smith and Nephew instigated an important shift in the union. The 
mass recruitment of workers outside factory gates led to a weak base with a high turn 
over in membership and a reliance on organisers.13 The recognition agreement required a 
union structure that would allow workers to deal with management on a day-today basis 
and by early 1974 a new organisational strategy, based on in-depth factory organisation, 
had already been devised (although it would take some time to implement).14 Organisers 
were assigned to specific factories and those factories with a small union membership 
were dropped. Shop stewards had to play a central role and were expected to recruit 
members, collect dues and handle complaints. In addition the NUTW continued to work 
closely with the TWIU, especially at Smith and Nephew, and these unions made great 
strides in creating unity between African and Indian workers and the TWIU raised the 
concerns of the NUTW at regional and national Industrial Council meetings. The 
recognition agreement at Smith and Nephew raised the expectations of all the open trade 
unions. The NUTW entered into negotiations with South African Fabrics, winning 
factory access, and unionists believed that they would sign another recognition agreement 
in the near future.  
 
MAWU also grew rapidly and claimed a combined membership of 3,883 by July 1974.15 
The union had a strong fighting spirit and while it formally boycotted any participation in 
wage and liaison committees, the union fought for recognition at a variety of companies 
including Glacier Bearings, Caravan International, Leyland, Hewlett’s Aluminium and 
Sarmcol. 16 MAWU also encouraged the election of shop stewards and Ensor reports that 
MAWU shop stewards were holding regular meetings and received education from the 
union as well as the IIE. 17 MAWU’s Pietermaritzburg branch was also asked to include 
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rubber and motor repair workers.18 Although their inclusion blurred industrial boundaries, 
these workers had previously been unionised and their experience and ‘high level of 
consciousness’ were viewed as assets.    
 
As noted above, the GFWBF also expanded significantly 19 The main strategy of the 
GFWBF was to organise workers into industrial sectors. Once a sector was considered 
strong enough a union would be formed. 20 In 1974 two unions emerged out of the 
GFWBF. These included the Furniture and Timber Workers Union (FTWU) and the 
Chemical Workers Industrial Union (CWIU).21  
 
The differences between the FTWU and the CWIU are striking. According to Ensor, 
furniture workers originally joined the GFWBF in late 1972/ early 1973 and were under 
the impression that the GFWBF was a union. 22 By the time the union was formed many 
had already lost faith in trade unions as the GFWBF had failed to negotiate on their 
behalf and improve their conditions. In addition, the actual status of the FTWU is vague 
and it has been documented that the union was originally established under David 
Hemson as a parallel to the registered furniture union in TUCSA.23 The FTWU seems to 
have gained little from this arrangement and was continually rebuffed by the registered 
union. 24 The union, disrupted further by internal squabbles, eventually collapsed due to 
financial mismanagement in 1976.  
 
The origins of the CWIU can be traced to a group of workers from African Explosives 
and Chemical Industries, owned by Anglo American, who joined the GFWBF at the end 
of 1973.25 A parallel chemical union, namely the South African Chemical Workers Union 
(SACWU) that was linked to the UTP, was already operating in Johannesburg. It was 
suggested, it is not clear by whom, that SACWU should extend to Durban and become a 
national union, but it would appear that SACWU’s parent union rejected the idea. 26 The 
formation of CWIU was therefore purely a TUACC initiative and in June 1974 Omar 
Badsha was appointed as the organiser.27 In spite of the lack of resources and experienced 
organisers, chemical workers chose to build carefully. Members were encouraged to 
organise themselves by taking a lead in recruiting and the union mostly relied on 
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organisers and  TUACC staff to handle money and other minor problems. According to 
Mare, factories were chosen on three basic criteria: a high level of self-activity amongst 
workers, size (the chemical industry was made of many small establishments with a few 
very large ones), and the attitudes of management.28 By August an estimated 816 workers 
had been recruited from AE&CI, Chrome Chemicals and Contact Packers and the union 
was launched in November 1974 with 1000 members. 29 Like other TUACC affiliates, the 
CWIU boycotted works and liaison committees and focused on fighting for recognition.30            
 
5.3. Organisational Decline  
It has been argued that once the euphoria of the 1973 strike wore off the emerging union 
movement went into decline. As Hemson et al note, there  is some debate relating to the 
timing of this nadir.31 Friedman dates the slump from late 1974 onwards, but figures 
reported to the TUACC secretariat in June 1975 indicate that the TUACC unions were 
still experiencing some growth during this year- NUTW cla imed 7,500 members; 
MAWU had approximately 5,000 members; the CWIU reported 2,300 signed up 
members with 900 paid up; and the general and industrial sections of the TGWU 
(previously the GFWBF) claimed a combined membership of 20,000 cardholders with 
5,000 of these paid up.32 By August MAWU reported a membership of 6500, with a third 
of these paid up, while the CWIU membership seemed to stabilise at about 2400.33 
 
Maree, however, argues that the number of signed up members does not reflect lapsed 
membership. The amounts received from subscriptions are a much more accurate 
reflection of the open unions’ organisational strength and reflect that the crisis manifested 
from 1975 onwards.34 He maintains that between September 1974 and July 1975 the 
average amount received from subscriptions by the NUTW on a monthly basis dropped 
from R1437 to R1108 and this halved in the second half of 1975. 35 MAWU’s paid up 
membership declined slightly and average monthly subscriptions dropped from R1064 in 
February 1975 to between R800 to R1000 in August of that year.36  While Maree does 
not contest the membership figures given by the CWIU, he argues that the union was in a 
state of collapse by the end of year.37 The membership of the TGWU is more difficult to 
gauge. Maree estimates that at the official launch of the union in July, the union claimed 
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25,000 card members, a third of which were paid up, which suggests a substantial 
increase from the figures quoted by TUACC in June.38 By August the general sector 
collected R2491 in subscriptio ns, indicating a membership of 5600, which is also an 
improvement on TUACC’s estimates.39              
 
It is perhaps the sharp decline of the NUTW, the strongest of the TUACC unions, which 
signalled that the new workers’ movement was beginning to recede. The figures given by 
TUACC and Maree conflict- making it difficult to draw any conclusions about the 
growth or decline in membership - but suggest that any significant decreases in the 
membership of other affiliates took place towards the end of 1975. Membership figures 
are incomplete and inconsistent and are not an accurate measure of organisational 
strength. Since the open unions struggled to implement firm financial controls, 
subscriptions are also unreliable.  
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that 1974-5 proved to be a difficult time for the open unions, 
which had to adjust to the realities of organizing black workers in the aftermath of a huge 
worker uprising and the recognition victory at Smith and Nephew. The downturn of the 
union movement in Natal manifested in the failure to establish a sustained presence in 
factories (which led to an unstable membership and organisational base), the loss of key 
strikes and the inability to make any headway in their campaign for trade union 
recognition.  
 
5.4. Employer, State, and Worker Responses to the Open Unions    
A number of factors hampered unionisation – including a downturn in the economy and 
rising unemployment, which further undermined the bargaining power of the open 
unions; the hostile attitudes and heavy handed actions of employers and managers, who 
aimed to regain control over African workers and prevent unregistered unions from 
gaining a foothold in their establishments; and state harassment, designed to intimidated 
workers and disrupt the day-to-day operations of the unions. In addition, the open unions 
had to challenge negative perceptions of unions, especially workers’ fear of joining 
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unions in a climate of widespread repression and victimization, as well as opposition 
from workers who set out to undermine organisation in their own workplaces.           
 
To understand the impact that the economic slow-down had on unionisation it is 
necessary briefly to consider the bargaining power of TUACC members. Webster’s 
survey, conducted towards the end of 1975, indicates that 80-90% of TUACC’s members 
were either unskilled or lower-semi-skilled. 40 The CWIU’s membership consisted of 57% 
unskilled workers and 29% ‘lower-semi skilled’.41 MAWU’s membership was split in 
roughly equal proportions between unskilled workers, estimated at 47%, and lower semi-
skilled workers, which constituted 41% of the membership.42 Members of the NUTW 
were more skilled with 14% classified as unskilled, 73% as lower semi-skilled, and 10% 
higher semi-skilled.43 This distribution of lower and higher semi- skilled work in the 
NUTW is explained by Alan Hirsch, who argues that due to the technological advances 
in the textile industry, capitalisation did not translate into a demand for skilled labour to 
operate machinery and production was mostly based on semi-skilled and unskilled work 
described as ‘highly repetitive’ with no need for initiative. 44 Such work, capitalists 
maintained, was particularly well suited for young African women who would be able to 
become productive after a couple of months training. 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, the downturn in the economy was accompanied by a structural 
shift away from a reliance on unskilled labour. This meant that unskilled workers who 
were retrenched or dismissed from the mid 1970s onwards had less chance of being 
absorbed back into the urban-based economy. As unskilled workers became expendable, 
the bargaining power of unions such as CWIU and MAWU deteriorated when the 
chemical and metal sectors experienced a recession in 1975 and 1976 respectively.45 
Employers found the semi-skilled members of the NUTW more difficult to replace, 
which partly accounts for the initial successes of the union. According to Hirsh, however, 
the South African textile industry (which catered for a limited local market, proved 
unable to compete effectively on the world market, and was heavily reliant on 
government protection) had already been faltering for a number of decades and was 
particularly prone to economic slumps. 46 Workers were often expected to absorb the costs 
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of falls in production through lay-offs and short time arrangements. The industry 
experienced a number of slumps during the 1970s and Maree notes that by March 1975 
more than 10,000 textile workers had been laid off, with thousands more on short-time.47  
 
The hostility on the part of employers has been cited as another key factor that curbed 
unionisation and greatly frustrated the struggle for recognition. Maree argues that once 
the 1973 strikes wave passed, employers quickly reasserted their dominance. They were 
compelled to bargain with registered unions, but employers and managers rejected any 
meaningful negotiations with African workers on substantive issues and did not tolerate 
unregistered unions. Some employers may have been guided by a sense of racial 
paternalism, even calling on experts to decipher ‘Bantu customs’ and to supply materials 
and education on how to transcend cultural distance in the workplace.48 Believing that 
they understood the needs of their African workers, who were not considered 
sophisticated enough for ‘responsible’ unionism, employers were usually suspicious of 
independent worker initiatives and only abided industrial relations structures (such as 
liaison committees) that ensured management retained control. Industrial action was 
often attributed to outside agitators and management did not hesitate to call the Labour 
Department or the police to solve disputes.49 For the most part, the workplace in the 
South African context was structured by racial inequality and prejudice.50 Operating 
within a society designed to regulate the African population, employers were able to 
wield substantial authority, which they often exercised arbitrarily, and African workers, 
who were frequently subjected to racial abuse and even violence, were rendered almost 
powerless.     
 
The victimization of union members, lockouts, widespread dismissal and the arrest and 
prosecution of strikers were common tactics deployed by employers to undermine 
autonomous worker organisation. 51 Employers and managers used the migrant labour 
system to ‘weed out’ unionists by refusing to renew their contracts and victimization 
often came in the forms of redundancy. Respondents to Webster’s’ survey noted that ‘[i]f 
the factory has to go on short time…it is the union activists who are laid off first.’52 
According to Maree, employers and managers also set up liaison committees to prevent 
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trade unions from taking root and the number of statutory committees increased from 773 
liaison and 125 works committees in 1973 to 2505 liaison and 301 works committees in 
1977.53 By establishing committees employers argued that they had provided the 
necessary channels of communication and could not be expected to deal with trade 
unions or other autonomous worker structures.  
 
Employer’s views of trade unions vis-à-vis liaison committees is demonstrated by the 
evidence given by Pinetext management in the case of the State vs. T. Colgien Mbali 
(who was accused of inciting an illegal strike- see below)54.  Mr Setterberg testified to the 
following:55 
 
Would it have been the policy not to speak to the workers via a union? We 
were only prepared to speak to workers via our Liaison Committee. 
Can you then tell us what is the attitude of the company with regard to 
Unions and Committees formed by workers? (Silence) 
Firstly, I will make it simple, are they against or are they for them? …The 
company policy is that it will negotiate through Liaison Committees. These were 
established for this purpose. It will not negotiate with any outside organisation, be 
it a ‘committee’ or be it a Textile Workers Union or any outside organisation.  
Under no circumstances will the company negotiate with a voluntary 
association of workers created by themselves for their own purposes? No. It 
[the company] sees no necessity to do so because workers have elected 
representatives to do just that. 
 
Employers devised various strategies to break the open unions and thwart their demands 
for recognition. In March 1974 Leyland dismissed 104 of the 177 workers who went out 
on strike to demand the recognition of MAWU.  Fearful of international criticism, 
Leyland’s management retreated and agreed to enter into negotiations with MAWU and 
to reinstate workers.56 Maree argues that Leyland management soon changed tack again, 
and, under the guise of a recession in the British motor industry, dismissed 65 workers, 
including the strongest and most influential unionists, which broke the back of MAWU at 
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the company. Maree also points to cases where management would enter into 
negotiations with open unions, only to draw out discussions.57 The activities of unions 
would be contained and their resources, momentum, and support worn down. This is a 
tactic deployed by SA Fabrics that held regular meetings with the NUTW from June 
1974, which produced few concrete results. Support for the union dwindled and the union 
eventually withdrew from the company in mid 1976.    
 
The prosecution of Mbali also revealed the extent to which the Labour Department 
collaborated with employers. In April 1974 the NUTW attempted to organise one of the 
first legal strikes by African workers at Pinetex to protest against the victimization of six 
contract workers. Mbali, the union organiser, was charged and prosecuted for inciting an 
illegal strike.58 He was found guilty on a minor technicality in that the documentation 
required by the Department of Labour for legal strike action was handed to the Labour 
Office in Pinetown instead of Durban.  
 
The Labour Department was also slow to act against employers who blatantly 
transgressed labour regulations. Such disregard for workers’ rights is illustrated by the 
GFWBF’s dealings with the Pinetown based Reynolds shoe-component company during 
the first half of 1974. Workers were locked-out for demanding a wage increase through 
their works committee and the GFWBF helped workers draw up a petition, while Barney 
Dladla attempted to open negotiations with management on their behalf. 59 When this 
failed, a complaint was laid against Reynolds for failing to register the works committee, 
interfering with a committee meeting; acting in an insulting manner, and dismissing 
workers unfairly. The Department of Labour, however, simply accepted management’s 
claims that workers had embarked on an illegal strike.  
 
At the same time, government disrupted the day-to day operation of the open unions 
through persistent harassment. In January 1974 four unionists (including D. Davis, H. 
Cheadle, D. Hemson and J. Cunningham-Brown) were banned under the Suppression of 
Communism Act and the police held pass raids at the NUTW’s offices. In May 1974 the 
Criminal Investigation Department (Commercial Branch) confiscated the GFWBF’s 
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records on the grounds that it was operating as an unregistered Friendly Society. At the 
end of the year the GFWBF was charged with contravening the Group Areas Act, while 
officials from the GFWBF and CAS were later charged and found guilty of contravening 
the Friendly Society Act in January 1975.60 The GFWBF was subsequently transformed 
into the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) in July 1975.61 Members of the 
IIE also received a fair amount of police attention and in December 1974 Eddie Webster, 
an education officer who also who served on the editorial board of the South African 
Labour Bulletin, was arrested and detained under the Suppression of Communism Act.62 
A year later Bekisisa Nxasana, also an education officer, was detained under Section 6 of 
the Terrorism Act.    
 
The government was successful in instilling fear amongst workers and contributed to 
negative perceptions of unions. In Webster’s survey, respondents identified three main 
factors that prevented workers from joining unions. Most of the respondents, 44%, 
believed that it was a fear of intimidation by employers and the state that caused workers 
to shy away from unions. This trepidation is confirmed by a report by the NUTW in April 
1975, which stated that workers were becoming afraid of playing an active part in the 
union. 63 In the second instance, 33% of the respondents viewed pessimism surrounding 
the long-term survival of the unions as the most notable deterrent. They argued that 
African workers tended to view unions as something alien, something for white workers, 
or believed that they were prohibited from taking part in unions. In addition, African 
workers considered themselves powerless in apartheid society and did not think that their 
unions were capable of bringing about change. Finally, the organisational failings of 
unions, especially the misappropriation of funds by organisers, also contributed to 
negative perceptions and 11% identified corruption as the main factor that prevented 
workers from joining unions.       
 
Workers were not necessarily united in their support of unionisation and some played an 
active role in undermining organisation at their workplaces. The most obvious cases were 
informants who spied on their colleagues and reported to management. They could be 
rewarded handsomely for this and during Mbali’s trial, for instance, one of informants 
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hired by the Pintex’s management testified that he was paid an extra R10 a week (over 
and above his normal wage of R25 a week) for his efforts. Unions upset established 
workplace relations and hierarchies, threatening the position of indunas and offending 
some of the more conservative workers. In an interview with Mike Kirkwood, B 
Tshabalala 64 recalls an incident in early 1974 when a group of indunas, who were also 
union members, tried to disrupt MAWU at Non-Ferrous Metals by exposing the union to 
management.65 Although they were unsuccessful, Tshabalala subsequently received a 
visit from security police.  
 
In his study of stevedores in Durban, Hemson explores the contradictory position of 
indunas. Management often thought that indunas held some form of customary authority 
and appointed them to supervise other African workers and instil discipline.66 While 
many workers viewed indunas as instruments of management and an obstacle to 
independent organisation, management considered them the legitimate representatives of 
workers and it would appear that indunas tended to dominate workplace committees, 
particularly liaison committees. With the growth of workers’ organisation, however, 
indunas were wedged between increasing pressure from management to implement 
controls and the rising resistance of labourers. 67 Like other African workers, indunas 
feared that they would either be dismissed or that their contracts would not be renewed if 
they sided with workers or refused to implement management’s demands. In spite of this, 
Hemson notes that some of the most radical workers with a clear grasp of the labour 
process were indunas. They believed that they too were exploited and threw in their lot 
with workers. 68  
 
African unions had to deal with similar difficulties in the past. Constrained in an 
industrial relations system specifically designed to thwart their progress and in a society 
geared towards disciplining and regulating African workers, African unions had not been 
able to set down strong roots. TUACC unions would have to come up with innovative 
organisational strategies to secure their long-term survival.           
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5.5. Strategic Alliances: the KwaZulu government and Other Unions 
As noted above, one of the TUACC’s key tasks was to liase with other bodies. TUACC 
sought to solidify the strategic alliances with the KwaZulu homeland and registered trade 
unions, and develop relations with local unions and international labour bodies. TUACC, 
however, was not in a position to dictate the terms of these relations and dealings with the 
KwaZulu homeland and registered unions yielded few positive results. In addition, 
establishing friendly relations  with other locally based unions and international bodies 
also proved difficult.    
 
Drawing of the strategy developed under the GFWBF, the TUACC sought to protect the 
open unions by entering into strategic alliances with other structures such as the KwaZulu 
homeland. According to the constitution, TUACC set out to ‘…advise Homeland 
governments on all matters pertaining to labour within the Republic of South Africa’; 
‘keep Homeland Governments informed on all developments in labour and labour 
organisation’; and counsel ‘Homeland governments in the drafting of all legislation 
affecting labour.’69 To cement the bond between TUACC and homeland leaders, Dladla 
was elected Chairperson of the TUACC. The selection of a political figure to such a 
prominent post jars with the criticisms that Left Marxists’ made of SACTU’s alliance 
with the ANC and demonstrates that notions of workers’ control, especially when it came 
to preserving the political autonomy of workers’ organisations, had not yet been fully 
formulated. Nonetheless, Dladla continued to prove a useful ally and went on to assist the 
NUTW in negotiations during strikes that took place in Pinetown-New Germany in early 
1974 and, as noted in many of the accounts on the emerging unions, led a march of 
strikers from Clermont to Frametex. 70  
 
Before long, TUACC’s relationship with the KwaZulu officials entered into what Maree 
classifies as the second phase in which the KwaZulu government withdrew its support of 
the open trade unions. This step was precipitated by a clash between Buthelezi and 
Dladla, caused by the threat that Dladla’s growing popularity with workers posed to 
Buthelezi’s position. 71 The unions were drawn into the spat after a letter written by a Mr. 
T.G. Dlangamandla, attacking Chief Buthelezi for failing to clarify his views on 
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opposition parties in the homeland, was circulated in Clermont and Durban. 72 The letter 
praised Dladla, and called on Buthelezi to ‘inject more men of the calibre and conviction 
of our hero (Barney Dladla)’ into the Parliament, which would prevent Buthelezi from 
having to ‘do all the thinking and talking for KwaZulu.’73 The letter stoked rumours and 
speculation in the press that unionists were involved in a plan to create a labour party, 
with Dladla as its leader, and that the open unions were part of a broader campaign to 
oppose Buthelezi.74 At the same time anonymous pamphlets were being distributed that 
claimed that the KwaZulu government did not support the union movement and that 
certain politicians were using the unions for their own political interests.75     
 
Keen to de- link the open unions from the political wrangling in the KwaZulu Cabinet, 
TUACC tried to explain that Daldla’s links with the unions were valid. The TUACC sent 
delegates to meet with the Cabinet, where it was agreed that the unions would work with 
Mr. Ngobese, who would report directly to Dladla. The TUACC also issued a statement 
that denied that that Dlangamandla’s letter represented the views of workers and claimed 
that Dladla interceded in industrial disputes with the full knowledge of the KwaZulu 
government.76  
 
The IIE seemed even more eager to placate Buthelezi. In a statement published in the 
South African Labour Bulletin the IIE argued that it was not in the interests of workers to 
oppose Buthelezi because:77 
 
[h]e has fully supported the unions, and the unions know that Chief Buthelezi is 
their most important source of moral support, and their greatest protection against 
government intervention. Even if it were thought that Mr. Dladla would be even 
more firm in his support of the trade unions, it is obvious that the hope of making 
that marginal gain cannot be worth the risk of attacking a leader who has the wide 
support not only amongst workers but all sections of the Zulu community.   
 
The IIE noted that the open unions had ‘no desire to be manipulated by politicians’, but 
Chief Buthelezi and his loyalists clearly held the upper hand. Dladla was subsequently 
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removed from his portfolio and, in spite of the calls made by TUACC to maintain and 
even strengthen relations, officials in the KwaZulu government rarely responded to 
requests for meetings and failed to provide any meaningful assistance to workers.78  
 
Unionists seemed as divided as ever over the open unions’ association with the KwaZulu 
government and failed to provide clear a analysis on the role of homelands in propping 
up apartheid as well as the undemocratic nature of homeland governments and traditional 
political structures. Some unionists, however, did attempt to extend and define the terms 
of the unions’ association with homeland governments in more detail. For instance, in an 
article published in the South African Labour Bulletin in July 1974, Alec Erwin noted 
that the homelands, which were in continuous decline (providing little opportunity for 
internal capital accumulation or the generation of surplus and unable to attract sufficient 
outside investment), had become a dependent sub-system of the South African 
economy.79 He argued that for the economy of the homelands to improve, unemployed 
workers would have to be absorbed into intensive agricultural and industrial 
developments and the income of rural families, especially migrants, increased. Rather 
than depress wages and discourage union organisation in an attempt to attract outside 
investment, which would ultimately decrease the wealth of the black population, Erwin 
urged homeland leaders to view unions as potential allies. He argued that unions could 
provide such leaders with organisational backing, allowing them to win more concessions 
from the apartheid government; assist with broader social mobilization and the education 
of migrants in their roles as subsistence farmers and workers; and facilitate democratic 
governance by encouraging popular participation.              
 
TUACC did  not fare much better with its attempts to establish strategic relations with the 
registered TUCSA unions. Following on from the GFWBF, TUACC affiliates hoped to 
develop cordial relations with sympathetic registered unions to gain access to collective 
bargaining structures to which non-racial and African were denied access.80 Even before 
the TUACC was formed, relations with TUCSA deteriorated rapidly. The open unions 
found themselves in a difficult position. While keen on guarding their independence, 
unregistered trade unions were still dependent on registered trade unions for access to 
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collective barraging structures, to create cross-racial unity on the shop floor, and to gain a 
measure of legitimacy (and protection). As competition with TUCSA unions intensified, 
TUACC was forced to confront TUCSA more openly and consider in more concrete 
terms the role that the open unions should play in the broader trade union movement.  
 
At the end of 1973 the tensions between registered and independent union officials in 
CAS were exacerbated by events surrounding another round of strikes led by the NUTW 
at the Frame Textile Company. During the strike the TUCSA’s executive met with the 
Divisional Inspector of Labour and accepted his claims that management had not 
victimised workers and that the NUTW was driven by political motivations. 81 GFWBF 
delegates who attended TUCSA’s annual conference in August of that year attempted to 
drum up support for the strike and the conference agreed to donate money to a strike 
fund.82 This gesture did not mend divisions and it has been argued that a speech made by 
David Davis, in which he praised SACTU and criticized TUCSA, further entrenched 
suspicions that the independent unions were indeed political. 83  
 
With the formation of independent unions the need for CAS to mobilise registered unions 
in a drive to organise African workers fell away. Barring the TWIU, registered unions 
withdrew from meetings after the TUCSA conference and CAS mainly served as an 
administrative centre that provided clerical services (such as typing and book keeping) 
for the new unions. In spite of the widening divisions, some of the members in TUACC 
believed that the open unions were still too weak to antagonise TUCSA openly and still 
hoped to ‘work hand in hand with registered trade unions on a democratic basis’.84 At the 
same time, fears were expressed that such an arrangement would undermine the 
independence of the open unions and at TUACC’s inaugural meeting Mbali from NUTW 
appealed that the ‘TUACC must not let TUCSA dominate them.’85       
 
There were instances where the open unions were able to work with registered unions in 
particular factories. The TWIU continued to work closely with the NUTW and, according 
to Ensor, MAWU’s Pietermaritzburg branch was given a great deal of support by Mr. 
Norman Middleton, secretary of the registered Engineering Union. This branch of 
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MAWU also cooperated with the registered Boilermakers Union, which supported a 
campaign by the union to gain admission into the National Industrial Council for the Iron, 
Steel and  Engineering industry.86 TUCSA’s executive, however, was becoming more 
antagonistic towards the open unions. This could be seen when TUACC organised a 
public meeting to protest the banning of unionists at the start of 1974 and invited other 
trade unions, officials from the KwaZulu government, prominent critics of apartheid, and 
church leaders to take part. 87 While some of the registered trade unions based on the 
Witwatersrand and the UTP sent messages of support, the executive of TUCSA accepted 
the Labour Minister’s word that these unionists were banned for political activities and 
refused to attend.88  
 
Harriet Bolton clashed with the TUCSA executive as a result and threatened to pull the 
TWIU out of the federation. This led to a discussion on the possible affiliation of the 
TWIU to TUACC, which went right to the heart of TUACC’s policy on open trade 
unions. Much like SACTU, TUACC struggled to transcend the racial separation of 
workers entrenched by the apartheid government’s refusal to grant African workers full 
industrial rights.89 White, Indian and coloured workers would have to forfeit their union 
and collective bargaining rights if they joined non-racial unions and only a few Indian 
workers became members of the open trade unions. This meant that while the open 
unions challenged the formation of racially exclusive unions in principle, in practice they 
mainly organised African workers. The proposed affiliation of a registered trade union 
amplified this dichotomy, testing the understandings of non-racial unionisation within 
TUACC.  
 
Two positions were developed in response to the proposed affiliation of the TWIU. The 
first proposed that a special section should be set up to deal with registered unions, while 
the second maintained that all trade unions regardless of their policies on race should be 
allowed to affiliate.90 Before the matter was resolved, however, Bolton was forced to 
leave the union and the TWIU decided to remain with TUCSA. Harassment by the 
Security Police compelled Bolton to leave South Africa, which in combination with the 
banning of unionists, impacted negatively on the NUTW. The alliance with the TWIU 
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was diluted, dissolving the connections that the NUTW had established with textile and 
garment workers on the Witwatersrand, and plans to extend the NUTW into the 
Transvaal were shelved. 91         
 
By this time unionists in unregistered trade unions were also becoming more vocal in 
their criticisms of registered trade unions. In an article, published in the South African 
Labour Bulletin, Ensor noted that ‘established unions’ had become bureaucratic and 
undemocratic and argued that ‘[over] the years, the established unions have striven to 
become more acceptable to the State, and have sacrificed their independence for the 
admitted benefits of recognition by the State…’.92 To counter the these oligarchic 
tendencies, she proposed that registered trade unions should allocate more money and 
time to the education of members; keep members informed; and encourage them to 
participate in meetings and the day-to-day running of the union.  
 
TUCSA’s worst fears had been realized with the emergence of independent unregistered 
unions (especially the open trade unions that were known for their militancy and were 
perceived to have political ambitions). In March 1974 TUCSA held a meeting for 
registered unions interested in unionising African workers where the General Secretary 
condemned the formation of independent unions in Natal and sought to woo African 
unions by inviting them to send representatives to TUCSA’s annual conference as 
observers in September of that year.93 It was largely in response to TUCSA’s attempts to 
organise African workers again that TUACC repositioned itself and called for the 
formation of a national coordinating body that would unite unregistered trade unions and 
allow them to engage TUCSA on a more systematic basis.94 
 
The TUACC tried to meet with other unregistered trade unions to win their support, but 
the proposal proved premature. 95 The unregistered union movement was still very 
fragmented and unions did not respond with much enthusiasm. Nonetheless, the TUACC 
aimed to influence the policies of registered unions and how they related to African 
workers. 96 TUACC decided to send delegates to TUCSA’s conference and, along with 
the National Union of Clothing Workers (NUCW), called on registered trade unions to 
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consult unregistered trade unions before attending industrial sittings or signing 
exemptions and agreements. 97  At the conference TUCSA decided to re-admit African 
trade unions and a few months later wrote to African unions informing them that TUCSA 
would be willing to consider applications for affiliation. 98 With the prospect of bringing 
African workers back into the federation, TUCSA did not consider it necessary to consult 
the independent unregistered unions on issues concerning African workers. 
 
The TUACC also experienced difficulties in forging links with international labour 
bodies.99 Problems had already been experienced in November 1973 when the IIE 
approached Ruskin College, an educational body based in Oxford for trade unionists. 
Influenced by exiles from the ANC and SACTU, the Ruskin Students Association argued 
that any involvement with the IIE was in contravention to the Geneva Resolution, which 
called for material support for the workers and people of South Africa ‘through their 
authentic trade union and political organisations’.100 The Association claimed that the 
ANC and SACTU, as opposed to the independent unions, were the true representatives of 
the oppressed people of South Africa.101 The anti-apartheid movement accepted 
SACTU’s claim that the South African state was fascist and that meaningful trade union 
activity inside of the country was impossible. Branded ‘yellow unions’, the open unions 
would continually be hampered as they operated in the international arena and tried to 
forge international cooperation.            
 
MAWU, however, did have some success with the International Metalworkers Federation 
(IMF). Although MAWU’s initial application was unsuccessful, the body was impressed 
by the Leyland strike and invited MAWU to join. A South African Consultative 
Committee was established, which consisted of both registered and unregistered metal 
unions. Tensions between MAWU and the UTP linked EAWU remained and discussions 
on the possible amalgamation of these unions bore no fruit.102 Nonetheless, MAWU 
established relations with the registered National Union of Motor Assembly and Rubber 
Workers of South Africa (NUMARWOSA) and its parallel the United Automobile, 
Rubber and Allied Workers Union (UAW), which would later prove critical in the 
formation of a new national federation. 103           
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TUACC’s attempts to forge links with local unions (registered and unregistered), 
international labour bodies, and the KwaZulu government proved unsuccessful. Fissures 
in the local trade union movement deepened as competition for African members 
intensified and, with the open unions labelled ‘yellow unions’, associations with 
international bodies would also be difficult to secure. In addition, TUACC had derived 
few advantages from its dealings with the KwaZulu government and would soon be 
exposed to the dangers of working with political organisation without a clearly defined 
political policy.  
 
5.6. Education, Organisational Skills and Leadership     
By failing to secure much needed support from outside sources, TUACC had to rely on 
its own strength to build a sustainable and democratic trade union movement. The new 
union movement, however, was constrained by a number of internal shortcomings. Many 
authors note that the open unions struggled to establish firm financial controls (especially 
without the advantage of stop-order facilities) and funds were always short. While 
TUACC aimed to place power in the hands of workers, structures did not always operate 
in the most democratic manner. The open unions had already started to develop shop 
stewards structures and to build from the factory floor upwards, but, with a large 
proportion of their membership being unskilled and lacking formal education, one of 
their most difficult challenges would be to develop a layer of capable worker leaders.  
 
Friedman notes that the emerging unions were not always able to set up firm financial 
controls. 104 Since the open unions were not entitled to stop order facilities, organisers 
were responsible for the collection of membership dues. They adopted rudimentary 
accounting methods, often marking the payment of subscriptions off in a little book 
provided to members. This system was not ideal and did not only hamper the collection 
of dues, but in some instances organisers misused or absconded with union funds. 
Subscriptions did not cover costs and, unable to rely on the GFWBF to raise funds, the 
open unions struggled to meet the shortfall. Apart from relying on registered trade unions 
for access to meeting halls and on CAS for secretarial services, the TUACC responded by 
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pooling the resources of the unions to ensure that all affiliates had access to basic 
services. To overcome the desperate need for transportation, for example, the TUACC 
bought and made a number of vehicles available to union organisers to ferry workers to 
and from meetings. Nevertheless, this did not cover all the transportation needs and 
access to and control over these vehicles proved contentious. 
      
The democratic structures developed by TUACC to ensure that elected worker leaders 
controlled the organisation did not always function as intended. The secretariat raised 
concerns over the lack of participation by union Branch Executive Committee 
representatives in meetings and organisers complained that they were not receiving 
proper report-backs.105 Workers’ democracy was partly held back by the difficulties 
related to building up a layer of confident and efficient workers leaders on the shop floor. 
One of the biggest obstacles was the lack of formal education. Maree notes that by 1970 
41% of the African labour force had not received education at all. A mere 44% had 
received primary education, with almost half of these only completing their first four 
years of schooling. 106  
 
These education levels were reflected in the open unions’ membership. Webster’s survey 
indicates that 22% of the members in CWIU and 35% in MAWU had received no formal 
education and none of their members had proceeded beyond Form 1 (standard 8-9/ Grade 
10-11). Members of the NUTW, who were more skilled, had attained higher levels of 
education. Only 7% had no formal education, while 48% had received some high school 
education and 10% had completed Form II (standard 9-10/ Grade 11-12).107 A number of 
factors contributed to the higher education levels in the NUTW. Firstly, the textile 
industry mostly employed African women. Hemson recalls that it was generally very 
difficult for African women to secure work in the manufacturing sector and that they 
needed to attain relatively high levels of education to compete effectively. 108 Secondly, 
the industry preferred to hire younger workers, who were considered more adaptable to 
the rhythm of production. Webster maintains that younger workers received more 
schooling than older generations, which contributed to higher education levels in the 
union. 109  
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For the most part, the lack of formal education meant that workers did not have the 
necessary organisational skills, especially when it came to bargaining and interacting 
with employers. Omar Badsha remembers that ‘many of the shop stewards were weak, 
they did not have the skills…and the movement had to struggle with this.’110 Although 
many had gained some organisational experience in the past (through participating in 
political parties, migrant associations and trade unions), they were hampered by their 
inability to communicate fluently in English, the language of South African business, and 
lacked the confidence to negotiate with management.111 Consequently, workers became 
dependent on more educated unionists and Maree and Buhlungu have already highlighted 
the dominance of white university trained unionists in the emerging union movement. To 
some extent Hemson et al concur with their arguments by maintaining that white 
intellectuals predominated ‘…the strategic and administrative field having the confidence 
to squeeze concessions from management, gain knowledge of the details of statutes and 
agreements often crucial to solving a grievance, letter writing and meeting skills.’112 The 
power of white intellectuals, however, should not be overstated and it is necessary to 
consider how other layers of leadership operated.  
 
The political role of white intellectuals is complex. On the one hand they promoted 
democratic shop floor organisation and, as will be demonstrated, from 1974 onwards 
promoted a strategy of tactical engagement with employers and the state to secure 
industrial rights for African workers. Drawing on the examples of the British shop 
stewards’ movement and the work of socialist thinkers suc h as Gramsci and Luxemburg, 
this type of workers’ control was promoted because it was considered the most effective 
way in which to build a strong and radical working class movement. These ideas fed into 
the traditions and concerns of black workers. They had already adopted democratic forms 
of collective action, but were afraid of employer and state victimization and supported the 
move towards industrial legitimacy. When it came to more immediate political issues and 
structures, such as criticising homeland  leaders and outlining a coherent political strategy, 
white intellectuals in TUACC played a much more cautious role.     
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Apart from an ideological commitment to workers’ democracy, other factors also 
checked the power of white intellectuals and levelled social relations in the unions. 
TUACC was unable to sustain specialized posts and most unionists were drawn into the 
difficult task of organizing workers at some time or another. In addition, most unionists, 
regardless of race or level of education, did not have union experience and Omar Badsha 
recalls that ‘none of us had experience, we all had to learn on the job.’113 Unionists had to 
rely a great deal on each other and were deployed where they were needed. Pat Horn 
recalls that in these instances unionists often relied on those African organisers who had 
gained some knowledge of trade unionism through their involvement with SACTU. 114     
 
Many unionists have romantic recollections of social interaction in TUACC, claiming 
that everyone worked together, cooperated across union lines, and gladly shared human 
and material resources.115 Workers generally welcomed all the assistance they could get 
and unionists were far too occupied with basic concerns for gender and racial difference 
to become contentious. African organisers, however, were not without their own 
influence and motivations. Contrary to Buhlungu’s claim that it was only in the mid 
1980s that African unionists became more assertive, a couple of conflicts took place 
within the open unions in the mid 1970s in which issues of ideology and the control over 
resources were brought to the fore.  Perhaps it is not all that surprising that these 
contestations emanated from the NUTW, which developed a solid layer of African 
leaders quite early on.  
 
Maree documents an instance where three well-established and respected organisers (who 
are not named) started to promote Black Consciousness ideas in the union in early 
1975.116 While John Copelyn believed that these organisers were frustrated by measures 
that ensured the accountability of leaders and regulated financial management, these 
organisers argued that white unionists retarded the progress of the union. 117 Even though 
their bid to change the non-racial policy of the union was unsuccessful, they were able to 
mobilise ‘fairly extensive support’ and the union lost members after the conflict was 
resolved. A more serious challenge came from Thizi Khumalo, also a well- regarded and 
popular organiser. Maree argues the conflict started to brew in mid 1974 when Khumalo 
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failed to submit regular factory reports, which led him to clash with BEC members and 
other organisers in the union. Khumalo maintained that he, an uneducated worker, was 
being squeezed out by intellectuals. He interpreted the conflict in racial terms and 
claimed that white unionists wanted to control him. Union members were drawn into the 
dispute, disrupting union organisation at factories such as CMC and Ropes and Matting 
and Khumalo was eventually reassigned to the TGWU in March 1976. Rather than 
resolve matters the conflict spread into the TGWU and MAWU.118 In February 1977 
TUACC took an unconstitutional decision to dismiss Khumalo, splintering the TGWU in 
the process, which had all but collapsed by July of that year.119 It was only after a long 
and complex legal battle and a concerted drive to revive the union that the TGWU was 
prevented from leaving TUACC.        
 
The uneven distribution of education and organisational skills also impacted on other 
layers of leadership, especially on the shop floor. According to Fanaroff, workers on the 
shop floor also recognised the value of having representatives who could communicate 
effectively in English and often voted for shop stewards purely on this basis. He recalls 
that:120  
 
although we went to great pains to explain at every shop steward election that you 
must elect the people who can represent you properly, there was, and probably 
still is, this belief that if somebody spoke English well they can represent you 
better, even if he was a liar and a scoundrel.  
 
This tendency, he maintains, impacted negatively on the unions in the 1980s when semi-
skilled workers entered FOSATU in large numbers. They gradually replaced migrant 
shop stewards and the unions increasingly lost touch with their migrant base. 
   
One much more positive consequence of the desperate need for skilled leadership, which 
the state continuously hacked away at through banning and detentions, was that space 
opened up for women to take up important positions, giving rise to a layer of African 
women worker leaders in the unions. Nala is probably the most notable of these leaders 
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and was elected on the executive committee of the NUTW in 1973, became acting 
secretary of the union after the banning of unionists in 1974, and represented the NUTW 
on the TUACC Secretariat and Council.121 Women did not only take up leadership 
positions in unions with a large female membership and, after her release from detention 
in December 1976, Nala went on to play a prominent role in MAWU and became general 
secretary of the union when it became a national union. Similarly, B. Tshabalala started 
out as a shop steward at Non- Ferrous Metals, she was elected onto the BEC of MAWU 
and in April 1975 she was elected chairperson of TUACC. Nala and Tshabalala would 
later be joined by other women leaders- such as Lindia Kompe, and Tembi Nabe (who 
became the second female general secretary of MAWU)- once TUACC became 
established in the Transvaal.  
 
The rise of female leaders in unions with a migrant base was hugely significant. Even 
though authors often comment on the democratic nature of migrant organisations such as 
burial societies, they note that women were excluded from participating.122 Although 
women leaders did experience some opposition, they claim that gender differences and 
inequalities within the unions did not become a central concern until the 1980s.123 This 
may partly be due to the lack of gender consciousness in the 1970s, but African women 
were able to counter prejudices by providing effective leadership.124 It would appear that 
much like migrant shop stewards, African women were also pushed out of leadership 
positions once the membership composition of unions shifted to include more urban-
based and semi- skilled men and competition over power and resources within the unions 
intensified.125          
 
One way in which the unions could build up organisational skills and develop leadership, 
especially on the factory floor, was through worker education. According to Maree, 
however, an intense conflict ensued over the IIE’s relationship with TUACC and the 
content of the education it provided.126 Maree argues that the TUACC’s link to the IIE, 
which operated in a relatively autonomous manner, was loosened after Hemson and 
Cheadle, the only two union representatives on the IIE’s Working Committee, were 
banned and not replaced. Unionists in TUACC, particularly Murphy and Copelyn, 
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expressed their dissatisfaction over the IIE. They believed that the IIE should be brought 
under union control and that the correspondence course should be replaced with a 
programme tha t served the needs of the unions and was geared towards developing BEC 
members, shop stewards and organisers.  
 
Maree argues that there were also deep political and ideological divisions between 
intellectuals in TUACC and the IIE. Unionists not only objected to the liberal leanings of 
some IIE members, such as Fisher and Schlemmer, but also opposed their proposal for a 
diploma in Community Studies that would train black leaders in community 
organisations. 127 Maree argues that Copelyn and Murphy perceived the workers’ struggle 
mainly as a class struggle and considered trade unions to be the most suitable vehicles 
through which to mobilise the African working class. Other issues also fuelled divisions 
between TUACC and the IIE and many unionists were becoming increasingly 
uncomfortable with the IIE’s close relationship with Chief Buthelezi. In addition, in 
December 1974 the IIE reported that it had received R15,000 from the TUC in Britain for 
shop stewards training. 128 Some unionists believed that the IIE needed to  be more 
accountable to TUACC when it came to developing international relations and raising 
money. 129  It would take some time for these issues to be resolved and little was done to 
advance formal worker education in the mean time.    
 
5.7. Refining Organisational Practices and Strategies  
Aware of the many problems confronting the open unions, TUACC affiliates looked 
inwards and evaluated their organisational strategies and practices. TUACC, which 
provided a space for the open unions to discuss their shared experiences, contributed a 
great deal to this process. The open unions attempted to deepen decentralised 
organisation (giving shop stewards more responsibility); consolidated their structures; 
rationalised resources; and reworked and reinforced their struggle for recognition. While 
relations with other unions and the KwaZulu government remained strained, TUACC 
unions focused on organising on a national level and made some progress on establishing 
relations with international bodies. The TUACC unions also changed their position on 
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workplace committees and decided to make use of various legal avenues to defend and 
extend the rights of workers.                   
 
Already in December 1974 TUACC’s secretariat called for an ‘honest and constructive 
self-examination’ of the organisation, arguing that ‘very careful attention’ should be paid 
to the individual policies of unions; the organisational needs of the unions; the 
composition and organisational problems facing TUACC; and work done in the field of 
worker education.130  TUACC’s constitution was amended the following year in April at 
TUACC’s 3rd Council Meeting. One of the aims of these amendments was to intensify 
union participation in TUACC meetings and to facilitate communication between the 
Secretariat and BECs.131 It was also noted the unions had gained a broader representation 
in the IIE, with more emphasis placed on developing courses and material for organisers 
and shop stewards.  
 
At the same time the secretariat reaffirmed the need to struggle for the right to negotiate 
as a key task and that this struggle would only be successful if it was based on sound 
factory organisation and the demand for recognition. The secretariat’s report stated:132  
 
What is important is the right to negotiate, to have stop order facilities, and to be 
present at industrial council meetings. We know that the right to negotiate is no 
right without the full participation and support of the workers. In the same way 
the right to negotiate will come as soon as workers in their factories are organised 
and demand recognition.    
 
TUACC’s relationship with TUCSA continued to get worse, but TUACC still sought to 
influence the policies of the registered trade unions and unite unregistered unions. In the 
run up to TUCSA’s annual conference in 1975, TUACC called on all the unregistered 
trade unions to attend a national meeting to develop a common position. Such a 
conference would be followed by a joint conference with TUCSA to thrash out ‘sore 
points’, such as barring unregistered unions from making use of facilities at Bolton 
Hall.133 At the same time TUACC condemned TUCSA’s parallelism and argued that by 
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forcing African workers to organise along ‘lines arbitrarily decided by the state and 
existing registered trade unions’, the working class would be splintered along provincial 
lines and into minor industrial sections, which would undermine the bargaining position 
of workers.134 Instead, TUACC argued, the trade union movement should aim to organise 
broad based industrial unions that were national in character. Delegates from the open 
unions were barred from attending TUCSA’s conference, but TUACC still issued a 
memorandum calling for debate on TUCSA’s approach to African workers and for 
workers to unite across the unregistered- registered divide. 135           
 
Once again, TUACC’s call for trade union unity did not amount to much and unions 
seemed to become more antagonistic towards each other as they contested for hegemony 
by attempting to win workers over to their particular approach to trade unionism. 
Nonetheless, TUACC was forced to clarify its objections to parallel unionism and 
increasingly recognised the urgency of transcending provincial and narrowly defined 
sectoral boundaries by building a trade union movement that was united on a national 
level. The NUTW had largely been unsuccessful in extending into other provinces and it 
was MAWU that spearheaded the creation of open national unions. In November 1974 
MAWU attempted to organise the Leyland plant in Elandsfontein on the East Rand.136 
This move was met with strong opposition from the state, leading to the detention and 
interrogation of a Johannesburg based activist, Pindile Mfethi. Nevertheless, MAWU 
established relations with the newly formed Industrial Aid Society (see next chapter) that 
proved instrumental in setting up a MAWU branch in the Transvaal.  
 
Some progress was also made on the international front. A product of the global 
economic crisis, which was starting to transform the social and economic order, the 
emerging unions were out of step with the ideological distinctions and organisational 
loyalties generated by the Cold War.137 Much like the other trade unions that were 
emerging in other industrialising countries at the time, the open unions were confronted 
with the authoritarianism of their own state and did not identify or want to associate with 
the Soviet Union. Union movements in countries such as Poland and Brazil would later 
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provide inspiration138, but since they were also in their formative stages could not provide 
the open unions with the  necessary support.  
 
Short of international allies, the TUACC accepted assistance from the ICFTU for 
donations to cover the transport costs of shop steward meetings and an organiser’s 
salary. 139 This was not an easy decision to make as the ICFTU was anti-communist and 
any association with this body would further entrench the claims made by SACTU that 
the emerging unions were conservative unions tied to the apartheid state. Declining 
subscriptions coupled with the difficulties surrounding the GFWBF eroded TUACC’s 
independent resource base and TUACC decided to approach international organisations 
such as the ICFTU for support. However, unionists in TUACC did not want to follow the 
same line as the UTP by coming dependent on the ICFTU for its existence and stressed 
the need to remain autonomous from outside influences.  
 
TUACC and the open unions struggled to come to terms with their relationship with the 
KwaZulu government. Two important shifts were starting to take place, however. Firstly, 
in the new constitution there was no mention of homeland governments and a clause was 
included that outlined a broader social role for TUACC and the open unions. The 
TUACC now aimed to ‘…secure social justice for all workers…to secure a decent 
standard of living, social security and fair conditions…’ for members and the working 
class as a whole.140  The focus on social and political rights (as opposed to specific 
political organisations or alliances) is reflected in the material published by the South 
African Labour Bulletin . In July 1974, for instance, the journal published the ICFTU’s 
Migrant Workers’ Charter that called for migrants to be paid wages equal to those of 
nationals; accorded social rights (such as housing, medical and welfare benefits); and be 
given the right to join unions without the fear of expulsion for resisting authoritarian 
regimes. 141  The editors, many of who were tied to TUACC, also commented on and 
published articles that critiqued government spending; the labour bureaux; rising 
unemployment; rural poverty; state repression and called for the right of workers to 
associate freely.   
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In the second instance unionists appeared more willing to confront KwaZulu homeland 
officials. In TUACC’s last attempt to engage the KwaZulu government the open unions 
presented a memorandum to Buthelezi at an IIE certificate-awarding ceremony in August 
1975.142 In addition to the usual requests for support, the memorandum called for the 
official recognition of unions that organised public workers employed by the KwaZulu 
government. 143  
 
Unionists, however, were caught off guard when Buthelezi responded by urging the 
unions to join Inkatha, revived in March of that year. This marked the beginning of what 
Maree considers the third phase of the open unions’ association with KwaZulu as 
politicians now attempted to influence the labour movement through populist parties. 
Inkatha was a popular organisation and grew rapidly, claiming a paid up membership of 
120 000 by September 1977. Maree speculates that the TUACC did not want to alienate 
union members, who he argues widely supported Buthelezi. Webster’s survey, for 
instance, reports that 87% of union members regarded Buthelezi as their leader. 144 
Badsha confirms that a substantial number of workers supported Inkatha and regarded 
Inkatha ‘as the embodiment of the ANC, the ANC incarnate’.  145 There were, however, 
workers that were more critical and Webster’s survey indicates that many of the younger 
workers did not view Buthelezi as a true worker leader.146 Unionists were divided on the 
issue and the TUACC took some time to make a decision and the cooperation with 
Inkatha remained unresolved until 1978. In so doing intellectuals once again failed to 
provide decisive political leadership on this issue . 
 
Much like the NUTW at the start of 1974, TUACC’s other affiliates also tightened up 
their organisational strategies. Increasing emphasis was placed on shop stewards, who 
could recruit workers from inside the factory, and the development of shop steward 
structures that could assist with the administration and day-to-day running of the union. 
In 1975 the TGWU reported that of the 25 factories the union was trying to organise, 16 
already had functioning shop stewards groups.147  The report noted that, ‘a major problem 
in starting the shop steward groups has been to make workers understand that the union is 
almost powerless unless workers unite and organise within their places of work…the 
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shop steward groups where this is understood have proceeded with vigour and a sense of 
direction.’148  
 
At TUACC’s 4th Council Meeting in August 1975, MAWU concurred that the mass drive 
for membership was no longer suitable and reaffirmed the need for decentralised 
organisation based on devolving responsibilities to shop stewards, who were expected to 
recruit, organise members, and collect subscriptions. 149 This would require the on-going 
training of shop stewards, which had now become the key task of organisers and union 
officials. MAWU also noted that the union also aimed to rationalise resources by 
focusing on a few carefully selected factories.    
 
The CWIU expanded decentralised organisation and in August 1975 reported that the 
union’s resources were focused on supporting existing shop stewards groups and officials 
feared that the union would soon loose touch with those workers in factories that had ‘not 
as yet reached the stage of throwing up their own factory leadership’.150 In order to 
combat this problem the CWIU aimed to set up a general Saturday forum for workers and 
maintained that the development of ‘locals’ constituted the next logical step in the 
union’s development. Similarly, the TGWU and the NUTW were already discussing the 
need to unite shop stewards across factories through the creation of shop stewards 
councils. 151       
 
At TUACC’s 4th Congress all of the unions noted that, in spite of the latest changes to the 
IIE, courses and material were still not suitable for the training of shop stewards.152 The 
IIE was subsequently transformed into an education sub-committee and placed under the 
direct control of TUACC affiliates.153 In spite of the very limited success - all of the 
unions still identified the struggle for recognition as their main task. Responding to a call 
made by MAWU, TUACC decided to launch a national campaign for the recognition. 154 
This campaign was not confined to the factories and unionists drew up a petition that was 
circulated in townships and beer-halls. 155  
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A new aspect of the open union’s strategy was also in the making – and the open unions 
reviewed their boycott of participating in work-place committees. At the beginning of 
1975, for instance, the NUTW decided to use a management controlled liaison committee 
to gain a foothold in Feltex and campaign for recognition. 156 The open unions, however, 
initially struggled to combine their participation in such industrial structures with in-
depth factory organisation. This seems particularly true of the CWIU and at AE&CI 
organisers entered negotiations with management without including the rank and file.157 
The union was unable to make effective gains and members soon became disillusioned 
with the union. Similarly, MAWU also attempted to make use of the liaison committee at 
Defy to advance the recognition of the union, but was unable to effectively contest the 
management’s attempts to alter the bonus system and 19 of the workers who led the 
opposition to the new production bonuses were dismissed.158     
 
In addition to participating in industrial structures, the open unions extended their fight 
against employers into the courts. Due to encouragement from the NUTW, the TUACC 
set up a permanent legal committee to help unions prepare cases.159 The committee, 
which was expected to make regular report backs, dealt with a variety of issues ranging 
from Workmen’s Compensation, UIF payments; assault cases; and overtime payments.160 
In February 1975 the NUTW defended workers that were charged for striking illegally at 
ITMA and, after some delay, all 110 workers that were charged were either acquitted or 
had the charges against them dropped. 161  Reflecting TUACC’s focus on social justice it 
was proposed that the unions should also launch a campaign to oppose Section 29 of the 
Bantu Urban Areas Act, which sought to deport pass offenders deemed ‘undesirable’ or 
‘loafers’ to camps in the homelands for a two-year period to learn a trade. 162   
 
TUACC affiliates aimed to strengthen their structures and refined their tactics in order to 
secure their long-term survival, but the greatest challenges were still to come as 
employers and the state stepped up their opposition against unregistered trade unions . 
This intensification of hostilities was already evident in MAWU’s dealings with Conac 
Engineering in September and October 1975 over a dispute related to overtime that 
resulted in the lockout of workers. 163  Worker representatives were chased away when 
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they tried to report the lockout to the Department of Labour and they were also prevented 
from meeting workers because they were followed and filmed by security police. 
Officials from the Industrial Council also refused to divulge any information on any 
exemptions or agreements on overtime in the industry to workers and their 
representatives. Conac was clearly concerned about losing experienced workers and 
when dismissed workers registered as work seekers at the Department of Bantu 
Administration they were told that they would be endorsed out of the area if they did not 
accept reemployment at the company. Maree claims that the dispute was significant 
because it demonstrated that ‘…three state departments, Labour, Police and Bantu 
Administration, as well as the  Industrial Council were all opposed to MAWU.’ 164   
 
At the same time the NUTW experienced one of its most devastating defeats at Natal 
Cotton and Woollen Mills after a two-week strike by Indian and African workers.165  The 
company, which had replaced a relatively benevolent personnel manager with the brother 
of Natal’s head of security police, dismissed all the strikers and called in 200 police. This 
broke NUTW’s base at the factory, which was one of the union’s strongest plants.      
 
5.8. Conclusion  
Between 1974 and 1975 the TUACC unions had to come to grips with the various 
difficulties associated with unionising black workers in apartheid South Africa. As the 
economy slowed down, the open unions had to face opposition from employers and 
managers, who went to great lengths to undermine independent worker organisation 
(through the use of lockouts, dismissals and redundancies) and aimed to thwart any 
demands for recognition and instil discipline through the introduction of liaison 
committees. Similarly the state, which colluded with employers to undermine the new 
unions through various departments, continually harassed unionists and workers. 
Economic recession, victimization by employers and state repression all served to disrupt 
the day-to-day organisation of the unions. The optimism that emanated from the strike 
wave was squashed and workers became fearful of associating with unregistered trade 
unions once again.   
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TUACC’s strategic alliance with the KwaZulu government also bore little fruit. Just 
when it appeared that unionists were willing to challenge officials by calling for the 
recognition of unions in the public sector, Buthelezi invited the open unions to 
collaborate with Inkatha. TUACC failed to provide decisive leadership on the issue, but 
from April 1975 committed the new union movement in Natal to fight for social justice 
for workers and political rights such as the freedom of association.    
 
With the exception of the TWIU, relations with registered trade unions also became 
strained as TUCSA decided to form African parallels. TUACC, nonetheless, tried to unite 
the unregistered trade unions and started to place more emphasis on building on a 
national scale. In spite of the negative perceptions of the emerging union movement 
internationally, TUACC was able to establish relations with overseas bodies such as the 
ICFTU and MAWU affiliated to the IMF. While the unions accepted donations from 
these organisations, which relieved the lack of financial resources, they were determined 
not to loose their independence.  
 
At the end of 1974 TUACC recognized that there were a number of organisational 
weaknesses within the open unions that needed to be addressed. A core of workers 
leaders, which included a group of extremely capable African women leaders, had 
emerged from the open unions, but for workers’ democracy to thrive administrative 
power had to be handed over to shop stewards. This would not be an easy task as many 
union members, which had not received much formal schooling, lacked the skills and 
confidence and were hampered by their inability to communicate fluently in English. In 
addition, most unionists were also inexperienced, which led to poor organisational 
practices and tactics that excluded the rank and file from negotiations with management 
and undermined in-depth factory floor organisation. Education was key, but TUACC and 
the open unions complained that the education provided by the IIE was not suitable for 
shop stewards or organisers.  
 
Structures were tightened up within TUACC and each of the open unions re-assessed 
their organisational strategies. Spearheaded by the NUTW, the unions placed more 
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organisational responsibilities in the hands of shop stewards, while organisers were 
expected to provide them with training and continue to rationalise resources by 
concentrating on a few carefully selected factories. The possibility of forming broader 
shop stewards councils was also mooted. The commitment to fighting for recognition 
remained steadfast, although the ways in which to achieve recognition became more 
flexible. Some unions experimented with using liaison committees to gain a foothold for 
a recognition campaign and TUACC launched a broader campaign that was not 
exclusively focused on the factories to popularise the demand for recognition. To bolster 
this struggle the open unions also began using the courts to push back employers.   
 
By the end of 1975 Webster’s survey indicates that while 34% of TUACC’s members 
joined unions to secure benefits and 7% hoped to improve wages, the majority (59%) 
signed up to defend the rights and dignity of workers. 166 The open unions had made very 
few gains by the end of 1975 and would not show much progress in 1976. It was largely 
this commitment to fight for workers rights that held the unions together.  
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Chapter 6: 
TUACC and the Formation of National Unions, 1976- 1978. 
 
6.1. Introduction  
From 1975 onwards MAWU worked closely with the Industrial Aid Society (IAS) in 
Johannesburg and managed to make inroads into the Witwatersrand, leading to the 
introduction of the workers’ control tradition in the region. Even though the open unions 
had revised their strategies and seemed ready to advance, 1976 was a particularly bad 
year for the emerging unions, which Friedman describes as ‘…a year of total gloom, 
lightened only by occasional flashes of disaster’.1 State and employer repression 
intensified, especially following the 1976 student uprising, and disrupted unionisation. 
Even though the TUACC and the IAS-MAWU failed to respond to the uprising, the 
urban revolt and emergence of open political resistance not only prompted state reforms, 
but also created a politically astute layer of future union members.  
 
From 1977 the open unions started to recover, although organisation would still prove 
arduous. TUACC’s expansion onto the Witwatersrand was consolidated with the 
establishment of national unions, while affiliates attempted to mobilise support from 
international unions to augment the struggle for recognition. Union representatives were 
also more careful when they took part in industrial structures such as works and liaison 
committees and aimed for the maximum participation by shop steward in plant level 
bargaining.    
 
6.2. The Industrial Aid Society, MAWU and the Heinemann Strike   
MAWU’s initial attempt to branch out onto the Witwatersrand by organising workers at 
Leyland’s East Rand plant was met with strong opposition. From March 1975 the union 
found an ally in the newly formed Industrial Aid Society (IAS), which would provide the 
TUACC unions with crucial support. The IAS, a worker centre, started much later than 
the WPWAB in the Western Cape and the TUACC in Natal and activists were deeply 
divided on which of these two organisation to model themselves. Once the IAS aligned 
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with MAWU, the organisation contributed a great deal to the development of the 
workers’ control tradition.  
 
The IAS started out as a project of the Wage and Economic Commission, which operated 
under NUSAS at the University of the Witwatersrand. The Inaugural Meeting of the 
Steering Committee was held in December 1973 and, according to Maree, the IAS aimed 
to improve conditions of African workers and promote a sprit of self-sufficiency. 2 To 
achieve these aims the IAS set up a legal advice centre and complaints service. An 
education and literacy programme was also developed.3 There was even talk of 
establishing a medical and dental clinic for workers.4 Founding members included 
Jeanette Curtis (later Jeanette Schoon) and students such as Steven Friedman, chair of 
NUSAS at the time. Curtis was well connected to the ANC underground and invited a 
people to participate, including Pendile Mfeti (described by Friedman as one of the 
leading intellectuals in the IAS) and Miriam Sithole (from SACTU) to join.5  
 
As noted previously, SACTU and other Congress structures had an ambivalent 
relationship with the new union movement in the 1970s. Tensions between the emerging 
unions and SACTU in exile were already starting to emerge (as seen in the case of 
Ruskin College), but there were locally based Congress activists who supported the IAS. 
For instance, Friedman recalls that Eli Weinberg gave the IAS a donation, which he 
viewed as a token of support from the SACP. 6 According to Friedman, however, the 
SACTU members in the IAS ‘…had very specific roles, which everyone kind of knew 
about but did not discuss upfront.’ They were there to give the IAS legitimacy and ‘…to 
make sure that [Congress] ‘Movement’ kept tabs on us’.7    
 
In spite of this seemingly strong SACTU connection, older SACTU unionists were not 
that influential. Friedman explains that:8  
 
they were not all that successful in controlling anything. When it came to gut 
strategic things, everybody was immensely polite and differed entirely, but then 
did what they wanted to do anyway. The old guard types were powerless to stop 
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them because this was a new ball game. They were used to being the trade union 
wing of the nationalist movement, with no particular prospect…of getting 
bargaining rights from anybody or being in any real industrial bargaining situation 
and suddenly they were sitting with people who were strategising how you got the 
employer to bargain with you. This was not stuff they that knew terribly much 
about. So they didn’t have terribly much influence… 
 
Division between the SACTU stalwarts and radical students was further entrenched by 
the way in which the IAS was structured. Older SACTU activists all served on the 
Steering Committee of the organisation, but radical students in the education group 
carried out the day-to-day running of the organisatio n. These students borrowed ideas 
from both TUACC and WPWAB. For instance, the IAS wanted to set up a benefit 
scheme similar to that of the GFWBF, but used the WPWAB’s constitution as a guide.9 
This did not mean that activists successfully combined these approaches and they were at 
loggerheads when it came to general versus industrial trade unions. 10 Worker education 
also became contentious and, as Maree points out, those in favour of WPWAB’s 
approach argued that general trade unions were inherently political, but without guidance 
could fall pray to reformism. Workers’ education, therefore, should ensure that workers 
developed the appropriate level of consciousness before trade unions developed. 11 
Consequently, the IAS decided not to affiliate to the IIE on the grounds that it did not 
approve of the separation between organisation and education and questioned ‘the value 
of workers receiving diplomas recognised by employers.’12  
 
Maree is critical of the IAS’s early organisational strategy. He claims that instead of 
building up solid factory organisation, the IAS enlisted the support of students to 
pamphleteer a wide range of factories all over the Witwatersrand.13 Perhaps Maree is too 
harsh in his criticism in that other workers centres started out in a similar manner. Unlike 
TUACC in Natal, which was bolstered by the mobilisation of workers during the 1973 
strike wave, it has been argued that unionisation in the PWV region proved slow and 
difficult. In his study of metal workers on the East Rand, Sitas also writes about the 
unwillingness of particularly urban workers to join unions. 14 Both of these factors, 
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however, do not account for the growth of other African unions in the region. By 1976 
the UTP had already printed and circulated more than 20,000 Workers Calendars, a 
popular educative tool that provided accessible information on trade unions and industrial 
relations, and had assisted in the revival of three older African trade unions and the 
establishment of seven new unions.15 In 1973 the UTP unions had already started to unite 
under the Consultative Committee of Black Trade Unions (CCOBTU), which included 
parallel unions affiliated to TUCSA.16  
 
By the time the IAS was formed the UTP was already contributing to the formation of a 
moderate mainly urban working class organisational culture that partly grew out of a 
variety of Christian churches and was based on gaining a sense of respectability by 
establishing an ordered industrial relations system that would allow more skilled workers 
to bargain with employers and participate in decision making on a friendly basis. This 
approach was based on the analysis developed by Loet Douwes Dekker, previously 
assistant general secretary of TUCSA and founding member of the UTP.17  He argued 
that, as African workers became more skilled, employers would no longer be able to 
dismiss workers involved in collective action as easily.18 Management would be 
compelled to abandon their unitarist approach (the paternalistic notion that the 
workplaces should function as one big happy family) and would have to accept conflict 
as a natural part of industrial relations. Both workers and managers, therefore, should 
work towards the introduction of reforms that would ultimately lead to the regulation of 
industrial conflict.                 
 
In addition to rejecting the UTP’s policy on black leadership, activists in the Wage 
Commission and IAS, ‘..felt that the UTP was reformist, conservative, [and] they didn’t 
want to get rid of capitalism.’19  Although the IAS was still in the process of debating 
which approach it should adopt, there was already a sense that the IAS would promote a 
more radical alternative.  
 
The IAS lagged behind the UTP, but was able to advance gradually. Within three months, 
between April to the end of June 1974, the IAS’ membership  had increased from eight to 
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132; the number of complaints referred had risen from 11 to a 130; and participants in the 
literacy class expanded from three to 30.20 By the beginning of July, 15 workers were 
taking part in the Saturday training program.21 The complaints service served as a main 
contact point and in many instances workers would lay a complaint as a group. This 
provided the opportunity for further organisation and meetings were held with these 
workers, who were encouraged to form factory committees at their workplaces.22 On 10 
August 1974 the IAS held its first general meeting with workers from 49 different 
factories. 23  
 
Maree also condemns the IAS for focusing on workers who worked in central 
Johannesburg and lived in Soweto. He maintains that Soweto was historically more 
difficult to unionise and, unlike the East Rand that was working class in character and 
included large hostels for migrants, Soweto was more dispersed and culturally and 
politically heterogeneous.24 Once again, Maree’s criticisms appear unfounded and Sitas 
argues that the IAS made contact with metal workers on the East Rand early on. 25 At the 
IAS’ first general meeting, for example, it was reported that 99% of workers came from 
the East Rand and only 1% from Soweto.26 According to Sitas, by September 1974 the 
IAS claimed a membership of 325 and had also made contacts with numerous metal 
factories – including GKN Rockwell, Metal Box, Leyland, Main Tin, Dunswart Iorn and 
Steal, Pearsons, Teal and Westvaal. 27 By establishing a base amongst especially migrant 
metal workers on the East Rand the IAS would start to resemble TUACC in Natal and the 
IAS became increasingly distinct from the UTP.  
 
Members of the IAS, however, did not believe that they were making enough progress, 
which they partly attributed to organisational weaknesses, and towards the end of 1974 
members of the education sub-committee called for the IAS to be restructured.  28 A 
central concern was the undefined relationship between the education group and the 
Steering Committee, which was not functioning properly. The Steering Committee was 
seen as a token body – which mainly served as convenient ‘façade of black initiative’- 
that simply ratified the decisions of the education group. 29 To overcome this structural 
imbalance both sections were incorporated into a central executive.     
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Maree argues that this reorganisation entrenched the domination of students and 
academics in the IAS, who mainly focused on intellectual debates and impeded the 
creation of democratic working class organisations. 30 This was not necessarily the case, 
however, and the restructuring of the IAS facilitated TUACC’s expansion into the 
Transvaal and further developed workers’ control in important ways. Firstly, power 
relations were upset, which ultimately allowed the pro- industrial trade union faction to 
gain the upper hand and develop closer links with MAWU. At the suggestion of 
Mthethwa, who attended a IAS meeting in March 1975 where he indicated that MAWU 
was willing to sponsor the salary of an organiser, the IAS executive decided to set up 
‘union structures in the field of metal’ and appointed temporary office bearers for the 
union. 31 This fuelled a bitter conflict within the IAS and as a compromise, mediated by 
Philip Bonner, it was decided to form a ‘metal wing’ instead.32 In so doing it was agreed 
that the formation of a union would be delayed until five functioning shop steward 
committees had been established and a deputation would be sent to TUACC to discuss 
possible points of disagreement in approach and strategy.  
 
At the end of April the metal section reported that contacts had been made with workers 
in several new factories (including General Erection, Consol, Mckechnie, Wolhuter Fry 
Metals, Mitchell Cotts, French Engineering, Metal Rolling, Gallops) and  meetings were 
being held with workers from Leyland and Heckett.33 By June the metal wing and 
representatives from MAWU had also established a coordinating committee as a 
forerunner to a national union. 34 It is interesting to note that the metal wing revised the 
IAS’s initial strategy of recruiting workers outside the factory gates and tried to organise 
workers through ‘home visits’ and meetings held in townships, which were far removed 
from the watchful eye of employers. The initial success of the metal sect ion fed tensions 
within the IAS. Activists fought over financial controls, the accountability of sub -
committees and, perhaps most importantly, the establishment of a metal versus a 
transport and general union.35 Matters came to a head at beginning of July 1975 and those 
activists who favoured the WPWAB stance on general unionism resigned. 36 This allowed 
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for the organisation of metal workers to begin in earnest and for relations with MAWU 
and TUACC to solidify. 
 
In the second instance, the concentration of academics in the IAS allowed for more in-
depth reflection on the meanings of workers’ control and activists incorporated 
ideological discussions into worker education. Material from the IIE was not devoid of 
political analysis, but was more practical in approach and dealt with issues such as 
industrial relations, the rights of workers, and the economy and IIE workbooks included 
topics such as profit, growth, investment, wages, and productivity. 37 The education group 
in the IAS, on the other hand, added broader theoretical topics such as labour history, 
economics, law (including the pass laws and the position of migrants), and politics (that 
dealt with the contemporary political function of Bantustans and debunking political 
myths) in their curriculum. 38  
 
With the resignation of pro-WPWAB students, a group that was much more critical of 
union alliances with national organisations and wanted the workers’ movement to remain 
politically independence rose to prominence. While this group of activists, identified as 
Phil Bonner, Bernie Fanaroff and Taffy Adler, have been accused of trying to control the 
political development of the IAS by preventing activists aligned to Congress Movement 
from gaining any influence, activists linked to the Congress movement continued to 
participate in the organisation. 39 For instance Sipho Kubheka, who became a full- time 
organiser in the metal section, had links to the ANC underground. 40   
 
Through the development of MAWU on the Witwatersrand the IAS started to develop a 
worker base. With the assistance of Gavin Anderson, Sipho Kubheka as well as Pindile 
Mfeti, MAWU established a strong presence at Heinemann towards the end of 1975. The 
organisational practices that were developed by workers at Heinemann were truly 
remarkable and reflected workers’ control in practice. Workers were recruited carefully 
into an organising committee, which held regular meetings and participated in the 
broader factory meetings held on Saturdays, and decisions were referred back to 
departments in the factory. 41 It was decided not to approach management for recognition 
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until 75% of the factory was unionised. By January 1976 the union had set up a shop 
stewards committee and signed up 484 of the 606 African employees.42  
 
‘Baba K’, a worker who later became an organiser in MAWU, recalls how the workers at 
Heinemann were organised43:  
 
We then heard that there was this union called MAWU. The union made it clear 
that the union would not just come in and represent the workers. It was not 
separate from the workers, but it was the workers themselves …It was then that 
we realised that we wanted the union to organise us and we also started to 
organise ourselves inside the factory in what you may call a very deep way of 
organising. You must remember that at that time we could not organise openly 
because we were afraid of being kicked out- fired, you know. We used to meet in 
Tembisa to organise workers or to try and explain to workers what the function of 
the union is. By March 1976 management had heard that there was a union 
operating in the plant at Heinemann. That is when they tried to do away with us. 
But we had faith then- faith in ourselves as part of the union. We knew that 
because there were many of us, we were strong.     
  
On 25th March the company dismissed 20 workers under the guise of redundancies.44 
Workers demanded an explanation from management and called for MAWU to be 
recognised. The extent to which workers organised themselves outside of the factory is 
also noteworthy. Workers were divided up into area committees and held a number of 
meetings to discuss the way forward over the weekend.45 On Monday 29 March workers 
met in front of the company gates, only to be violently dispersed by the police, and all the 
strikers were subsequently dismissed.46 Twenty-eight people had to be treated in hospital 
and MAWU laid charges of assault against the Minister of Police.47   
 
Anderson claimed that the strike was a victory. Workers demonstrated that they were 
willing to stand up for trade union rights, regardless of the pressures from the state and 
employers, and that the state had to come to terms with the unions for African workers.48 
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Even though the Minister settled out of court, paying R21,000 in damages to each injured 
party, MAWU organisers (Sipho Kubheka and Gavin Anderson) were charged for 
inciting an illegal strike. Contrary to Anderson’s assessment, the dispute proved a 
tremendous setback for MAWU. While unionists were tied up in a court case, up to 200 
workers, including some of the most active union members such as Baba K, were 
dismissed, leading to the collapse of MAWU’s branch at Heinemann. 49 Baba K recalls 
that ‘we were really believing that as we were so united, management can’t do away with 
us’ and the Heinemann strike highlighted that, in spite of building a solid and democratic 
base, unregistered trade unions were still very weak because they had no bargaining 
rights.50 
 
The brutal response of the police at Heinemann was indicative of the intensification of 
opposition to unregistered trade unions. State repression continued and in May 1976 
more unionists – including June Rose Nala, Obed Zuma, Phindile Mfeti and Miriam 
Sithole - were detained. 51 This would mark the end of Mfeti’s union activity. He was held 
for 366 days and was ‘deported’ to Butterworth in the Transkei in July 1976. 52 On his 
release, he was banned and placed under house arrest, but subsequently disappeared and 
it is believed that he was killed by death-squads.  
    
6.3. The Emerging Unions and the 1976 Student Uprising  
The 1976 student uprising transformed the political landscape of South Africa and 
quickened the pace of open political resistance to the apartheid government. Barring the 
WPWAB, the emerging unions did not seem to recognise the significance of this urban 
revolt. While large numbers of workers went on to support the students’ struggle, the 
unions themselves did not play a significant role in the revolt and failed to provide any 
leadership or direction for workers during the uprising.        
 
Against a background of increasing economic hardship and unemployment and a under-
resourced and authoritarian local government administration and education system, 
secondary school students in Soweto, who were influenced by the ideas of the BCM, 
organised a march on 16 June to protest against the introduction of a new language policy 
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that required half of examinable subjects to be taught in Afrikaans. Violent clashes 
between police and students transformed the protest march into a full-scale riot, which 
quickly spread to townships in other parts of the Transvaal and the Cape.  
 
The student uprising entered into a second phase when the SSRC in Soweto called on 
workers to support a series of political strikes (or stay-aways). The first strike took place 
on the 4-8 August and two-thirds of the African workforce in Johannesburg and Pretoria 
stayed at home.53 The second stay-away, called for the 23-26 August, was even more 
widely supported. Hirson claims that up to 80% of workers heeded the call and Hemson 
et al note that the police estimated that 430 000 workers stayed away on the first day and 
320 000 on the second and third days. 54 This stay-away, however, was marred by violent 
clashes between hostel dwellers and residents in Soweto. After a mysterious fire at the 
Mzimhlope hostel (in the Meadowlands area) on the morning of the 24 August, a group 
of enraged hostel-dwellers stormed through the adjacent sections of the township and 
attacked houses and residents.55 Residents organised to defend themselves and by 
nightfall a number of street battles between hostel-dwellers and residents had erupted. 
Such skirmishes continued into the following week.56 The police and individuals from the 
Urban Bantu Council were subsequently implicated in stoking up the conflict, but Glenn 
Moss argues that the very nature of hostels, which operated as separate institutions, laid 
the basis for these clashes.57  
 
Moss claims that hostels set two processes in motion. 58 Hostels dwellers were physically 
separated from other residents, which limited social contact and entrenched antagonistic 
stereotyping between the two groups. At the same time, hostels created the potential for 
mobilising hostel dwellers as a group for collective action. There are a number of 
problems with Moss’ assessment. In their study of Kathorus, for instance, Bonner and 
Nieftagodien note that there was a fair amount of social contact between hostels and 
townships and they argued that in the 1960s and 1970s ‘[r]elationships between township 
residents and hostel dwellers are recoded almost universally as being ‘cordial’, good’, 
and ‘very good.’.59 The only long standing grievance that hostel dwellers had was that 
they were targeted by criminal township youths who robbed them of their hard earned 
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wages. Even Moss acknowledges that similar conditions existed in Soweto and residents 
and hostel dwellers united in 1975 to boycott beer in response to a price increase.60  
 
Moss is correct in pointing out that municipals hostels could facilitate collective action, 
but such action was not necessarily inward looking. Even though municipal hostels were 
highly regulated by police (called ‘black jacks’), they were not as strictly controlled as 
closed compounds and workers were able to make wider connections, which could aid 
political mobilisation on a wider scale. In the 1940s Pedi migrants were able to establish 
contact with others from Sekhukhuneland, hold meetings, and organise beyond the 
hostel. 61 In the 1980s the unions organise workers through the hostels and many hostels 
became FOSATU strongholds.62   
 
The factors that facilitated the clashes in Soweto appear more straightforward than Moss 
suggests.  Hirson claims that the demands of students did not resonate with migrants and 
hostel dwellers. He argues that:63 
 
The slogans of the Revolt were meaningless to them, and they were more likely to 
find the closing of schools incomprehensible. Education, for many of them, was still 
a prized object they failed to attain. The unemployed youth, on the other hand, were 
(or appeared to be) the tsotsis they hated and feared as pay-day predators.    
 
This highlights David Lewis’s argument that community organisations and protests often 
focused on the grievances of permanent township residents and failed to take up the 
issues effecting squatters and migrants living in hostel complexes.64 This, he maintains, 
excluded a large portion of the working class from community organisation and 
hampered union-community relations.  
 
Migrants and hostel dwellers were given little opportunity to relate to students’ demands. 
This was mainly because student leaders failed to consult them before they made the call 
for the stay-away and there were indications that groups of students accosted and 
intimidated strike-breakers, especially during the first stay-away on the 4 August.65 In 
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addition, unionists did not counter the contradictory leadership provided by politicians 
such as Buthelezi. Unlike the WPWAB in the Cape, the emerging unions in the Transvaal 
were silent on the question of the urban revolt. The IAS-MAWU did not respond 
officially and the UTP, which was approached by Soweto students, reaffirmed its position 
on ‘no political involvement’ and did little to support the uprising.66 The only exception 
was the NUCW, led by Lucy Mvubelo, which came out in support of students. 67 
 
The student protests spread into Natal much later than other parts of the country and 
TUACC may have been too far removed from the upheaval to respond adequately. On 
the Witwatersrand the IAS-MAWU were devastated by the Heinemann defeat and further 
disrupted by the upheaval in the townships- especially since they relied a great deal on 
township meetings and home visits to make contact with workers. Perhaps the Black 
Consciousness tones of the student protests also repelled unionists. Nevertheless, without 
the unions taking a stand on the uprising, workers were left to look to students or 
traditional leaders and homeland politicians for guidance.  
 
Many authors contest the claims that it was only Zulu workers who were behind the 
violence, but Buthelezi was one of the most outspoken homeland leaders and the only 
one to became directly involved in the stay-away. His leadership on the student revolt 
was inconsistent at best. Before the stay-away, Buthelezi objected to the destruction of 
schools and educational equipment and issued a call for ‘the establishment of vigilante 
groups to protect Black property against political action’, warning radicals to watch out 
for a backlash from more ‘responsible’ elements in the community. He also criticised the 
‘arrogance of young people who think they know what’s best for people.’ 68 After the 
clashes, however, Buthelezi addressed hostel dwellers in Soweto on the 27 August and 
called for calm and the cessation of hostilities.69         
 
The SSRC soon called for another political strike from the 13- 15 of September. This 
time students consulted more widely and met with spokesmen from the Mzimhlope, 
Inhlazane and Dube hostels. This stay-away was the most successful yet and was widely 
support by workers in Soweto. On The 15th of September 200,000 mostly coloured 
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workers in Cape Town joined them. 70 This was followed by another successful stay-
away by workers in Tembisa and Hirson argues that ‘the industrial complex at Isando 
was empty on Monday the 20 September.’71 
 
Most unionists remember the 1976 uprising as a time when union organisation was 
severely disrupted. They were also unable to escape the harsh repression that came with 
the government’s attempts to quell the student uprising. Storey Mazwembe from the 
WPWAB paid the ultimate price and died a few hours after being taken into detention.72 
In November a ‘slew of trade unionists were banned: from the WPWAB, Elijah Loza, 
John Frankish, Debbie Budlender, Judy Favish, Jeremy Baskin, Willie Hofmeyer and 
Graeme Bloch; from the FCWU, Wilma van Blerk; from the UTP, Loet Douwes-Dekker, 
Eric and Jean Tyacke; from the IAS, Chris Albertyn, Gavin Anderson, Jeanette Curtis, 
and Sipho Kubheka, and from the TUACC, John Copelyn, Pat Horn, Alpheus Mthethwa, 
Mike Murphy and Moses Ndlovu.’73  
 
The repression of popular resistance would remain a prominent feature of apartheid South 
Africa, but from the mid to late 1970s the government sought to abandon direct coercion 
in favour of limited political and institutional accommodation in order to stabilise the 
country economically and stem growing political uncertainty.74 Friedman claims that the 
move to reform came more from the need to defuse the political unrest unleashed by the 
1976 student protests than the emergence of the new unions.75 Others maintain, however, 
that it was the combination of industrial unrest in 1973 and the growth of unregistered 
trade unions together with the political turmoil in 1976 and growing international 
criticism of apartheid that precipitated government reforms. 76 Horn argues that the 
government was terrified that workers and students would unite and Bonner writes that: 
‘…after the urban uprising of 1976- the threat of the politicisation of strike action was 
much feared if no effective trade union rights were to be granted- a prospect all to real, as 
the ‘class of 76’ began to enter the factories.’77  
 
Government reform was heralded by the appointment of two key Commissions, including 
an enquiry in into labour legislation and regulations under Prof. Nicholas Wiehahn in 
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1977 and into the ‘utilisation of manpower’ (urbanisation and influx control) under Dr 
Piet Riekert. The recommendations proposed by the Wiehahn Commission would have 
far reaching implications for trade union organisation in future, but in the meantime the 
government sought to amend the LRA. The Bantu Labour Relations Regulations 
Amendment Bill (1976) removed the preference accorded to liaison committees and 
allowed for the election of a works committee irrespective of the existence of a liaison 
committee.78 Works committees were allowed in smaller establishments (with less than 
20 workers), while employers with more than one plant in an area were able to set up a 
liaison committee covering all of their establishments and the formation of industry 
committees, comprising of a number of liaison committees and works committees in any 
given trade, were sanctioned. 79 Members of industrial committees were allowed to attend 
Industrial Councils when African wages and working conditions were discussed (but 
were given no voting rights) and employers could enter into agreements with Industrial or 
Regional Bantu Labour Committees, which, if approved by the Minister, were legally 
binding. The limited right to strike remained, but agreements between employers and 
Industrial or Regional Bantu Labour Committees could place further restrictions on 
strikes in certain trades or industries.80 Finally, the Bill permitted Africans to serve on the 
Central Bantu Labour Board and Africans could also be appointed as chairs of Regional 
Councils and Bantu Labour Officers.81  These amendments were not enacted, but 
demonstrated that the government was still committed to the development of a dual 
labour relations system and no provision was made for the registration of non-racial and 
African trade unions.   
 
Baskin notes that, in spite of the relative weakness of the emerging unions, their struggles 
were making an impact on business. He maintains:82  
 
unions were causing employers problems with their campaigns for recognition. 
Companies were loosing production and profits in an effort to avoid relatively 
straightforward union demands. A few leading employers began to argue that 
some accommodation could be made.  
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In November 1976 the country’s top business leaders met to set up the Urban Foundation, 
which would seek to improve conditions in the townships and promote the extension of 
property rights in order to promote stability. 83 Friedman argues that while the UF did not 
offer any immediate gains for workers, it gave the government’s reform strategy new 
momentum. The role of employers should not be overestimated, however, and most 
remained set on sidelining the emerging unions and would only make concessions when 
forced to do so. After 1976 employers, nevertheless, became sensitive to growing 
international criticism and hurriedly adopted a string of ‘codes of conduct’ in 1977 to 
promote an image of good practice and fend off calls for disinvestments. These included 
the Sullivan Code adopted in February, the EEC Code in September, and the SACCOLA 
Code in November.84 As the editors of the South African Labour Bulletin pointed out, 
however, these codes failed to recognise unregistered unions. 85 In addition, the editors 
maintained that racial discrimination in the workplace could not be addressed within the 
current system of apartheid, which was propped up by a system of labour allocation that 
operated through influx control and the labour bureaux. 
 
Many authors note that when the ‘class of 1976’ entered the labour market they brought a 
new assertiveness and confidence with them.86 There was, however, a delay before this 
generation joined the TUACC unions. To the frustration of many unionists, large 
numbers of politicised youth left the country to join MK and the ANC underground, 
robbing the workers’ movement of a whole layer of potential leaders. 87 On the 
Witwatersrand many of the urban youth that did become involved in the union movement 
were initially attracted to the UTP unions, which mainly organised semi-skilled workers 
and promoted black leadership. For instance, Bafana Ndebele, who is still a committed 
unionist in the National Union of Metal Workers of South Africa (NUMSA), first signed 
up with EAWU. Ndebele was later drawn to the militancy of the FOSATU unions and 
remembers that ‘Moses Mayikeso would say, if you join MAWU I will not come to your 
factory if there is not strike.’88 In the early 1980s Ndebele played a crucial role in 
bringing a section of workers in the EAWU over to MAWU.   
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The 1976-generaton brought a fierce commitment to political education with them. 
Ndebele remembers that his generation focused on activities tha t would ‘empower them’ 
and prepare them for national liberation. There was little time for recreation and he 
recalls that:89    
 
we did not see a reason why we should play soccer while we were not liberated, 
while we were not yet free…most of the time you spent time either at home, with 
friends, or church, and then the union, and these meetings, these evening 
meetings…Your parents couldn’t tell that you were going to a meeting, You tell 
them that you are going to bioscope, you are not going to discussion groups. You 
come back late. 
     
Both government reform and the unionisation of the 1976-generation would have a 
significant impact on TUACC in the late 1970s and FOSATU in the early 1980s. 
According to Bonner, the move towards reform and the appointment of the Wiehahn 
Commission encouraged unions to unite under FOSATU in anticipation of new labour 
legislation. 90 Although these reforms mainly served to regain political control, space was 
opened up for the trade unions to expand substantially. The participation of the 1976-
generation in the workers’ movement, on the other hand, reflected significant changes 
that were taking place in the membership composition of the  open unions that would 
form FOSATU as increasing numbers of semi-skilled workers signed up and heightened 
political discussion in the unions.         
 
6.4. Local Factories, National Organisation and International Solidarity  
By the end of 1976 the TUACC unions were in a poor state, but from 1977 the TUACC 
renewed attempts to consolidate and strengthen factory organisation. The struggle for in-
depth factory floor organisation and the struggle for recognition remained central, but 
was bolstered by attempts to win the support of internationally based unions. 
  
At the end of 1976 the survival of the TUACC unions in Natal were in jeopardy. The 
detention of June-Rose Nala and Obed Zuma in May 1976 caused serious disruptions in 
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the NUTW and Maree claims that the union experienced a severe slump until the end of 
1976.91 Largely due to the support offered by TUACC officials and the establishment of 
local committees, the NUTW was able to retain a presence in the Pinetown area and was 
making inroads into Hammarsdale.92 MAWU was at the verge of financial and 
organisational collapse; the TGWU was ripped apart and paralysed by internal conflicts; 
and the CWIU had made few gains.93  
 
The TUACC was also experiencing a number of difficulties. Adequate BEC participation 
in Secretariat meetings was still lacking, which meant that union secretaries were left to 
make decisions on their own and officials acted without mandates.94 Locals had been 
established (which allowed affiliates to pool resources by sharing offices at Jacobs, 
Pinetown, Durban and Pietermaritzburg), but were still ad-hoc in that no constitutions 
had been adopted for such structures by October 1976.95 The production of a workers 
newspaper was irregular and while meetings were held with the IAS in Johannesburg, 
discussions with the WPWAB failed to take place after virtually all of their organisers 
were detained during the student protests in Cape Town. 96      
 
The fight for recognition had largely been unsuccessful and the NUTW and MAWU had 
experienced significant defeats at Cotton, Wool and Textiles and Conac Engineering. In 
addition the Natal unions struggled to use the existing industrial relations machinery to 
their own advantage and often their participation in industrial structures undermined 
strong factory floor organisation and union democracy. With the help of TWIU the 
NUTW challenged an exemption granted to CTM by the Industrial Council on overtime 
restrictions for women workers. Union organisers, however, dominated negotiations with 
the regional and national Industrial Council and the campaign became separated from the 
rank and file and organisers failed to understand the demands of their members. 97 Thus, 
while organisers were successful in preventing the company from renewing its exemption 
on overtime, which meant that overtime would be pegged at ten hours a week, workers 
wanted overtime to be restricted to 13 hours a week. Officials later admitted that they 
were too focused on winning the issue than using overtime as an issue to organise and 
mobilise workers.98   
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Other open unions did not have the same level of access to Industrial Councils, but they 
soon learned that working through works and liaison committees posed similar 
difficulties. Workplace committees were designed to limit independent organisation and 
curtail the bargaining power of workers and workers were often frustrated when 
committees failed to win any significant gains. The limitations of union participation in 
works and liaison committees were highlighted by CWIU’s struggle at Natal Chemical 
Plastics (NCP) and Revertext.99 One interesting aspect of the union’s approach at NCP 
was that works committee representatives tried to gain some degree of autonomy from 
management and expand the constitution to compel management to meet with the whole 
executive instead of just the chairperson.100 Management responded by establishing a 
liaison committee in its second plant (the ‘North plant’), which was used to introduce a 
5c an hour increase, and simply refused to have anything to do with the works 
committee’s executive other than the chairperson. The works committee declared a 
dispute, but both management and the Department of Labour were unsure of how to 
respond to the workers’ demand for a works committee constitution.  
 
Management agreed to meet with a more representative grouping of worker leaders and 
allowed day workers to leave company premises during lunchtime.101 Just as it appeared 
that the works committee had made some headway, management went on the counter 
offensive. Unionists were victimised and management interfered with the election of 
works committee representatives. In one instance management even threatened to deduct 
workers’ pay if the committee failed to find out who was responsible for the theft of a 
few yarns of bobbin and beer cartons.102 According to Mawbey, an organiser for the 
CWIU, this strategy had enabled the union to sustain a campaign against management for 
a time, but there were few concrete advantages for workers and this strategy had ‘…led 
workers to misconceive the struggle. They became caught up in committee affairs, 
neglecting the overall union struggle.’ 103  
 
Shop stewards at Revertex, adopted an innovative approach and used the works 
committee to spearhead a campaign around the Factories, Building and Machineries Act, 
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in which workers actively participated by drawing up a memorandum that listed the 
breaches of health and safety regulations.104 Management was subsequently forced into 
making improvements and providing workers with safety equipment. Nevertheless, 
Maree maintains that the works committee subsequently failed to find other issues to 
mobilise all workers around and did not make much progress in the fight for union 
rights.105   
 
Organisation in the Transvaal also floundered. Maree argues that in spite of the creation 
of worker controlled structures at factories such as Heinemann, tensions emerged 
between the white members of the IAS and organisers in MAWU.106 While the members 
in the IAS were committed to workers’ control, Maree argues that they struggled to 
relinquish power and the union was split between MAWU organisers who controlled 
internal affairs and IAS members who managed external matters such as fund raising.  107   
 
In September 1976 a bridging committee- the Council of Industrial Workers on the 
Witwatersrand (CIWW) that was made up of the IAS executive and the BEC of the 
union- was formed to resolve these divisions.108 This new coordinating body also aimed 
to facilitate the extension of other TUACC unions into the province and establish closer 
links between the IAS and the IIE. 109 The CIWW adopted similar principles to those of 
TUACC and sought to promote non-racism through the formation of open trade unions; 
workers’ democracy; and the sharing of resources (offices, transport, running costs, 
education and legal aid) amongst affiliates 110 The organisational strategy of the open 
unions in Natal was promoted and the CIWW confirmed that unregistered unions needed 
to rely on intensive factory organisation to build up the strength and unity required to 
force employers into negotiation. 111 Education was also considered a key component of 
this strategy and a report by the CIWW noted that: 112  
 
While African workers have had unions for decades, there is no well- established 
tradition of organisation particularly among migrant workers. Many factory 
workers are illiterate or semi illiterate and most are not functionally numerate. In 
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order to ensure real participation by members in their union, both at the factory 
and in the union offices, a lot of intensive training and education is needed…  
 
Even though the union representatives were assured majority representation on the 
CIWW, officials in the IAS maintained a great degree of control. 113 Maree argues that it 
was only after unionists were banned in November 1976, allowing members from the 
IAS to become active participants in the union, that hostilities subsided. One of the 
factors that contributed to these tensions was that MAWU and the IAS failed to use their 
legal campaigns to mobilise workers or build the union. The IAS was asked to assist with 
legal matters relating to the Heinemann case, but MAWU organisers complained that the 
union and their members were being isolated from the process. 114 This meant that 
lawyers were making decisions for the union, which undermined workers’ control and 
placed decisions in the hands of outside experts.115 
 
The CIWW experienced many of the same difficulties that the TUACC unions were 
dealing with in Natal. Chris Bonner remembers that:116  
 
You would organise secretly- you get workers to meetings, you build regular 
contacts, workers recruit other workers- it is all underground. You meet outside 
the factory, we had an office, we met in peoples’ homes and in the township, or 
whatever. You build strength on the shop floor and you elect shop stewards 
etcetera… Once you get to the point of approaching management that’s when the 
trouble really began, because in that point in time management would then 
victimise workers nine times out of ten. Or you never got to the stage to approach 
management and …you would struggle to maintain organisation because in fact 
you were not really able to do anything. And then we were collecting subs by 
hand. So what would happen is that workers would always pay when they joined 
and then may pay a month subscription and then gradually you would have 
problems to …collect the money. So it was quite a tough time. It was very much a 
rolling membership I would say at that stage. It was totally unstable and really, 
really difficult to actually secure. We couldn’t really because of the management. 
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There were odd occasions and breakthroughs. Generally it was very difficult to 
get to the stage of going and doing anything for workers. 
 
From 1977 the TUACC and the CIWW concentrated on rebuilding the open unions. They 
relied on their strategy of in-depth-factory- floor organisation and adopted measures to 
ensure that campaigns for union rights were based on rank-and- file participation. Unions 
cooperated at the local level, sharing resources and organisers, and, at the same time, 
consolidated on a national level. In addition, the open unions developed a new strategy of 
mobilising international support for recognition.      
 
Nala and Obed Zuma were eventually released from detention in December 1976. 
Together with John Makatini and Willies Mchunu, Nala went on to rebuild MAWU. 
Organisation was re-established at Scottish Cables and Sarmcol in Pietermaritzburg; 
Non-Ferrous Metals and Ferdo in Jacobs; and Glacier Bearings and Natal Die Casting in 
Pinetown. 117 In February 1978 it was reported that MAWU concentrated on building up 
factory leadership and had not expanded to any new factories, but the union proposed that 
TUACC affiliates should consider the creation of a local committee in the Richards Bay 
area.118 The union continued its struggle for recognition at Glacier Bearings. In so doing 
MAWU ensured that the rank and file and shop stewards were included in all aspects of 
the struggle. Organisers refused to negotiate with management without shop stewards 
being present and mobilised workers to collect affidavits when the union challenged the 
legal status of the liaison committee.119  
 
In June 1977 the CWIU reported that the only functioning shop steward group was based 
at NCS Plastics, although the union was organising Revertex and Total in Jacobs and 
Henkel Adhesives in Isipingo- Prospection. 120 The union continued to encourage works 
committees to adopt their own constitutions, which the management at Revertex and 
Total rejected and the Department of Labour provided draft specimens for works 
committees to model their constitutions on. In February 1978 the union noted that a 
‘French Subsidiary’ (probably Total) had recognised the shop stewards committee as the 
works committee, which was able to secure a few small victories (including the issuing of 
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pay slips and the installation of a wash basin). 121 The union soon discovered that works 
committees did not have much legal power and the union’s preoccupation with the 
constitutions of such committees had not proven effective. From the beginning of 1978 
the union concentrated on gaining recognition from Revertex and in September shifted 
attention to Henkel SA, a subsidiary of Henkel West Germany. The CWIU won a partial 
victory early in 1979 when Henkel’s management agreed to recognise the union, but only 
as representative of its members, and allowed shop stewards elections and meetings to 
take place at the plant. 122 These victories were short lived, however, and management 
subsequently formed a ‘Company Council’ that covered all the workers at the plant with 
the aim of undercutting the union. 123     
 
TUACC prioritised rebuilding TGWU, which was in turmoil. The TUACC Secretariat 
reported that by July 1978 the TGWU had established a stable BEC and that Industrial 
Sector was developing well in Durban. Organisation was much slower in 
Pietermaritzburg, but subscriptions were stable and one factory was well organised. 124 In 
October 1978 the general sector was transformed into the TUACC Workers Project, 
which aimed to provide benefits, legal aid and education to unorganised workers and 
encourage them to form committees to deal with group complaints and establish trade 
unions.125 The TUACC Workers Project also made contact with workers at Rainbow 
Chickens, which undertook a number of stoppages in 1979. 126 
 
The most potential for growth was on the East Rand in the Transvaal- the heart of the 
metal and chemical industries.  In June 1977 the CIWW reported that MAWU was 
holding regular meetings with 11 factories (mostly in the Benoni, Isando, and Kew) and 
had opened branches in Benoni and Kew.  127 Membership and subscriptions were up, 
several stable shop steward groups and BECs were in operation, and plans were afoot to 
establish a local in Benoni. 128 By the end of the year the CIWW drew up a plan that  
estimated potential union growth and identified the areas that would be targeted in future. 
These included: Kew/ Wynberg, which consisted of light and general engineering and 
chemical establishments and drew on workers from Alexandra, Tembisa and Soweto; 
Benoni/ Boksburg, which consisted of the largest concentration of metal companies on 
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the Witwatersrand and employed workers from Natalspruit and Vosloorus; and Isando/ 
Spartan/ Elandsfontien, home to many foreign owned engineering companies and the 
centre of the chemical industry, with workers coming from Tembisa, Daveyton, 
Natalspruit and Soweto. Heriotdale/ Clevaland and Denver/ George Goch/Jeppe were 
also considered viable and mainly served the engineering and food industries. 129  
 
MAWU (Tvl.) made some progress at Vosa Valves (a Stewards and Lloyds company) 
where management accepted the union as one of the legitimate channels of 
communication and agreed to meet with shop stewards. 130 Maree argues that MAWU 
was also on the verge of signing a recognition agreement with Tensile Rubber, but first 
had to develop shop stewards during 1979 before the opportunity was exploited. 131 A 
great deal of emphasis was placed on teaching shop stewards about industrial legislation. 
Education was mostly provided by the IAS, which held Saturday morning classes and 
produced a range of practical guides such as ‘Understanding Payslips’ and a booklet on 
sick pay, maternity benefits, and UIF. 132 The CIWW had also started a health and safety 
programme and appointed a medical officer to assist with this work. 133   
 
The CIWW also attempted to prevent the separation of unionists from legal processes and 
proposed that legal matters should be included in worker education and that a procedure 
should be adopted whereby the legal committee would conduct the necessary research 
and submit all the legal opinions to the unions. 134 Any case that was perused would be 
discussed and monitored in joint MAWU-IAS meetings. In October 1976 TUACC’s legal 
committee reported that quite a number of industrial cases had been dealt with, most of 
which were settled out of court, and that the TUACC and CWIU aimed to set up a joint 
Legal Defence Fund to raise funds for legal cases rather than expect individual unions to 
carry the cost. 135 It was essential for the rank and file and shop stewards to be involved at 
all levels of organisation to prevent officials from being separated from members and 
specialists from dominating decisions. 
 
In February 1977, concerns were raised at a joint TUACC and CIWW meeting that 
MAWU had not been transformed into a national trade union. 136 TUACC wanted to avoid 
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the mistakes made by the NUTW, which had made contacts with textile workers in 
Johannesburg but failed to formalise the relationship. 137 The creation of a chemical union 
in Johannesburg was under consideration and the meeting resolved that both MAWU and 
the CWIU should become national unions. 138 Drawing on the policies of the TUACC, it 
was decided that the branches of these national unions should share the same policies and 
that the regional branches of MAWU should elect sub-committees to discuss a 
constitution for the new national unions.139 The establishment of national unions brought 
the relationship between the TUACC and the CIWW as well as the IAS and the IIE into 
question. Consequently it was proposed that all of these bodies should unite into one 
national body, preferably under the TUACC.140 
 
In May 1978 the new draft constitution for the national TUACC was circulated and a 
month later the CIWW and TUACC merged. The National and Regional Executive 
Councils of the TUACC were elected on the 30 July 1978, while the National Executive 
of MAWU was confirmed and Regional Committees were established by the CWIU, 
NUTW and the TGWU. 141 In spite of the initial proposal to extend the chemical union to 
the Transvaal, the CIWW proposed that it would be more beneficial for the TGWU to 
become the next national affiliate.142 Maree claims that this was largely in response to a 
debate between intellectuals who called for the formation of industrial trade unions, and 
worker representatives wanted to see the formation of a general union because they 
believed that the union movement should be concerned about all workers and not jus t 
workers from a particular industry. 143 The TGWU’s Transvaal branch was founded in 
November 1978 and Lydia Kompe was appointed as the organiser.144 The industrial 
sector of the new branch prioritised recruiting workers in the chemical industry and, like 
the Natal branch, the general sector was transformed into the ‘TUACC Worker Project’. 
The TGWU soon made contact with workers at Reef Chemicals, Dunlop and Transvaal 
Coffin and workers from Pick n’ Pay and Rubenstien Plastics were referred to the 
TWP.145 
 
As the unions started to stabilise in the Transvaal a group of confident worker leaders 
started to emerge in the factories and took charge of the day-to-day organisation of the 
 217 
union. A number of these worker leaders, such as Baba K, who were victimised and 
dismissed for their union activities, and became organisers. For instance, Petrus 
Mashishi, longstanding president of SAMWU, became involved in organising workers in 
the TWP. 146 Perhaps the best example is Moses Mayekiso, who was chairperson of the 
shop steward council at Toyota and lost his job during a strike. He first volunteered to 
work for MAWU and was subsequently employed to organise in the Wadeville area.147         
 
Even though the education sub-committee failed to develop a comprehensive programme, 
organisers undertook the education of shop stewards, which was quite successful since 
they were involved in organising and understood the issues that shop stewards had to deal 
with. Pat Horn explains: 148  
 
Well, the IIE started off being a correspondence course. There was a big 
discussion about whether that was the most appropriate way to do education. 
There was a big push for more face-to-face education, in the factories, in those 
factories where workers were being organised…. So they used to produce little 
booklets, you know, ‘How to be a Good Shop Steward’, ‘How to Form a Works 
Committee’ and negotiation handbooks. There were little booklets for shop 
stewards. Mainly that because there were no specialised trainers in those days, we 
all as organisers used to get together and plan courses using our own common 
sense. There wasn’t much of the kind of adult basic education training that there 
is these days. You know, later on we had all sorts of other methods of doing 
things. We used to say to ourselves, we shouldn’t lecture so much, but in fact 
there wasn’t such a well-developed system of adult education. So we used a 
combination of rather traditional skills of standing and giving boring lectures, and 
sometimes we used to do group work if we were more creative. It was pretty 
much up to us as organisers. The advantage of having it like that was that the 
people who did the facilitating were also involved in organising, so they actually 
understood the issues. 
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Drawing on a strategy originally developed by the CWIU, MAWU focused on organising 
foreign owned companies, which were more sensitive to international criticism and called 
on the support of other unions that organised the same company in different parts of the 
world. In March 1976 the secretary reported that ‘MAWU had used overseas pressure in 
an attempt to gain union recognition in Leyland’ and that this tactic eventually forced 
Leyland management to accept the election of a shop steward group during working 
hours.149 MAWU stressed, however, that ‘…there was a danger of using outside foreign 
pressure to win union recognition as this may encourage workers to rely on this outside 
pressure rather than relying on their unity within the factory.’150 Finding international 
allies would still prove difficult. For instance, MAWU’s international publicity campaign 
at Glacier Bearings was less successful, mostly because SACTU tried to dissuade British 
shop stewards at Glacier Bearings from visiting South Africa.151 Even though the 
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) did send a representative and 
shop stewards at Glasgow and Kilmarnock supported MAWU demands, the AUEW’s 
district committee backed SACTU. 
 
The NUTW, which concentrated on organising Smith and Nephew, received two harsh 
blows in 1977. Firstly, after the student uprising and banning of unionists, Norma 
Daniels, general secretary of the TWIU, attempted to distance the registered trade union 
from the NUTW and TUACC. The long-term cooperation between the NUTW and the 
TWIU at Smith and Nephew allowed workers to unite across the racial divide. Maree 
notes that Indian workers were angered by Daniels’ actions and the entire TWIU’s 
membership at the plant – which included 60 Indian workers - resigned and joined the 
NUTW.152 Secondly, it has been speculated that the company came  under pressure from 
the government and sought to use the divisions between the NUTW and TWIU and in 
May 1977 management indicated that they would not renew the recognition agreement 
and aimed to transform the shop steward committee into a statuary works committee.153 
The NUTW launched an international campaign to pressurise management into signing a 
new agreement, but it was not until the NUTW targeted unions that organised the British 
section that Smith and Nephew agreed to re-negotiate the agreement.154 A new 
recognition agreement was eventually signed in September 1978. 
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By this time the TGWU had embarked on a recognition campaign at Frobo-Krommenie, 
a subsidiary of a Swiss multinational. The company deployed a number of methods to 
break the union – including a lockout of workers and the dismissal of unionists for trivial 
offences. 155 In this instance Dutch and Swedish workers took up the TGWU’s recognition 
campaign, but the company proved intransigent and for much of 1979 management 
attempted to force the unio n to work through and accept the ‘Works Council’. 156  
 
TUACC played a prominent role in assisting affiliates. In February 1978 a decision was 
taken that any donations to unions would be channelled through TUACC, which would 
allocate funds to all affiliates, and in March a policy relating to the employment of 
organisers and volunteers was formulated.157 Locals had become an effective organising 
tool and at the beginning of 1978 the possibility of establishing new locals in Prospecton/ 
Isipingo, Richards Bay and Hammardale was considered. 158 Finally, the joint Legal Aid 
Committee funded numerous cases (dealing with the prosecution of strikers, dismissals, 
and victimisation of unionists) and sought legal opinions on the status of the Smith and 
Nephew recognition agreement; the constitution of works committees; and compared the 
Factories Act to the Industrial Council Agreement for the Iron, Steel and Metallurgical 
Industries to find inconsistencies.159 The contracts of migrants were also investigated, 
with the aim of understanding the liability of employers when they breached the contract 
and the service benefits of workers.160 
 
By the end of 1978 the unions in TUACC were still weak. The open unions, however, 
had made some progress in their struggle for recognition and the ir focus on in-depth 
factory organisation under a soundly organised umbrella body such as TUACC laid a 
solid foundation for future expansion.  
 
6.5. Conclusion 
MAWU’s extension onto the Witwatersrand marked the introduction of the workers’ 
control tradition in the region. The IAS was initially dominated by white intellectuals, but 
gained a worker base through the development of the metal section. The IAS appeared 
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much more reflective when it came to the ideological training of workers and, together 
with MAWU, created organisations that extended into the townships and were based on 
the democratic participation of union members.     
  
Organisation in the region suffered a massive set back after MAWU was broken at 
Heinemann and was further disrupted by the 1976 uprising. The TUAAC and the IAS-
MAWU, however, did not provide workers with any analysis of the urban revolt and 
leadership was left to students and homeland politicians. Igniting fears that the union 
movement would become political, significant state reforms were instigated. In addition a 
generation of workers that were politically aware and assertive was forged in the urban 
revolt. This would have important consequences for FOSATU in the 1980s. 
 
In spite of the setbacks experienced in 1976, the unions were able to move forward. The 
first national unions were established, the use of the courts as a tactic was extended and 
unions attempted to mobilise the support of overseas unions to advance their campaigns 
for recognition. In-depth and democratic organisation at the plant level remained key. 
Unions were careful not to become reliant on ‘pressure politics’ and the intervention of 
international unions and increasingly ensured that shop stewards were included at all 
levels of the union struggle.  
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Chapter 7: 
Political Alliances, the State and the Formation of FOSATU, 
1977-1979.  
7.1. Introduction  
From 1977 TUACC started to consolidate at the local and national level and even started 
to develop relations with trade unions overseas. At the same time, opportunities opened 
up for TUACC to play a more prominent role in shaping the local trade union movement. 
TUACC participated in the unity talks that led to the formation of a national federation of 
unregistered trade unions and, together with NUMARWOSA, submitted evidence to the 
Wiehahn Commission. The unity talks heightened tensions in the emerging union 
movement, but TUACC managed to play a leading role in determining the structures and 
policies of the new federation as well as the way in which the new federation would 
respond to the anticipated labour reform. TUACC was also compelled to take a decision 
on Inkatha, but its policy on how to relate to cross-class nationalist movements remained 
contradictory.      
 
7.2. Political Alliances and the Independence of the New Workers Movement  
Unionists in TUACC were struggling to come to grips with Inkatha. As Inkatha stepped 
up efforts to woo workers, the differences between TUACC, which was now attempting 
to organise public sector workers in the KwaZulu homeland, and Inkatha were brought 
into sharp focus.1 In March 1976, for instance, workers at the Umlazi Roads Department 
called on Chief Xolo, Minister of Roads and Works, to discuss problems with their 
liaison committee.  Xolo ‘strongly condemned the idea of workers having any dealings 
with the union whatsoever’ and encouraged them to join Inkatha instead.2 In the same 
year the Director of Works sent out an official circular, which noted that ‘trade unions are 
interfering more and more with workers of this Department’ and while there could be no 
objection to workers joining unions, such unions were not recognised by the KwaZulu 
government and had no official standing. 3   
 
There were other points of contention. Inkatha, which claimed to oppose discriminatory 
wages and support the extension of trade union rights to African workers, sought to 
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become more active in the field of labour relations. Inkatha assured management ‘…that 
it was a responsible organisation and wished to establish a genuine partnership of 
employers and employees.’4 The prevention of disinvestments, which Inkatha claimed 
would hurt black workers, was one area in which cooperation was possible. Inkatha 
maintained that the best way forward would be to ensure that the codes of employment 
practices developed by employers were implemented and proposed that, together with 
other unions, Inkatha should monitor compliance with these codes. These aims conflicted 
with those of TUACC, which not only chose to remain neutral on the question of 
disinvestments, but also had little faith in the codes of conduct that did not recognise non-
racial or African unions. 5          
 
Eventually TUACC officials agreed that while the unions could enter into ‘diplomatic 
relationships’ based on expediency, such relations should ‘never ever exercise the 
slightest degree of influence on the union movement either in respect of its policies or in 
respect to its activities.’6 By 1978 it was decided that TUACC would not affiliate to 
Inkatha, although it would not object to individual workers joining. 7 In the absence of a 
clearly defined political programme, however, this policy reduced the political role of 
trade unions in the minds of members, who increasingly viewed the unions as a means 
through which to fight for workers demands at the workplace and nationalist 
organisations as vehicles for political change.  
 
Pat Horn, for example, notes that workers could be:8       
 
members of political parties and the unions at the same time… So in the unions 
they were fighting for better working conditions, they were also fighting against 
apartheid. They were fighting against anything that was bad for workers. They 
[members] also had their political lives where … some people [supported] 
Matanzima, some people supported the IFP, many people supported the ANC in 
exile. Many people had relatives who were in the armed struggle. All of that was 
understood to be the case. That was freedom of association, a freedom of choice. 
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There wasn’t a contradiction because everybody, no matter what their political 
beliefs, has problems at work and that was what the union was for.   
 
Maree documents the experiences of a MAWU organiser who was elected onto the 
executive of Inkatha in his local area.9 The organiser was shocked by the lack of 
democracy within the organisation and came to believe that Inkatha mainly promoted the 
interest of other classes- ‘big people’ and storekeepers- and subsequently resigned. 
Nonetheless, hundreds of workers did maintain a dual membership, leading to a 
contradictory coexistence of workers’ democracy, socialism and the call for worker unity 
with the acceptance of an ethnically based cross-class populist movement that 
discouraged criticism of political leaders.  
 
Unionists in Natal failed to interrogate these contradictions. Pat Horn recalls:10        
 
everybody just understood that we are in IFP territory, we all support the IFP, we 
never say anything against the IFP. The IFP kind of supported FOSATU, although 
it used to be a double-edged support…We had a big function for the launch of 
FOSATU in Northern Natal, the [KwaZulu] Minister of the Interior and Labour 
…slated unions and what he called undue strikes. Everybody just totally ignored 
it because they were waiting for the meat to come on. It was a very insulting 
speech, if the papers had been there it would have been put as a contradiction- 
guest speaker criticises the organisation that he is launching. Everybody totally 
ignored it and when he was finished they clapped and went to have their meat.   
 
Even though TUACC in Natal was keen to maintain the autonomy of the new workers 
movement, unionists left the political affiliations of workers unchallenged and its policy 
on alliances was largely a defensive move designed to protect the unions from being 
swallowed up by a powerful populist movement. Nevertheless, unionists in the Transvaal, 
who were critical of union alliances with nationalist parties and sought to build a 
politically independent workers’ movement that could fight for socialism and national 
liberation on its own terms, were already developing a more coherent political position. 
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This position, which called on workers to take control of their political destiny through 
democratic working class organisations, would later be adopted and developed by 
FOSATU.           
 
7.3. NUMARWOSA and the Search for Unity  
The TUACC was not able to unite unregistered trade unions and the move to create a 
national federation in the first half of 1977 came from an unlikely source- the registered 
NUMARWOSA and the UAW that were based in the Eastern Cape. NUMARWOSA, 
which was formed in the late 1960s, was a registered union for coloured workers that 
organised in the motor and rubber industries, mostly in the Eastern Cape, and an affiliate 
of TUCSA. Adler, who has written the history of the union, details how a group of 
‘insurgents’, including Fred Sauls and Joe Foster, challenged the bureaucratic nature of 
the union that had become typical of TUCSA unions. 11 Once these ‘insurgents’ managed 
to take over the leadership of the union, structures were democratised. The union now 
relied on the leadership of elected and accountable shop stewards and ensured that 
decision-making shifted from officials to workers on the factory floor. NUMARWOSA 
also started to focus on African workers. Given the growing importance of African 
workers in the industry the new NUMARWOSA leaders realised that any motor union 
that failed to organise African workers would be severely limited. Adler argues, however, 
that the original impulse for organising African workers ‘…came less from such strategic 
concerns and more form a general political understanding of the workers’ situation.”12  
 
According to Adler, those who led the challenge against the old guard were part of an 
informal discussion/reading group that drew on material from a range of organisations 
including the Unity Movement and the exile movements. This group, however,  
developed a general political outlook similar to that of the Black Consciousness 
Movement. Due to the legal restrictions placed on the organisation of African workers, 
NUMARWOSA decided to set up a parallel union (the UAW), which it planned to merge 
with in future. 13 Although relations between NUMARWOSA-UAW and UTP organisers 
were strained in Port Elizabeth, cordial relations were established with UTP structures in 
Durban and Pretoria.14 
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NUMARWOSA, which found little enthusiasm for organising African workers within 
TUCSA and disapproved of the bureaucratic character of TUCSA, withdrew from the 
federation in December 1976. Leaders in NUMARWOSA-UAW started to look to other 
like-minded trade unions for new allies and called for the formation of a national 
federation. 15 Contact was made with the TUACC, CIWW, UTP-CCOBTU and a number 
of Cape based unions including the WPWAB, the Breweries and Goldsmiths Union, and 
the Western Province Motor Assembly Workers Union (which had undergone a similar 
grass-roots led rejuvenation of leadership and had let its affiliation to TUCSA lapse).16 
All these structures professed themselves keen and a joint meeting to discuss cooperation 
was set for the 23 March 1977.17 
 
By this time NUMARWOSA-UAW and TUACC were already moving closer together.  
NUMARWOSA-UAW had some dealings with MAWU in the South African committee 
of the IMF and proved to have much in common with the TUACC.18 According to Adler, 
the NUMARWOSA-UAW was moving away from its initial Black Consciousness 
position and also aimed to unite workers, regardless of their race, on a national level.19 
NUMARWOSA and the TUACC began to share resources and ideas and Adler argues 
that NUMARWOSA and the UAW, which did not have the same support from university 
based intellectuals, received educational material with an explicitly class based analysis 
from the IIE and worker intellectuals within NUMARWOSA and the UAW started to 
develop a class based understanding of society. 20        
 
The joint meeting brought unions from Natal, the Transvaal and the Cape together and 
included representatives from 11 UTP-CCOBTU unions, the TUACC, CIWW, 
NUMARWOSA-UAW, and the WPWAB. 21 Uniting unregistered trade unions would 
prove difficult to achieve, especially in the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape, and unions 
started to clash almost immediately as they tried to stamp their form of unionism onto the 
new federation. Lowry maintains that representatives from the UTP-CCOBTU unions 
perceived proposals for cooperation as ‘a white- led takeover bid’.22 The UTP-CCOBTU 
unions distributed a memo that stressed their policy of advancing black leadership  and 
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listed their objections to other unions, especially MAWU that was organising on the 
Witwatersrand, claiming that TUACC’s expansion into the Transvaal would just confuse 
and fragment workers.23 The memo noted that the CCOBTU unions would only consider 
cooperation if the other unions amended their way of operation to suit the needs of the 
CCOBTU.24  
 
TUACC and the CIWW also came prepared and sent a large delegation to the meeting.25 
It should be noted that TUACC and the CIWW were still in the process of establishing 
the terms of their relationship at this time and at first disagreed on the terms upon which 
union cooperation should be based. While the TUACC favoured the formation of a ‘tight’ 
alliance, the CIWW was concerned about tensions in the Transvaal and preserving 
regional autonomy and wondered if a loose federation would not be more suitable. 26 It 
was agreed, however, that the TUACC and the CIWW would call for ‘close cooperation’ 
- based on developing common policies, sharing resources, and promoting workers’ 
democracy- at the meeting. 27   
 
Bonner argues that three main areas of contention were raised at this initial meeting that 
would remain prominent in the course of discussions. 28 These included the argument that 
the unregistered trade unions were still too weak to consider cooperation and the 
federation would become a cumbersome bureaucratic structure imposed on the unions. 
The second concern related to the UTP-CCOBTU’s policy on black leadership and they 
feared that the white and coloured representatives of other unions would confuse and 
divide black workers. Finally, concerns were raised that the federation would be 
established before unions were given an opportunity to iron out their differences.   
 
The CCOBTU was based on a loose form of cooperation and, without a shared position 
on a new federation, representatives soon pulled in different directions. While unions still 
affiliated to TUCSA – including the NUCW and the Transvaal Textile Workers Union- 
decided to pull out of the negotiations, others broke from their rigid position outlined in 
the memorandum and endorsed a resolution to establish an ad hoc Feasibility Committee 
that would investigate the possibility of forming a new federation. 29   
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The Feasibility Committee –consisting of one representative from the CIWW, two from 
the TUACC, one from NUMARWOSA/ UAW, two from the UTP, and one from the 
WPWAB - met for the first time in April. While Lowry notes that CCOBTU had more 
members, TUACC was better organised and soon held the upper hand. The TUACC and 
the CIWW were already working together, which meant that they had more weight on the 
Feasibility Committee, and quickly obtained dominance by presenting arguments that 
were based on well-developed proposals that had been circulated amongst affiliates. The 
basis of cooperation proved a central issue and the TUACC and the CIWW once again 
called for the formation of a national federation that would: decide on common policies, 
pool resources, standardise worker agreements with employers; collect and research 
information on workers rights; obtain legal opinions and exploit what rights workers did 
have; and train seasoned organisers to negotiate with management. 30 They also stressed 
that the federation should be based on workers’ control-  which would allow elected 
worker representative to make the decisions and keep officials accountable to the rank 
and file. 31     
 
The Feasibility Committee, which agreed that the new federation should be called 
Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU), decided that further cooperation 
would be based on a formal and close relationship. 32 It was also decided that national 
trade unions would not expand any further to prevent competition. To alleviate the fears 
that a bureaucratic monster would be created and that unions would not be given an 
opportunity to discuss their differences, the meeting passed a resolution that union 
branches should take part in Regional Federation Meetings. Such meetings would discuss 
demarcation issues, establish lines of communication, and allow for members to become 
actively involved in the establishment of the new federation. 33 It was resolved that such 
meetings should be, ‘arranged as to accord every opportunity for membership 
participation. 34.   
 
Although the WPWAB had a representative on the Feasibility Committee, any further 
participation of the unregistered trade unions in Cape Town remained unclear. Brian 
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Fredericks from NUMARWOSA was mandated to hold a meeting with the Cape unions 
and in June he reported that he had met with a range of unions, including the FCWU and 
the WPWAB. 35 Unionists claimed that their unions were still too  weak and that the 
federation was premature. They were not ready to participate in the unity talks. Friedman 
maintains that these unions privately feared that the TUACC would dominate the new 
alliance.36 Nonetheless, it was agreed that the Feasibility Committee would keep in 
contact with the Cape unions and continued to invite them to meetings.  
 
The first round of Regional Federation Meetings yielded mixed results. In Natal trade 
unions made the most progress in terms of overcoming their differences. Their meeting 
held on the 4 June 1977 included TUACC and NUMARWOSA as well as UTP- 
CCOBTU linked unions such as the Sweet, Food and Allied Workers Union (SFAWU) 
and Paper, Wood and Allied Workers Union (PWAWU). There was little conflict and it 
was agreed the new federation should centralise the administration of affiliates; combine 
and strengthen education facilities; negotiate and obtain recognition from employers; and 
coordinate activities for the benefit of all members.37 While concerns were raised about 
the limited number of worker representatives in attendance, those present committed 
themselves to encouraging more worker participation. 38 In the other regions, however, 
tensions quickly came to the fore. The UTP-CCOBTU linked EAWU and SFAWU 
refused to attend a regional meeting in Port Elizabeth and decided to vacate the offices 
provided by NUMARWOSA without notice.39  In the Transvaal disagreements over who 
would serve as representatives at the meeting prevented any meetings from taking 
place.40  
 
Relations at the level of the Feasibility Committee were also strained and, according to 
Bonner, further controversy arouse over the draft budget and proposed appointment of a 
permanent official.41 The TUACC and the CIWW objected to these measures on the 
grounds that a bureaucratic superstructure would be created even before the federation 
had been properly formulated and it was agreed that such issues could only be decided 
once regional cooperation had been established. The Feasibility Committee focused on 
the Transvaal region and the chair was mandated to bring the unions together.  A meeting 
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was eventually set for the 21 June, but was not very productive as representatives spent 
most their time arguing. 42 Once again, representation featured as a central concern. Maree 
claims that the CIWW wanted the entire executives of unions to attend, while the UTP-
CCOBTU unions insisted that only union secretaries sould be represented 43 In addition, 
the CIWW criticised the UTP unions for not encouraging workers to participate, while 
the UTP unions objected to the attendance of non-union bodies such as the IAS. 44 The 
meeting deadlocked over MAWU’s growth in the Transvaal and regional talks stalled for 
over a year.45 It would later become evident, however, that much more fundamental 
issues were at stake for the CCOBTU, which was coming apart and many of the UTP 
unions were experiencing serious internal conflicts. 
  
In spite of the difficulties with the Cape unions and the UTP-CCOBTU in the Transvaal 
and Eastern Cape, discussion continued and the TUACC, CIWW and NUMARWOSA- 
UAW were drawn closer together. At the end of 1977 NUMARWOSA-UAW asked the 
TUACC to assist with the organisation of textile workers in Port Elizabeth and the 
CIWW subsequently agreed to aid the UAW with unionising workers at the Sigma plant 
near Pretoria. 46 Most significantly, these union groupings decided to unite around the 
Wiehahn Commission and respond jointly.  
  
7.4. Responding to the Wiehahn Commission  
Friedman claims that in the period leading up to the final report, government officials and 
Professor Wiehahn himself indicated that the Commission would propose far reaching 
reforms.47 He argues that, it soon became clear that the Commission was not an inquiry at 
all, but a vehicle for testing the reform’s acceptability to key labour interest groups. 
These interest groups- including employers associations and registered trade unions- were 
represented on the Commission and thereby given a stake in the plan. Even though 
unregistered trade unions, which were not represented, were deeply suspicious of the 
outcomes, TUACC, CIWW, NUMARWOSA, UAW decided to submit evidence. 48   
 
The decision to engage with the Commission was informed by the historical experiences 
of these unions, which, Philip Bonner argues, shaped their understanding of the state. 
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NUMARWOSA and the UAW had already worked within industrial structures without 
undermining union autonomy or democratic shop- floor organisation. 49 NUMARWOSA 
and the UAW rejected a functionalist approach to the state and had learned that strong 
unions could use the structures established by government and employers to their own 
advantage. Bonner maintains that unionists in TUACC believed that strong plant based 
organisation together with entering into legally binding agreements with employers  (such 
as recognition agreements) ‘…would serve as defensive ramparts for workers in a hostile 
situation, and as platforms for further advances once conditions improved’.50 The 
TUACC unions understood the importance of gaining basic rights and they based their 
engagement with structures sanctioned by government or employers on their ability to 
use such structures to further union goals. In sharp contract to SACTU, TUACC position 
rested on the assumption that while the state was a repressive instrument, it was 
‘…located in a nexus of contradictory social relations and whose characteristic is 
determined by the changing relations between the classes involved.’51 This meant that 
unions should pressure the state to make concessions and unions should make use of any 
advances to further their own aims.    
 
Consequently, unionists within TUACC, CIWW, NUMARWOSA, UAW believed that 
unregistered trade unions had little to lose by submitting evidence and in the worst case 
the Commission would ignore their contributions and maintain the status quo. The 
unregistered trade unions had little reason to trust the apartheid government, and the 
TUACC, CIWW, NUMARWOSA and UAW first noted their reservations of the 
Commission in a joint press statement.52 They stated that it was unlikely that the 
Wiehahn Commission would take the concerns of unregistered trade unions seriously and 
indicated that the black representatives on the Commission, who did not have any 
‘practical experience’ of the unregistered trade unions, were unable to represent black 
workers effectively.  
 
This was followed by the submission of written evidence in November.53 The document 
outlined the shortcomings of a variety of laws (including the Factories Act, Workman 
Compensation Act and the Unemployment Insurance Fund) as well as the Department of 
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Labour.54 The submission rested on a key political demand and called for the freedom of 
association to be extended to all workers. Related to this, the submission argued that 
unions that were sufficiently representative should be guaranteed collective bargaining 
rights and recognition by management as well as the right to operate without fear of 
victimisation from either managers or the state.  
 
It would take another two years before the Wiehahn Commission would make its 
recommendations public and the TUACC’s Secretariat noted that ‘…it is not optimistic 
about the outcome of the Wiehahn Commission and reports received from a number of 
sources confirm this. We should continue to organise actively rather than wait for 
anything form this Commission.’55  This, however, was the first time that the trade unions 
that would form the core of FOSATU acted in unison and they were able to establish 
common ground on how to relate to future reforms.  
 
7.5. Competing Traditions and Unity Talks in the Transvaal  
During the second half of 1978 unity talks were revived in the Transvaal. This was 
largely precipitated by the CCOBTU’s proposal to form an alternative federation to 
FOSATU. With two possible federations on the table the differences between the 
emerging unions were highlighted and the conflicts between the UTP-CCOBTU and the 
TUACC in the Transvaal heightened. This time contestation revolved around two main 
issues – democracy and trade union militancy.  
 
The UTP linked unions in the  CCOBTU had adopted a more moderate approach to union 
organisation. Maree points out, however, that there were some regional variations in the 
UTP unions and that union branches on the East Rand were more confrontational and 
workers manifested a more militant consciousness.56 As Bonner notes, the UTP unions 
were not based on workers’ control and did not develop democratic shop floor 
structures.57 For example, Mr Mqhayi, who was approached by members of his church to 
become involved in the EAWU and was appointed, rather than elected, as a shop steward, 
confirms this. 58 No mechanisms were put in place for the rank and file to hold their 
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executives accountable and the power to make decisions lay with the general secretaries, 
who were the primary participants in the loosely structured CCOBTU.59           
 
Maree argues that with the formation of FOSATU, the CCOBTU unionists were exposed 
to an alternative tradition. Since the CCOBTU’s participation in the unity talks was based 
on unaccountable officials, it would appear that contact with the TUACC and the CIWW 
was limited in this forum. Activists in the CIWW, however, played an active part in 
making contact with UTP organisers and discussing ideas. Taffy Adler from the CIWW 
recalls:60    
 
When we started the discussion on FOSATU there was a decision to interact with 
the UTP unions on the assumption that if we could not win them, then at least 
split them and bring some of them in. And certainly that happened… It’s not that 
easy, basically you present alternatives and people make a cho ice. And if they had 
decided on the basis of whatever the benefits that they thought they might gain by 
joining FOSATU, then they must do that.  
 
During the latter part of the 1970s the CCOBTU block was weakened by internal 
conflicts, mostly fuelled by power struggles between executive members, in at least four 
UTP unions. Lowry maintains that these internal conflicts reflected a crisis of growth and 
consolidation. 61 Similarly, Friedman explains that as the UTP unions began to expand, 
their elected executive committees began to demand a greater say and accused their 
general secretaries of taking decisions without consulting them. 62  
 
It was against this background that Henry Chipeya, secretary of the UTP, mooted the idea 
of creating an alternative federation.63 Since union secretaries in CCOBTU appeared 
disinterested, Chipeya called a meeting of national and branch presidents, where it was 
recommended that the UTP-CCOBTU unions should first investigate the progress made 
in the unity talks to set up FOSATU. At the end of August a meeting that included 
TUACC (Tvl) and the UTP-CCOBTU was held. Workers were mobilised to attend and 
representatives from the Glass and Allied Workers Union (GAWU), which had a strong 
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East Rand following; the East Rand branch of the Commercial, Catering and Allied 
Workers of South Africa (CCAWUSA); and workers from PWAWU, SFAWU, and the 
Building, Construction and Allied Workers Union (BCAWU) attended. 64 Petrus Tom, 
and organiser for the UTP who disapproved of the undemocratic practices within the 
EAWU and Jane Hlogwane’s refusal to take the concerns of the EAWU’s executive into 
account, also actively encouraged EAWU members from the Vaal Triangle to attend the 
meeting (Tom subsequently became a leading FOSATU unionist and community leader 
in the Vaal during the 1980s).65 This was one of the first times that workers from the UTP 
were given a chance to participate in the unity talks and the TUACC (Tvl) and 
NUMARWOSA-UAW were shocked to learn that workers had not been informed about 
the new federation or its progress. 66 Much of the meeting was taken up with the UTP 
participants lambasting their officials.  
 
In October 1978 a follow up meeting was held. Although the same old conflicts surfaced, 
three UTP unions- EAWU, GAWU and PWAWU - decided to take part in FOSATU. 
Believing that these unions were ‘a bad influence’ the CCOBTU expelled the GAWU 
and the EAWU, evicted these unions from their offices, and refused to return their 
records.67 In the case of the EAWU, Jane Hlogwane, who was expelled from the union by 
the executive, claimed that the EAWU had been split and seized the assets and the funds 
of the union.68 The Feasibility Committee assisted the UTP unions that decided to join 
the federation financially and applied for a court interdict against Jane Hlogwane. 69 The 
UTP retaliated by writing to the ICFTU and other international trade unions, claiming 
that the new federation was using overseas donations to split the CCOBTU and its 
affiliates. 70    
 
These difficulties did not prevent the Feasibility Committee from forging ahead. After 
proposals were made to restructure the Feasibility Committee to ensure that all the 
participating unions were sufficiently represented and a seminar was arranged for all the 
participating bodies, the first interim structures of the federation were established in 
November 1978. 71 These consisted of an Interim Central Committee of FOSATU as well 
as Interim Regional Executive Committees. 72 With the inclusion of the EAWU, GAWU, 
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and PWAWU, the Transvaal region of the federation also started to stabilise and a 
number of ‘factory plans’- a scheme whereby those trade unions that organised in the 
same factory agreed to work together- were drawn up.73 In the Port Elizabeth and Natal 
discussions over some of the industrial sectors had already moved away from 
demarcation issues and the amalgamation of the metal unions was seriously 
contemplated. 74 At the same time, other trade unions from the Cape- including the  
Brewery Employers Union, the Liquor and Catering Trades, the Jewellers and 
Goldsmiths Union- also expressed an interest in joining FOSATU.75 
 
7.6. The Formation of FOSATU  
The new federation was inaugurated between the 13-15 April 1979 in Hammanskraal. As 
Bonner notes, this was a significant development and FOSATU became the first 
federation of predominantly unregistered trade unions to operate openly in South Africa 
since SACTU went into exile and the FOFATUSA dissolved. 76 Even though the 
federation brought unions from a variety of different traditions together, the type of 
workers’ control developed by TUACC left a distinct mark on the new structure. 
 
While some authors claim that FOSATU started with a combined membership of 45,000 
others are more cautions and suggest that 35,000 (with many not fully paid up) is a more 
accurate reflection. 77 According to Gerald Kraak, early affiliates consisted of a number of 
unregistered unions – including the TUACC’s NUTW; MAWU; TGWU and CWIU; the 
UTP’s PWAWU; SFAWU; and GAWU (Glass); and the UAW. In addition to 
NUMARWOSA, a number of registered unions were also drawn in – including Western 
Province Motor Assemblies Worker Union (WPMAWU); the Chemical and General 
Workers Union (CGWU) and the Eastern Province Sweet, Food and Allied Workers 
Union (EPSF&AWU).78 The NUMARWOSA, WPMAWU, UAW, were subsequently 
merged in the National Automobile and Allied Workers Union (NAAWU), while the 
EPSF&AWU was incorporated into the SFAWU and the CGWU joined the CWIU.  
 
Polices adopted by FOSATU reflect those developed by TUACC. FOSATU was 
committed to building non-racial industrial trade unions that were national in character 
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and based on strong factory floor organisation at the local level.79 Workers’ control was a 
guiding principal and in FOSATU Worker News it was noted that active members and 
shop stewards were an essential component of a worker-controlled movement, which 
would ensure that worker leaders truly represented and advanced the interests of workers 
in society. 80 The federation, therefore, encouraged an active and well informed 
membership that supported each other and their elected shop stewards in the struggle to 
improve the rights of workers in the workplace.  
 
Provisions were made to ensure that workers dominated and occupied key positions in 
the Central Committee and Executive Committee. FOSATU was a tight federation, which 
meant that cooperation between affiliates would be encouraged at all levels of 
organisation; resources of unions would be pooled and shared at the regional and local 
levels; and that there would be a high degree of consensus and policies would  be binding 
on affiliates.81 Attempts were made to balance central and regional power and Regional 
Councils and Committees, which had jurisdiction over a wide range of regional issues, 
and Locals were provided for.82   
 
The formation of a new federation was not the only shift to take place in the emerging 
union movement. The Cape based unions developed new tactics and drew on the 
community to boycott products in order to strengthen the demands of workers. The 
FCWU’s strike at Fattis and Monis in June 1980 intersected with school boycotts, a bus 
boycott and the community was mobilised to support workers, while the WPGWU 
initiated a meat strike and boycott in May 1980.83 At the same time a new tendency 
emerged in the progressive union movement, predominantly in the Eastern Cape, with the 
formation of South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) that broke from BAWU in 
1979. SAAWU has been described as a ‘community union’ and was not only much more 
overtly political than any of the other emerging unions, but also aimed to take up issues 
beyond the workplace (such as rents and transport) that impacted on workers.84 Rather 
than workers’ control, this union promoted ‘mass participatory democracy’, which meant 
that key decisions were made at mass meetings as opposed to factory departments or the 
workplace.85 This focus on the community and on political issues spread to other part of 
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the country, leading to a split in the UAW’s Cortina branch where the union failed to 
support a strike led by the rank and file to oppose the dismissal of Thozamile Botha, a 
local community leader in PEBCO.   
 
One of the most important issues confronting the workers movement was the publication 
of the Wiehahn Commission’s recommendations in May 1979 and the drafting of the 
government’s white paper and new Industrial Conciliation Bill.86 The Wiehahn 
Commission rejected the dual industrial relations system already in existence, arguing 
that union rights should be extended to African workers.87 The aims of these 
recommendations were made very clear - unregistered trade unions would be brought 
under state control and prevented from becoming political.88 Bonner argues that the 
government, which was under pressure from the homeland governments and hard- line 
apartheid constituencies, did not accept all of the Commission’s recommendations and 
decided to exclude migrants from this dispensation and maintain proscriptions of non-
racial unions.89 
 
The emerging unions were united in their objections to the exclusion of migrants, forcing 
the Minister of Manpower to extend rights to migrants and frontier commuters in 
September 1979, but were deeply divided on other issues surrounding registration.90 
FOSATU rejected the notion that unions would become bureaucratic and incorporated 
under state control if they registered and affiliates decided to register on condition that 
the unacceptable features of the new Industrial Consolidation Act were removed. 
FOSATU affiliates, therefore, would only register if non-racial unions were accepted; 
provisional registration was scrapped; restrictions on the democratic factory floor 
organisation were removed; and registration was granted on a broad industrial basis.91 
FOSATU’s stand on registration would bear fruit and in July 1980 the state granted non-
racial exemptions to six FOSATU affiliates. 92   
 
Much like the 1970s, the early 1980s was characterised by an upsurge in militant worker 
action. This time strike action was concentrated on the East Rand and workers did not 
only demand higher wages, but opposed the government’s new Pensions Bill.93 Unlike 
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the 1970s, these workers were organised and employers and the state had conceded that 
non-racial unions had a right to exist.94 FOSATU operated in a very different context to 
TUACC and workers’ control would adapt to new challenges that confronted  the union 
movement, giving rise to the most notable expressions of the workers’ control tradition in 
the form of large militant shop stewards councils.95  
 
7.7. Conclusion  
Between 1977 and 1978 the TUACC eventually took a position on Inkatha and decided to 
steer clear of entering into alliances that may compromise the autonomy of the workers 
movement. Nevertheless, it was only with the formation of FOSATU that a more 
coherent political position was developed. In addition, talks were held to unite the 
emerging unions and like-minded registered trade unions into a national federation. These 
talks highlighted the different union approaches that had been developed in different 
regions throughout the 1970s. While the Cape unions bowed out of the talks early on, the 
UTP-CCOBTU unions and the TUACC-CIWW confronted each other head on. This 
fuelled much conflict in the Transvaal region and discussions were delayed for some 
time. Even so, TUACC-CIWW and the auto unions, NUMARWOSA and the UAW, 
developed a close relatio nship and were able to mould the core character of the future 
federation. In so doing these bodies drafted a joint submission to the Wiehahn 
Commission. This joint action laid the groundwork for FOSATU’s approach to the 
subsequent labour reforms and informed the federation’s position on registration.  
 
At the end of 1978 the UTP-CCOBTU unions returned to the negotiation table, although 
there were already suggestions that these union would form an alternative federation. The 
democratic practice of the TUACC attracted unionists and workers that were frustrated 
by the unaccountable action of their union secretaries. Consequently, FOSATU was able 
to capture a number of UTP-CCOBTU unions. FOSATU, which was inaugurated in April 
1979, marked the victory of the workers’ control tradition that was initiated by the open 
unions in Natal.             
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Conclusion 
The recent work by Sithole and Ndlovu on trade unions in the 1970s have resuscitated the 
arguments made by SACTU in exile and characterise all the emerging unions, including 
TUACC, as undemocratic and economistic organisations that ‘bordered on the 
reactionary’.1 This study contributes to a growing body of literature that rejects such 
claims and argues that the TUACC was at the forefront of creating a unique 
organisational style that was profoundly democratic and radical in nature and laid the 
foundations for the policies and strategies developed by FOSATU and later COSATU.  
 
One of the key difficulties with Sithole and Ndlovu is that they severely limit the terms of 
debate and prevent a serious engagement with various actors and ideologies that shaped 
the emerging unions. Most importantly, they eclipse the role that ordinary members 
played in building the new unions. Drawing on some of the observations made by 
Buhlungu about the making of a democratic trade union culture in South Africa, this 
stud y maintains that the policies and strategies adopted by the TUACC, which were 
forged in the daily struggles of the unions, were the joint product of workers, who drew 
on their organisational and political traditions, and a diverse layer of activists, who drew 
on a variety of political ideas.  
 
Initiated by student radicals, activists linked to the Congress Movement and unionists 
from sympathetic registered unions, the GFWBF drew on the rising militancy of workers 
in Natal and, from the outset, attracted a relatively large worker base that went on to form 
the new unions under TUACC. Reflecting complex shifts in the labour market, the 
TUACC organised a significant proportion of semi-skilled African women in the NUTW 
and large numbers of unskilled migrants in MAWU and the CWIU. TUACC, which 
created a framework for affiliates to develop a common strategy and pool resources, 
initiated much of the workers’ control tradition and (in sharp contrast to the claims that 
the emerging unions were undemocratic) promoted the creation of non-racial and 
predominately industrial trade unions that were rooted in factory floor organisation and 
controlled by workers through their elected shop stewards.  
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The adoption of this organisational strategy was partly informed by student radicals, who 
were inspired the revolutionary combinations of workers (such as the Paris Commune 
(1871), Italian Factory Councils (1920) and the British shop stewards’ movement 
(1960s)) and believed that trade unions could only become radical if they were workplace 
based organisations that were controlled by workers. They also maintained that broad 
based industrial unions that were united into a national federation could foster interracial 
unity at the workplace and overcome sectoral divisions. Contrary to the arguments made 
by Maree and Friedman, however, student radicals were not solely responsible for the 
creation of democratic shop floor based structures. Largely due to the efforts of SACTU 
affiliates that established factory committees in a variety of industries during the 1950s 
and early 1960s in Natal, there was already a tradition of non-racial and democratic trade 
union organisation in the region. SACTU unionists and workers that were initially 
schooled in SACTU brought these traditions with them.  In addition, particularly migrant 
workers drew on their own democratic traditions of clandestine workplace organisation 
and resistance.     
 
Faced with employer and state hostility as well as a lack of resources, the implementation 
of this organisation strat egy proved difficult. One of the key challenges that the TUACC 
unions had to face, however, was the development of a confident and effective layer of 
worker leaders. African workers, especially migrants, did not have much formal 
education and lacked administrative skills. Many were also not fluent in English, the 
language of business, and did not have the confidence to negotiate with employers. 
Confirming the arguments made by scholars such as Maree and Buhlungu, workers did 
become dependent on more educated unionists as a result. Even so, the power of white 
university trained unionists should not be exaggerated – especially during this formative 
stage when the unions were unable to sustain specialised posts and all unionists were 
drawn into the difficult task of organising workers. Moreover, a working class leadership 
did emerge early on (at the start of the decade). Significantly this leadership included a 
number of competent African women workers, who were usually employed in semi-
skilled positions and who had received more formal education than their migrant 
counterparts.         
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The TUACC unions should also not be dismissed as reformist or reactionary and it is 
necessary to consider the ideas that informed their engagement with employers and the 
state and their fight for industrial legitimacy. Although the apartheid state was repressive, 
unionists believed that the character of the state was determined by the balance of power 
between class forces and, mainly through their struggle for recognition, the TUACC 
unions developed a Gramscian strategy whereby they sought to enter into legally biding 
agreements with employers that ‘…would serve as defensive ramparts for workers in a 
hostile situation, and as platforms for further advances once conditions improved’.2 They 
also attempted to exploit loopholes in the law and use workplace committees and other 
industrial relations structures, which they could only access through sympathetic 
registered unions, to defend the existing rights of workers, gain a foothold in factories 
and advance their struggle for workers’ rights. This strategy was consolidated through 
TUACC’s dealings with NUMARWOSA and the UAW, which demonstrated that strong 
and democratic unions could work within industrial structures without undermining union 
autonomy or democratic shop-floor organisation.     
 
Workers, were very weary of works and liaison committees, which partly accounts for 
TUACC’s initial reluctance to participate in these structures, and proved keen on 
guarding the independence of their organisations, especially from management. At the 
same time, workers feared victimisation from their employers and the state. Most workers 
joined unions to advance their rights and defend their dignity and, along with union 
intellectuals, recognised that the survival of the unions was based on gaining some form 
legitimacy.3 It was partly due to the search for additional protection against employers 
and state repression that workers in TUACC turned to traditional leaders and homeland 
politicians for assistance.  
 
The political position of TUACC is difficult to assess. As many authors note, the TUACC 
unions distanced themselves from banned organisations, mainly to avoid the unions from 
being smashed before they had a chance to consolidate. The failure to enter into a formal 
alliance with the Congress movement did not necessarily mean that the TUACC unions 
were economistic. Authors such as Maree, Webster and Lambert maintain that the unions 
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challenged existing power relations and posed a threat to racial capitalism. In the second 
instance, Friedman argues that the everyday factory struggles and democratic trade union 
structures were political in that they demonstrated that change was possible and gave 
black workers the opportunity to make decisions and the confidence to change their 
world. It can also be added that the notion that workers’ should control their unions also 
implicitly raised broader political questions about workers’ control over society.      
 
Finally, Baskin notes that activists in the unions were motivated by broader political 
concerns. Many unionists, including those linked to SACTU and the Congress 
Movement, maintained that the time had come to rebuild political resistance inside the 
country and that the unions would serve as a battering ram against apartheid. It has also 
been noted that radical white students were influenced by socialist thinkers and called for 
a workers movement that could promote the political and economic interests of workers, 
even after independence was achieved. This does not necessarily mean that white student 
radicals downplayed national liberation, as argued by Buhlungu. Rather, they did not 
want to see the workers’ movement subordinated to cross-class nationalist organisations 
and argued that workers should struggle for national rights on their own terms.  
 
Most socialists, including Anarcho-syndicalists, maintain that militant and democratic 
unions do not automatically give rise to revolutionary consciousness and the political 
ideas of workers in TUACC proved contradic tory. On the one hand, workers were 
instrumental to the creation of a democratic trade union culture predicated on socialist 
notions of workers control. Yet, on the other hand, workers also supported populist 
movements such as Inkatha and did not contest the more autocratic aspects of traditional 
political structures. Union leaders in Natal, however, did not provide a clear political 
alternative and it is only once the TUACC became established on the Witwatersrand that 
a groups of intellectuals articulated a clear political position that was later adopted by 
FOSATU.           
 
One of the key weaknesses of this study is that it does not include the voices of the 
worker members of TUACC and a proper social history of the emerging unions, which 
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takes the views and experiences of ordinary members into account, is still required. 
Nevertheless, this study raises a number of interesting themes that require further 
investigation. Firstly, the transmission of political ideas within the unions needs to be 
examined. How did the union impact on the consciousness of the rank and file and how 
were political ideas spread? Second, generation needs to be considered. The unions 
reflected the emergence of a more politically assertive generation of youth and the role of 
these youth in reviving workers’ organisations need further investigation. There are also 
indications that there were generational differences within the union movement and that 
young workers were at the forefront of creating a militant workers culture. Lastly, 
although this study notes that women workers took up leadership positions, the way in 
which gender relations and identities shaped organisation requires much reflection.    
 
According to van der Linden the ‘New Labour History’ as developed by social historians 
is giving way to ‘Global Labour History’, which questions the nation state as a primary 
unit of analysis and encourages historians to study the working class in a broader 
transnational and transcontinental context.4 Gay Seidman, who compares the labour 
movement it Brazil and South Africa in the 1980s, as well as Sithole and Ndlovu and 
Martin Legassick, who look at the relationship between SACTU in exile and the 
emerging unions, have already started to highlight some international dimensions of the 
emerging unions. There is still much that can be done in this field. The failure of the 
militant labour movements that emerged in the newly industrialised countries (such as 
South Africa, Brazil and Poland) during the 1970s and 1980s to transcend their national 
concerns and create an alternative international movement that broke out of the bounds of 
Cold War politics is of particular interest.           
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